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Abstract
“Community in Solitude”: The Solitary Self, Social Critique, and Utopian Longing
by
Colin S. Macdonald
Advisor: Richard McCoy
This dissertation argues that the discourse of solitude in early modern English literature
was used to construct a fantasy of resistance to political and social corruption and
internecine conflict. Furthermore, the rhetoric of solitude and the positioning of oneself as
an outsider, as “uniquely separate from society,” in Andrew Bennett’s terms, led to the
development of an early modern authorial identity in opposition to the world, opening a
space that allowed social critique and utopian desire to flourish. The notion of disengaged
resistance, or what we might call disengaged engagement, is the key component of the
rhetoric and practice of authorial solitude in the early modern period, derived via Petrarch
and Montaigne. I apply these Petrarchan and Montaignean templates of solitary withdrawal
to early modern England, attempting to move beyond the critical conversation on the
“active life–contemplative life debates.” In English Renaissance literature, the depiction of
a solitary character often acts as a warning against the breaking of traditional bonds,
hierarchies, and social commitments in favor of a rapacious individualism or an emphasis
on distinction. But this alienation is not always portrayed in purely negative terms: indeed,
there is a real attraction and interest in solitariness that tests the limits of obedience and
conformity, opens the possibility of social critique, and posits the construction of an
alternative identity and, consequently, an alternative society.
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“That is why I go into solitude—so as not to drink out of everybody’s cistern. When I am
among the many I live as the many do, and I do not think as I really think; after a time it
always seems as though they want to banish me from myself and rob me of my soul.”
Friedrich Nietzsche, Daybreak

Chapter 1. Introduction: Solitude, Privacy, and Social Critique

Francesco Petrarch and Michel Montaigne, two intellectual and literary Renaissance giants,
were both deeply preoccupied with the issue of solitude: Petrarch in his De vita solitaria,
De otio religioso, and the Secretum, Montaigne in “On Idleness” and “On Solitude,” among
the other Essais that broach the topic. In addition to writing extensively about the subject,
both practiced a form of solitude in their own lives. Petrarch’s solitude was at Vaucluse:
“At mid-career [Petrarch] swore off romantic attachments and became a self-declared
celibate, initially pursuing a reclusive existence at Vaucluse subsequent to a hypothetical
mid-life ‘crisis.’ The years at Vaucluse remained a powerful memory for him throughout
the remainder of his life, a period of contemplative, scholarly activity that he wished to
recreate in different venues even when called to perform other functions as a public
servant.”1 Montaigne’s retreat was in the Dordogne; inscribed on the wall of Montaigne’s
study, in Latin, was the following: “In the year of Christ 1571, at the age of thirty-eight, on
the last day of February, his birthday, Michel de Montaigne, long weary of the service of
the court and public employments, while still entire, retired to the bosom of the learned
virgins, where in calm and freedom from all cares he will spend what little remains of his

1

W. Scott Blanchard, “Petrarch and the Genealogy of Asceticism,” 403.

2
life, now more than half run out. If the fates permit, he will complete this abode, this sweet
ancestral retreat; and he has consecrated to it his freedom, tranquility, and leisure.”2
In their wake, solitude, often conflated with privacy, has been regarded as an
essential component of early modern subjectivity: from architectural developments that
furnished homes with closets or private studies (the so-called Great Rebuilding3), to
Philippe Ariès’s assertion that early modern England was the “birthplace of privacy” and
that in the Middle Ages “nobody was ever left alone,” to Burckhardt-influenced theories
of the rise of individualism and a break from medieval modes of subjectivity concomitant
with mercantile capitalism and centralized power.4 While these theories have been
successfully challenged or revised, especially through studies of material culture, 5 the
question of the ambivalent moral status of solitude in the period, and the motivation behind
praising or invoking it despite the risk of moral censure, remains.
This dissertation will examine the rhetoric of solitude in Tudor-Stuart English
literature, specifically in works by Sidney, Shakespeare, and the Scottish lawyer, novelist,
essayist, and politician George Mackenzie, tracking both Petrarchan and Montaignean
strands of influence as well as the social and intellectual factors that precipitated solitude’s
reemergence as an anxiously debated concept. I will focus on the development of authorial

See Stephen Greenblatt’s introduction to Shakespeare’s Montaigne, ed. Greenblatt and
Platt, x–xi.
3
The term is from W. G. Hoskins’s 1953 article “The Rebuilding of Rural England, 1570–
1640.”
4
Philippe Ariès, “Introduction,” in Roger Chartier (ed.), A History of Private Life, 5; Ariès,
Centuries of Childhood, 398; Jacob Burckhardt, The Civilization of the Renaissance in
Italy; Hugh Grady, Shakespeare and Modernity, 2.
5
See, for example, Lena Orlin, Locating Privacy in Tudor London; Alan Stewart, “The
Early Modern Closet Discovered”; John Jeffries Martin, “The Myth of Renaissance
Individualism.”
2
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identity, and the appropriation of solitude as a fantasy of resistance to political and social
corruption and internecine conflict. This latter iteration of solitude functions paradoxically:
the solitary, even if misanthropic, can represent a communal, utopian impulse, or, through
a depiction of a group of exiles, a community of solitaries forms.
While solitude could, conditionally and with great attenuation, be incorporated into
a humanist framework, fundamentally it represented a direct refutation of the Ciceronian
ethos, derived from De officiis, that dominated elite English culture in the period. Given its
connections to satire and world-weary discontent with politics, reflections on solitude—if
not the actual practice of it—are linked with both political critique and ethical self-conflict
and self-division, with increasingly psychologized depictions that complicate and subvert
the period’s myriad warnings against aloneness (e.g., Burton’s Anatomy and Donne’s
Devotions),6 where the solitary is diseased, in some cases even nonhuman. The rhetorical
rehabilitation of solitude, however tentative, paradoxical, and ultimately unsuccessful in
the early modern period, opens up new avenues in literary explorations of identity and the
conflicts between social participation and withdrawal; interestingly, in contemporary
society the issue is once again at the forefront, where notions of solitude or privacy seem
increasingly obsolete. While solitude can function as a potential escape from mass culture
and “technoconsumerism,” it also presents dangers in the despair, disconnectedness, or
egoism of existential solitude. Further, has the experience of solitude been lost or is it,
rather, pervasive, due to the atomization that results from virtual connectedness?

6

For Burton, in Anatomy of Melancholy, isolation leads to extreme inactivity and,
ultimately, to death: “Be not solitary, be not idle,” Burton writes. Quoted in Brian Vickers
(ed.), Public and Private Life in the Seventeenth Century, xviii.
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Architecture, Material Culture, and the Performance of Privacy
One of the foundational studies positing an increased sense of privacy in the early modern
period, which has driven narratives of a widespread acceptance and even celebration of
solitude and individualism in the Renaissance, is W. G. Hoskins’s “The Rebuilding of
Rural England, 1570–1640.” Hoskins argues that

we must look for the cause of the Great Rebuilding in the filtering down to the mass
of the population … of a sense of privacy that had formerly been enjoyed only by
the upper classes. Privacy demands more rooms, devoted to specialised uses: so we
get in the Elizabethan yeoman’s house the kitchen, the buttery, the best parlour, two
or three separate bedrooms, the servants’ chamber, besides the truncated medieval
hall shorn of many of its functions…. Lewis Mumford is right when he says that
“the first radical change, which was to destroy the form of the medieval dwelling
house, was the development of a sense of privacy,” and hence the notion that …
there should be more rooms: smaller rooms perhaps, but each devoted to a
specialised use, representing a withdrawal from the common life.7

Lena Orlin tries to complicate this narrative of progressive acceptance of privacy/solitude
in the early modern period, and a big part of this lies in addressing the Great Rebuilding—
“the transformation of domestic interiors that were to have their most celebrated expression

Hoskins, “The Rebuilding of Rural England,” 54. For Mark Girouard, “The idea that there
was no privacy in a mediaeval house is based on a total misreading of the mediaeval plan.
There was little privacy from personal servants, but a great deal of privacy from everyone
else.” Girouard, Life in the English Country House, 54.
7
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in the closet or study.”8 Orlin thinks the account is told in a too linear way and too much
“as a story of steady and deliberate progress.”9 Furthermore, she disagrees that the desire
for privacy was the dominant motivation for changes in architecture that facilitated a move
away from the great hall and added more rooms, especially closets. Rather, she offers a
material explanation—closets replaced chests as a means of storage of materials and
commodities, and weren’t necessarily locations of solitude, withdrawal, or isolation. Orlin
also argues that “the pursuit of privacy was inherently suspicious” in early modern
England, not something that was celebrated, as it was tied in with issues of secrecy and
surveillance.10
Her compelling argument that closets replaced chests and thus were for securing
possessions and not for romanticized isolation doesn’t entirely militate against the closet
as a space of solitude and withdrawal, even if she tries to minimize this interpretation: Orlin
writes of “accidental privacy,” when someone had a closet for the original purpose of
storing materials, but, through an examination of a household inventory, we see that writing
instruments were among the possessions in a closet: “In this room meant for objects … an
early occupant had perhaps discovered the subjectivity that we associate with
authorship.”11 So while the building of such rooms might not have been motivated solely
by privacy/solitude, withdrawal from others and the development of a new kind of literary
self may have emerged, in part, through them.

8

Orlin, Locating Privacy, 3.
Ibid., 4.
10
Ibid., 7.
11
Ibid., 8.
9
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Privacy, as with solitude, remains both sought after and suspicious, elevated and
degraded: “Privacy inspired an uneasy mixture of desire and distrust. There are countless
instances of individuals actively seeking privacy,” but also communal resistance to that
privacy.12 Society tried to organize itself around preventing privacy, Orlin argues, and thus
the story is more equivocal than many recognize, and less the linear development of a
cherished “modern” value. Orlin echoes Katharine Eisaman Maus in arguing for the
necessity in England at this time for some kind of interior space and privacy due to the
trauma and conflicts of rapid religious changes—at certain points, every person had to have
a “private conscience.”13
For Orlin, privacy and solitude were not widespread objects of desire, even after
the vogue for closets and other supposedly private rooms: “To test the prevailing
associations of space and solitude is to revisit the Great Rebuilding a last time … and to
argue that the Tudor closet had its genesis in the accumulation of valuable goods rather
than an aspiration for personal privacy.”14 However, what emerges throughout her welldocumented argument is that the evidence shows that closets had the latter effect
(“aspiration for personal privacy”) even as she insists their design had other, unrelated
motivations. The closet was for “safe storage,” even if was referred to as a “study,” and
“its nature was betrayed by the first of its names: it was a room that was closed (and
secured), even during daylight hours…. The medieval practice had been to stow valuables
in chests” but the “impact of early modern goods” meant more space was needed.15 Orlin

12

Ibid., 10.
Ibid. See Maus, Inwardness and Theater in the English Renaissance.
14
Orlin, Locating Privacy, 299.
15
Ibid., 301.
13
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cites Dora Thornton’s point “that even the Italian studiolo was ‘social’ as well as
private”16—the key here being “as well as”: even as she expands the definition and function
of small rooms in this period, there is still a solitary, private function, and one explicitly
tied to literary production and letters. For example, she looks at inventories of closets at
Boughton Monchelsea Place: books such as Foxe and Chaucer are listed in these
inventories, and they don’t seem to be places of commodity storage only (though Orlin
claims that “by tradition, inventories did not include fixtures and fittings”).17 She notes a
“standish … an implement containing ink, pens, and other scribal accoutrements.” And so,
this “privacy could have been the kind history has always valued highly: that which
manifests itself in a subjectivity made accessible to us through its articulation in
authorship.”18
In closing, Orlin’s argument seems to have reoriented itself toward affirming the
closet as a solitary space, even if only rhetorically or as a fantasy: solitude and secrecy
could carry “the stigma of sinister intent,” but “the closet achieved a focused meaning in
common culture as a space of solitude.”19 But then, she concludes, solitude was less a
reality than a rhetorical strategy, and privacy more of a mental life than a material one. 20
Ronald Huebert, in his recent Privacy in the Age of Shakespeare, has pushed back against
Orlin’s argument to a certain degree, via a remark he attributes to John Harington in the
Prayse of Private Life (ca. 1605), a devotional work based largely on Petrarch’s De vita
solitaria: “Whereunto he addeth, in howe great pleasure and securitie are they that live a

16

Ibid., 316. See Dora Thornton, The Scholar in His Study, 175.
Orlin, Locating Privacy, 320.
18
Ibid., 321.
19
Ibid., 324.
20
Ibid., 325.
17
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private life.”21 For Huebert, this comment demonstrates “the coming into positivity of the
idea of privacy”: “The word ‘private’ is doing work for Harington that it was not called
upon to do in his source material. Indeed, there is a sense in which Harington has
deliberately replaced Petrarch’s ‘solitaria’ with the partly overlapping but not entirely
synonymous ‘private.’”22
Huebert wants to challenge what he calls the “prevailing critical orthodoxy” that
there was “no such thing as the private in early modern culture” or that “privacy did not
matter to Shakespeare’s contemporaries.”23 Further, he directly challenges Orlin’s
argument: “The virtues of Orlin’s book are ample, but her treatment of the question of
privacy is not one of them. She has no coherent position on privacy, except a desire to deny
that it really made much of a difference in the sixteenth century, and an eagerness to refute
claims that privacy was an emergent and growing concern for the inhabitants of London
during this period.”24 While Orlin’s work is subject to a certain slippage—denying the use
of the closet as a private, authorial space even while discovering evidence for just that, for
example—Huebert overstates the case, as well as exaggerating the “critical orthodoxy,”
which is more nuanced than stating there was “no such thing” as privacy in the early
modern period. But his works helps to reform a narrative in which solitude/privacy25 gains

21

Huebert, Privacy in the Age of Shakespeare, 4. The Prayse was for a long time thought
to be by Sir John Harington, but it now seems more likely that Samuel Daniel was the
author: see John Pitcher, “Margaret, Countess of Cumberland’s The Prayse of Private Life,
Presented by Samuel Daniel,” in In the Prayse of Writing, ed. Cerasano and May, 114–44.
Huebert does not mention Daniel, treating Harington as the author and even using
biographical details from Harington’s life to interpret the work.
22
Huebert, Privacy in the Age of Shakespeare, 5.
23
Ibid., 6–7.
24
Ibid., 7.
25
Huebert attempts, with mixed success, to distinguish between privacy and solitude; for
example, he speaks of “being alone together” as a form of privacy, and states that “privacy
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cultural and intellectual acceptance, without the overly teleological arguments implied in
the Great Rebuilding narratives, though sometimes his language falls into that mode:
“Generally speaking, there is a progression from suspicion of or hostility to privacy in the
earlier texts to acceptance and even a cherishing of privacy in the later ones.”26
Alan Stewart has made an important argument in his “The Early Modern Closet
Discovered” that complicates Huebert’s narrative, as well as Mark Girouard’s contention
that the closet was “perhaps the only room in which its occupant could be entirely on his
own.”27 For Stewart, drawing from a 1623 treatise by Bishop Joseph Hall and from a 1990
book by Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Epistemology of the Closet, the closet is an
intersubjective space: “In this paper,” Stewart writes, “I shall argue that the crisis of the
epistemology of the closet in the early 1990s is inherent to and prefigured in the closet as
architectural reality … in sixteenth-century England…. The early modern closet … is often
associated with the construction of a new modern subjectivity. Yet I shall show that the
epistemology of the Early Modern closet—and by extension, our contemporary closets—
demands an analysis that rejects the search for the secret subject in favor of an interrogation
of secret spaces and relationships.”28 Stewart does not accept the notion of the private self
or the private closet. After quoting extensively from fifteenth-century Italian texts
testifying to the development of the closet or studiolo, Stewart claims these are “topos” or

[unlike solitude] can be shared with other persons”: see ibid., 13, 16. However, as will be
seen below in my discussion of Petrarch’s De vita solitaria, solitude is something that,
paradoxically, can be shared, and does not always require absolute physical isolation.
26
Ibid., 23.
27
Girouard, Life in the English Country House, 56.
28
Stewart, “The Early Modern Closet,” 77.
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“social myth[s] functioning in a particular way,” not “absolute truth” or “unmediated
account[s] of household practice.”29
Alice T. Friedman, Stewart writes, “has indicated [in House and Household in
Elizabethan England] a number of architectural innovations over the century that affected
the lives of the inhabitants…. Small rooms known as closets appeared all over large
houses—or indeed did not appear: they could often be secreted within massive interior
walls, in ‘false’ chimney stacks, in the center of the house, or in high basements.” 30 As
mentioned, Stewart takes issue with Girouard’s account of the closet’s “utter privacy”:
“This insistence on the closet as a private space—the notion that still obtains in its lesbian
and gay appropriations—effectively collapses the ‘private’ nature of what went on in the
closet with a supposed nonsocial, individual inhabitant.”31 Stewart draws on Patricia
Fumerton’s work, arguing that “Elizabethans habitually represented ‘private experience as
inescapably public.’ The subject lived in ‘public view but always withheld for itself a
“secret” room, cabinet, case, or other recess locked away (in full view) in one corner of the
house.32’” Thus, Elizabethan privacy was public, or “privacy exhibited in public”—in other
words, performative. For example, consider the ambivalence of Margaret Hoby’s privacy
from her “so-called ‘diary’”: it is not only that sometimes her bedchamber and closet serve
similar functions, but also “Stewart … emphasizes an entry for February 1600: ‘To my
closet, where I prayed and writ some thing for mine own private conscience.’ The thing
she recorded was too private for the journal that has survived.”33 Ultimately, “The closet

29

Ibid., 79.
Ibid., 80.
31
Ibid., 81.
32
Ibid.
33
Orlin, Locating Privacy, 314.
30

11
is thus constructed as a place of utter privacy, of total withdrawal from the public sphere
of the household—but it simultaneously functions as a very public gesture of withdrawal,
a very public sign of privacy.”34 The closet becomes a figure of speech: it is not a site of
“individual withdrawal, but … a secret nonpublic transactive space.”35 It is, however,
important to keep in mind here that solitude in early modern England was not only a state
of literal physical isolation or aloneness. Furthermore, the term most often used was
solitariness; Janette Dillon, trying to convey the nuances and flexibility of the definition
of solitariness in Elizabethan England, writes: “Self-love, detachment, a contemplative
bent, a sense of individual superiority, a cultivation of distinctiveness, any anti-social or
even simply asocial behavior, might be seen by the Elizabethans as a form of solitude.”36
There is something inherently performative about solitariness—whether a literal isolation,
a public display of solitude, a solitude a deux, an exiled community, an emphasis on
distinction, or a purely rhetorical tool.

Equivocal Solitude: Major Scholarly Narratives on the
Cultural Acceptance of Solitariness
There are two competing scholarly frameworks relating to solitariness and its perception
in elite culture of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The first narrative, the most
sustained account of which is found in Janette Dillon’s Shakespeare and the Solitary Man,
posits a progression in the early modern period from outright rejection of solitude to
uncritical, even fashionable, embrace of solitude (or retirement), following a transitional

Stewart, “The Early Modern Closet,” 81 (italics in original).
Ibid., 83.
36
Dillon, Shakespeare and the Solitary Man, xi.
34
35
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period of high uncertainty, ambivalence, and moral stigma. The Renaissance development
of attitudes toward solitariness follows the Greek and Roman paradigm “from idealisation
of the state and the individual’s duty to the common good to the expression of a desire for
solitude and an emphasis on the private, inner world of the individual.”37 As Jacob Zeitlin,
an early twentieth-century Petrarch scholar, has argued, the Aristotelian legacy on the
contemplative life is highly contradictory: Aristotle, who famously defined man as a social
animal, seems to agree with Plato that the good of the state and service to the state comes
before the individual, and thus discourages periods of solitary contemplation. However,
Aristotle “uses language which sounds as though he were placing the supreme happiness
of the individual in detachment from ordinary affairs. Since reason, he argues, is the highest
part of man, contemplation is his highest activity … ‘and it is admitted that there is no
virtuous activity so pleasant as the activity of wisdom or philosophic reflection.’”38 Stoic
thought eventually reacted against the ostensible Athenian ideal of the public life, with
Seneca an especially important figure for early modern England: “Participation in the state,
an ideal which united pleasure with duty for Aristotle, became more clearly a duty alone
in Seneca, one which conflicted with the personal desire for solitude in which to cultivate
the inner life,” and thus Seneca foreshadows Petrarch and early modern English writers.39
In this narrative, the subsequent medieval framing of solitude makes only religious
solitariness permissible. The medieval individual is not defined from within, but in relation
to society, thus secular isolation is a state to be decried or pitied. It is in the later sixteenthcentury in England (and here Petrarch is a couple hundred years ahead of the game) that

37

Ibid., 3.
Zeitlin (ed.), The Life of Solitude, 28.
39
Dillon, Shakespeare and the Solitary Man, 4.
38
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the perceived turn inward allows for new consideration of secular solitariness and
introspection. Dillon posits a transitional period between 1570 and 1630 and uses
Shakespeare’s corpus to track part of that period: Hamlet emerges as a crucial figure,
someone whose profound solitariness, unlike Richard III, for example, is not a sign of
villainy. In Shakespeare’s sonnets, the frequent repetition of the word “self” demonstrates
the new role of this word as an “autonomous noun,” not merely “an element of reflexive
pronoun.”40 Here, again, solitariness is inextricably linked to a narrative of modern
subjectivity, of inwardness, located in literary terms in Petrarch, Montaigne, and
Shakespeare. The attitudes are still equivocal during this period, but progressing toward a
cult of solitude that at first challenges traditional notions but eventually becomes
normalized in the mid-seventeenth-century lyrics of Marvell and others, often depicting a
“mower” or rustic.41 No longer fraught with anxiety over amorality, leisurely
contemplation in solitude becomes a mark of a gentleman or scholar.
Brian Vickers rejects the paradigm articulated above and argues that the negative
connotations of solitariness (included in Vickers’s account under the rubric otium) remain
predominant throughout the early modern period. Vickers seeks to act as a corrective to
modern accounts that give the impression that otium “was an unqualified good,” especially
in seventeenth-century poetry.42 For example, in “The Garden” (ca. 1650–52), the speaker
of Marvell’s poem rejects the public, political world in favor of solitary pleasures in a green
world, claiming that Adam’s state before Eve was the truly enviable one: “But ‘twas
beyond a mortal’s share / To wander solitary there: / Two paradises ‘twere in one / To live

40

Ibid., 77.
Ibid., 24.
42
Vickers, “Leisure and Idleness in the Renaissance,” 1.
41
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in paradise alone” (lines 61–64). Many twentieth-century critics, conflating Marvell with
the poem’s speaker, have viewed the poem as a traditional expression of Horatian leisure
and retirement, an endorsement of the contemplative life. Some, however, like Vickers,
argue that this reading misses the severe negative implications of solitude/retirement in
seventeenth-century poetry: “The persona in ‘The Garden’ … is guilty of hedonism,
selfishness and the arrogant rejection of God’s will. His otium is anything but admirable.”43
Moral censure of solitude continues to be the dominant ideological mode of early modern
culture and literature, with occasional voices sounding discordant notes by thinking about
solitude in less didactic or moralizing terms.
Vickers then reinterprets the Petrarchan legacy of solitude. Vickers sees the
negative implications of otium present even in Petrarch, who is usually accepted as a
champion of the contemplative life. The life of intellectual seclusion could easily be drawn
in contrast to a life of virtuous action, leading to charges of “idleness” or “luxury”; and a
distinction is made between otium negotiosum, “leisure with a satisfying occupation,” and
otium otiosum, “unoccupied and pointless leisure.”44 And for Petrarch himself there were
two distinct forms of otium: “One is busy, which even in very rest is doing somewhat, and
busie about honest affayres, and this is very sweete: The other is slouthful and idle, and
geven onely to sluggyhnes, than which there is nothyng more loathsome, or more lyke to
the grave.”45 In the mock dialogue with Augustine, Petrarch scolds himself for the mistakes
he made as a result of loving Laura. He confesses to having not, as a young man, pursued

43

Ibid., 1–3, quotation on 3. Cf. Dillon, Shakespeare and the Solitary Man, 23, who argues
that the trope of rural retreat in the mid- and late seventeenth century represents a “growing
fashion for solitude,” or a “changing morality.”
44
Vickers, “Leisure and Idleness in the Renaissance,” 5–6.
45
Ibid., 115.
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the difficult path to virtue, opting for “sensual desires” instead; and he suffered a
“melancholy love for being alone, avoiding all our fellow-men,” as Augustine implores
him to “avoid solitude.”46 However, we shouldn’t neglect Petrarch’s actual practice of
solitude, mentioned above. Dillon is certainly right to trace an increased interest in solitude
and privacy from the late Elizabethan period, culminating in a faddish, reified, and
“monied” form of “leisure” in the Restoration;47 though Vickers’s skepticism toward the
actual cultural acceptance of solitude is a helpful corrective against the tendency to see
unabashed celebration of the individual in isolation.

Petrarch and Montaigne
De vita solitaria asks whether an individual has the right “to absolve himself from all social
claims.”48 Of course, Petrarch voluminously described his desire for solitude while at the
same time being “the most politically connected intellectual of his century.” 49 He did
cultivate a solitary life at Vaucluse during personal crisis in the 1340s, but his task of
praising and defending that solitude had to surmount notable classical authorities arguing
against it, including Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero.50 Nor, in Petrarch’s ongoing attempt to
reconcile the Christian and the pagan, did the early church fathers present him with a more

46

Ibid., 114.
Dillon, Shakespeare and the Solitary Man, xiv.
48
Jacob Zeitlin (ed.), The Life of Solitude, 25. References to Petrarch’s text are from this
edition and are given parenthetically.
49
W. Scott Blanchard, “Petrarch and the Genealogy of Asceticism,” 401.
50
Seneca is an oft-cited exception: see Seneca, “On Leisure,” where he defends
solitude/withdrawal on Stoic grounds, though insisting that it can only be justified if it
promotes the greater good.
47
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favorable precedent in glorifying solitude: while there is importance in a life leading to
God through contemplation, there are also works and duties to be performed.51
Petrarch’s De vita has a strong satirical element to it, relying on a conventional
dichotomy of contrasting city and rural life: he views city life as one of corruption and
venality and lechery—ironically, an alienated, solitary existence, despite being surrounded
by crowds; the “retired” man, on the other hand, is not weighed down by the bondage of
business, money, the need to connive or scheme, and so forth. The liberation from these
concerns is explicitly tied to nature, specifically the image of entering the woods. In the
city, the emphasis is on needless decadence, which doesn’t breed happiness, but rather
surfeit and anxiety. Petrarch claims to be appalled at seeing servants who shiver in their
nakedness while their masters eat from silver vessels wrought with gold (112–13). This is
contrasted to the solitary man who at most will have one servant, and who finds beauty in
nature. This is a picture of a solitude of tranquility and contentment, not the tortured
solitude of the unrequited love of the Canzoniere. Happiness comes from the “inward
possession of truth” (128).
Petrarch differs from Cicero (a difference that produces a deep sense of anxiety):
the more noble character, Cicero contends, prefers the life of service to solitude. But,
Petrarch says (and this is a point that Montaigne strongly echoes), service is simply a veil
for ambition, and is fruitful only in theory (125–26). Petrarch is also forced to disagree
with Seneca: unlike the Stoics, Petrarch believes that place matters in pursuit of solitude—
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in other words, solitude is not just a state of mind, but physical retirement to a rural setting
or at least a private room or closet is necessary.
Petrarch establishes an inherent and vital connection between solitude and
literature: “For there are some for whom the life of solitude is more grievous than death …
and this will happen particularly with persons who have no acquaintance with literature….
And indeed isolation without literature is exile, prison, and torture: supply literature and it
becomes your country, freedom, and delight. ‘What is sweeter than lettered ease?’ is a well
known saying of Cicero. Not less familiar is Seneca’s sentence, ‘Leisure without study is
death’” (131). Over and over, solitude is expressly linked with books, writing, and
literature.
This point, as so many others do as well, puts Petrarch on the defensive: “I am not
unaware that I shall be violently attacked at this point by those who think solitude is
unfavorable to literature and the virtuous life” (154). Again, this anxiety is dealt with by
trying to reconcile his views with the classical masters: while discussing Quintilian,
Petrarch notes that although he agrees “with me in saying that a private and secluded spot
and the deepest silence are particularly suitable for writers and declares that no one disputes
it,” he does not think that groves and woods are proper places for study. For Quintilian,
such solitude seems more suited to pleasure than rigorous literary exertion. Petrarch then
evokes the importance of solitude in a private chamber, or closet (what Petrarch calls “the
secret chamber” [157]): both nature and the closet are solitary, and “I do not require that
students should write their books in the woods or mountains, but I permit them to withdraw
their minds, after refreshing them with the sight of these, to some silent and concealed
recess” (156).
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A crucial aspect of Petrarch’s definition of solitude, however, paradoxically
involves sociality, and Petrarch evokes the idea of a communal solitude of those who have
chosen an exile of sorts from the public world. In discussing Seneca’s promotion of
solitude, Petrarch notes that it is rather extreme, since Petrarch advocates fleeing from
crowds, not necessarily from friends. For Seneca, “avoid even the individual”: “I confess
Seneca, you have me there and weigh me down with your authority,” he writes. But then
he pivots to Cicero and his views on the importance, almost the transcendent importance,
of friendship (163). Despite Cicero’s firmly anti-solitude position, Petrarch is able to use
Cicero on friendship to defend this vein of communal solitude. Petrarch concludes that
nature is averse to complete solitariness: “It will never be my view that solitude is disturbed
by the presence of a friend, but that it is enriched…. And so in embracing solitude I do not
reject friendship, and I do not fly from any individual unless he be of the sort whose
character I should shun in cities also…. The whole matter then comes to this, that I would
share my solitude like everything else with my friends, believing that Seneca spoke with
true humanity when he said that ‘no good thing is pleasant to possess without friends to
share it,’ and being assured that solitude is a great and sweet possession” (165).
Despite the flexibility and even sociability in Petrarch’s solitude, he articulates a
form of lay asceticism that is textually based and can be conceived as an act of political
and cultural resistance: solitude as a paradoxical form of ethical engagement, critique, and
resistance is a key thread that runs through all the texts examined in this dissertation. W.
Scott Blanchard has made this point regarding Petrarch’s form of asceticism in the De vita,
which is worth quoting at length:
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Conceived in this manner, asceticism becomes a withdrawal not so much away
from the world … as a flight into the text. Indeed, flight into the text, or into one’s
contemplative study, becomes for writers and intellectuals like Petrarch an act of
resistance; literacy’s capacity for empowerment (in the world) is thus paradoxically
linked to a movement away from the world and its competing interests, a movement
by which the practicing ascetic/intellectual withdraws from close affiliation with
worldly formations of power, much in the manner that the traditional ascetic
withdraws from “the world” in its material manifestations…. Contemplative
withdrawal, as an act of disaffiliation, can thus amount to an act of political
resistance rather than a stance of quietism, since its flight away from worldly
activity may increase the propensity for textual activity and for the kind of
intellectual concentration, argumentation, and research necessary for challenging
the legitimacy of orthodox structures of authority.52

Demetrio Yocum makes a similar argument for Petrarch’s other major work on solitude,
the De otio religioso, where ascesis, “far from representing an idealized withdrawal from
engagement in the world … is a technique employed by Petrarch to construct his own ideal
of the public intellectual, disengaged and resistant to structures of coercive authority and
power.”53 This notion of disengaged resistance, or what we might call disengaged
engagement, is the key component of the rhetoric and practice of authorial solitude in the
early modern period, consistent despite the shifting political, religious, and cultural forces
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being engaged and critiqued across time and place. As Blanchard writes, “In Petrarch the
desire for autonomy is experienced as a centripetal pull inwards that does not enforce a
political quietism upon him, but rather enables a persistent critique of the contaminating
powers of the world.”54
Petrarch’s treatises on solitude stumble when he tries to justify them in terms of
conventional morality: in De otio religioso he attempts to define an active leisure by which
withdrawal is not rendered idle or inefficacious, but morally purposeful;55 however, it is
his own self-reported failure to live up to this ideal that undermines his entire moral
argument in favor of solitude. How does his all-consuming, solitary, and tortured love for
Laura, enacted in the Canzoniere, conform to otium negotiosum, “leisure with a satisfying
occupation,” or the commonplace that literature should “support moral values in
society”?56 In Petrarch’s Secretum, he is upbraided for his solitary life, as Augustine
implores him to “avoid solitude.”57 And so even the supposed champion of secular solitude
becomes ensnared in its contradictions.
It is, of course, anachronistic to refer to the solitude that Petrarch articulates as
secular, as it appropriates elements of medieval monasticism. But it also departs from the
monastic-ascetic framework in its Epicurean drift and its articulation of at least a secular
possibility. The first sentence of De vita solitaria embodies this tension: “I believe that a
noble spirit will never find repose save in God … or in himself and his private thoughts.”58
The “or” opens up a new realm in the articulation of solitude. For Montaigne, as recounted
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in “On Idleness,” his entire project of the Essais was essentially an attempt to structure his
neurotic solitude:

Recently I retired to my estates, determined to devote myself as far as I could to
spending what little life I have left quietly and privately; it seemed to me then that
the greatest favour I could do for my mind was to leave it in total idleness, caring
for itself, concerned only with itself, calmly thinking of itself…. But I find … that
on the contrary it bolted off like a runaway horse, taking far more trouble over itself
than it ever did over anyone else; it gives birth to so many chimeras and fantastic
monstrosities, one after another, without order or fitness, that, so as to contemplate
at my ease their oddness and their strangeness, I began to keep a record of them,
hoping in time to make my mind ashamed of itself.59

Before his retirement, which was enabled by his being independently wealthy and was
motivated in part by the death of his friend La Boétie, Montaigne had been very active in
public life as France was “in the grip of profound tensions between Catholics and
Protestants that would eventually erupt into full-scale massacre and civil war.”60 But it is
important to note, as with Petrarch, that he continued to be engaged even while in supposed
solitude or a state of retired withdrawal: “He tried unsuccessfully, after the Saint
Bartholomew’s Day massacre in 1572, to mediate between the Catholic Henri de Guise
and the Protestant Henri de Navarre; he served two two-year terms as the mayor of
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Bordeaux; he acted as an informal, confidential adviser to successive kings and to
important men and women in the court. He took part in the siege by Catholic forces of the
Protestant stronghold of La Fère; he was arrested in Paris in 1588 on order of the Catholic
League and then quickly released; constantly attempting to moderate murderous religious
passions, he was distrusted and attacked by zealots on both sides. And in the midst of these
public affairs, he continued to manage his large, complex estate.”61 So what was the
importance of solitude for Montaigne?
In “On Solitude,” he writes that Man should “set aside a room, just for ourselves,
at the back of the shop, keeping it entirely free and establishing there our true liberty, our
principal solitude and asylum. Within it our normal conversation should be of ourselves,
with ourselves, so privy that no commerce or communication with the outside world should
find a place there…. We have a soul able to turn in on herself; she can keep herself
company; she has the wherewithal to attack, to defend, to receive and to give. Let us not
fear that in such a solitude as that we shall be crouching in painful idleness.”62 Montaigne’s
injunction to “withdraw into yourself” in his essay “On Solitude” becomes an emblem for
his life’s work: if the world is a “deceptive theater,” then “Montaigne feels the need to
create a private place for himself at a distance from the world…. To have secured the
possibility of occupying his own private territory … of withdrawing at any moment into
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absolute solitude,” a “choice of identity in conscious opposition to the world.”63
As Montaigne repeatedly makes clear, his ideal solitude, which necessitates not
merely physical apartness but a mindset that puts aside things outside the self, is in direct
opposition to a Ciceronian approach—which he associates with glory, fame, and greed—
and even to Ciceronian solitude, which he labels “a ridiculous contradiction.”64 Yet
Cicero’s ideal of the orator forms “the ideal of the English gentleman … as the cultivated
man of affairs,” the ideological basis of the humanist-educated governing class.65 In his
letter to Edward Denny recommending the books an educated man should read, Philip
Sidney—the “Scipio, Cicero and Petrarch of our time,” according to Sir Walter Ralegh66—
placed Cicero second only to the Bible. And yet Sidney, writing to his mentor, the
Protestant humanist Hubert Languet, echoes Montaigne’s sentiment of a turn inward when
replying to one of Languet’s many exhortations to avoid solitude: “For while the mind is
thus, as it were, drawn out of itself, it cannot turn its keen sight inward to examine itself
thoroughly, a task to which no other that men can undertake may be compared.”67
Whether “detached from explicitly religious content”68 or imbued with a Protestant
ethos, why the Montaignean inheritance of a self-conscious turn inward and its necessary
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solitude was so conflicted in Elizabethan and Jacobean England is one question this
dissertation will address. But while solitude is intimately connected to the discussion of
inwardness, it can also be focused on outwardness, on a performative or affected display.
The solitary character is often parodied for his excesses, for “fashioning” solitude, but also
often endowed with superior critical thinking, which is deployed to critique the other
characters and the society they inhabit.

In English Renaissance literature, the depiction of a solitary character often acts as a
warning against the breaking of traditional bonds, hierarchies, and social commitments in
favor of a rapacious individualism or an emphasis on distinction. When his mother pleads
with Coriolanus to spare his birthplace and he responds, “out, affection! / All bond and
privilege of nature break” (5.3.24–25), he refers to the bond that differentiates man from
beast, famously formulated by Aristotle: “He who is unable to live in society, or who has
no need because he is sufficient in himself, must be either a beast or a god.”69 But the fears
of social breakdown that solitude represents coexist in some cases with exciting
possibilities: the possibility of a new self that is not determined by preexisting social
strictures or commitments, an ambivalent fantasy of liberation and self-determination
through the cultivation of an inner life. The change from the medieval, then, is not the
Renaissance inauguration of a modern self, the development of inwardness, or an
awakening of autonomous individuality in lieu of communal, corporate identity; it is,
rather, an attempt at refashioning and re-appropriating solitude, which in previous literature
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functions largely as a “tragic predicament.”70 In this space of actual or conceptual solitude,
we find satirical, experimental, and increasingly psychological explorations of self and
society, explorations that “subject humanism to … irony and critique” and “interrogate
cultural commonplaces and affirm alternative identities.”71
The term prevalent in England from 1575–1700, as noted above, was solitariness,
not solitude; solitariness had a range of meanings and implications and could connote “selfenclosed inwardness” as well as “physical isolation.”72 Despite critical narratives to the
contrary, the concept of solitude remains fraught with anxiety and moral dubiousness
throughout the period, only achieving valorization with Rousseau and the Romantics.73
While Hamlet may stand as a turning point, an inauguration of a Montaignean
subjectivity,74 its depiction of the prince’s solitude, while not as a mark of villainy, is still
ambivalent. The same ambivalence can be found in Shakespeare’s Elizabethan
predecessors—particularly in Sidney’s Arcadia and other prodigal-son prose romances75—
and in his Jacobean contemporaries, such as Webster’s solitary villain-satirists. Solitary
characters in the period tend to be contemplative (anti)heroes, lovers, monsters, satirists,
or misanthropes, who dissect social foibles and contradictions in often scathing terms, who
win reader/audience affection through daring rhetorical flights or by allowing access to
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their inward musings, but who remain, at best, liminal figures, not integrated into the
society depicted. But this alienation is not always portrayed in purely negative terms.
Whether it’s the solitariness that Pyrocles (Arcadia) seeks away from court in love and
pastoral adventure, or the tortured, metaphysical solitariness of Hamlet struggling against
political obligations, there is a real attraction and interest in solitariness that tests the limits
of obedience and conformity, opens the possibility of social critique, and posits the
construction of an alternative identity and, consequently, an alternative society.

Solitude as Social Critique and Utopian Yearning
One of the arguments of this dissertation is that solitude fosters and enables social critique,
particularly of customs that otherwise seem ingrained and natural, such as hierarchy or
sovereignty, and that such critique, even coming through misanthropic characters, reflects
a desire, sometimes naïve, sometimes nuanced and complex, for alternative forms of social
organization and human relations that we can broadly call utopian. I will illustrate this point
now through a reading of Hamlet as a reaction to political and social corruption.
Political corruption was a pervasive fear and anxiety in late Elizabethan and
Jacobean England.76 While the prevailing elite ethos remained the vita activa, supposedly
virtuous participation in the business of the state, many “believed that the world they
inhabited was in decline, that it had abandoned virtue and given itself over to the
treacherous politics of the court. The wars of religion had eroded the notion of a common
good; Europeans increasingly abandoned humanist teaching that emphasised virtuous
action undertaken for the common good and they sought the wisdom of Tacitus and Seneca
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and their recent interpreters, including Lipsius and Montaigne, as guides to how to survive
in a world abandoned by virtue.”77 The most salient and radical form of critique of
corruption was to embrace supposedly amoral solitude—to refuse participation in a
diseased and debauched state. Solitude is thus often specifically tied not only to critiques
of the court, but of sovereignty itself.
Turning to Hamlet, we see a prime example of solitariness as a response to political
and social corruption: corruption makes solitude a virtue, an ethical position, though
Hamlet’s problem is the realization of how tied his self-understanding is to his public role,
to the workings of institutions. Furthermore, what begins as a critique of the Danish court
becomes a much more fundamental critique of social relations and hierarchy, emphasizing
why the solitary/private self was seen with such suspicion: it encouraged this kind of
deconstruction of custom, of the norms of the social order. Solitude involves more than
abstention—it involves a difficult renegotiating of one’s identity. As Andrew Fitzmaurice
has written in “The Corruption of Hamlet,” while criticism of Hamlet has focused on
notions of emergent subjectivity, it is very much a play about responding to political
corruption, with Claudius’s Denmark standing in for post-republican Rome: “The audience
could only draw the conclusion that this play is a chronicle of a kingdom that has passed
from a state of republican-like virtue to imperial corruption.”78 Shakespeare’s audiences
“would have seen Hamlet not as a modern subject but as man who withdraws from the
corruption of political life.”79
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Indeed, the first thing audiences generally note about Hamlet is his solitariness, and
in the centuries since the play was performed at the Globe (ca. 1600) Hamlet has come to
represent various forms of solitude and alienation in myriad cultural, historical, and
intellectual contexts.80 The first scene in which the prince appears (1.2) emphasizes his
apartness via his supposedly excessive mourning, which is deemed an offense against
social norms and mores. His first line—“A little more than kin, and less than kind”
(1.2.65)81—is a sarcastic pun that highlights the difference or ontological gap he perceives
between himself and Claudius, and soon he is embarking on his famous exposition
(“Seems, madam?...” [1.2.76–86]) of the impossibility of denoting his inner self, hinting at
vast and ineffable reservoirs of interiority. Hamlet is the pivotal marker for Dillon, as it
was for M. C. Bradbrook, whom she quotes: “Hamlet, the solitary muser, was an
innovation; it is on the whole not till the seventeenth century that praise of solitude becomes
a general thing.”82 As opposed to Richard III, whose solitariness marked him as a villain,
Hamlet initiates the moment when the outsider becomes the hero. Ultimately, Dillon sees
Shakespeare as divided in the play “between admiration for the inward solitude which
Hamlet so proudly defends in a false society, and condemnation of the individualism to
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which the disintegration of social values is linked in the first place.”83
The haunting question “Who’s there?” greets the viewer/reader right away; several
lines later, when asked, “is Horatio there?”, Horatio responds, “A piece of him” (1.1.23):
the play is replete from the outset with questions of identity, and particularly the relation
of individual subjectivity to the structures and customs of the state. Startlingly, the play
ends, after the bloodbath that leaves Hamlet, Laertes, Claudius, and Gertrude dead, with
the dissolution of the state of Denmark: Hamlet’s legacy, his dying voice, speaks to the end
of the state to which he is heir, as Denmark becomes annexed under the auspices of the key
theatrical double to Hamlet, young Fortinbras. Hamlet’s endurance, its achievement of
mythic status, has largely derived from the enigmas that seemingly lie at its core, paradoxes
that relate profoundly to a political reading of the play: A revenge drama whose focus
occupies the space between mandate and revenge; a play of political inheritance in which
the king’s son does not succeed him to the throne, and eventually dissolves the very state
which his father ruled, a father whom he purports to have adored; a play about a prince
who constantly undercuts the notion of privilege, royalty, court life, all of which constitute
a world in which he is profoundly enmeshed; and a play that ends in annihilation with
ambivalent prospects for the future, but that simultaneously contemplates a more distant
future far different than that which the characters or ourselves can fully imagine.
Despite the prevalence of productions of the play that rely on extensive editing and
often emphasize the family drama, or family romance, over the political considerations of
the text, the machinations of state power and politics are never far away in Hamlet; and
often, as in the first scene, discourse concerning state matters forms an incongruous and
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dissonant relationship with the more lyrical and personal discourse of the characters—see,
for an example of the latter, Francisco’s haunting line in the play’s opening exchange, “For
this relief much thanks. ‘Tis bitter cold, / And I am sick at heart” (1.1.8–9). Shortly after
encountering King Hamlet’s ghost, Horatio, prompted by Marcellus’s questions about the
purpose of the night watch and the military acceleration he notices underway, recounts the
story of King Hamlet and old Fortinbras, as well as the current actions of young Fortinbras.
Old Fortinbras lost lands to King Hamlet, who killed him in combat, and the son, young
Fortinbras—like Hamlet, a prince who did not ascend to power upon his father’s death, but
rather watched his uncle do so—seeks to reclaim those lost lands:

Now, sir, young Fortinbras,
Of unimprovèd mettle hot and full,
Hath in the skirts of Norway here and there
Sharked up a list of lawless resolutes
For food and diet to some enterprise
… to recover of us, by strong hand
And terms compulsatory, those foresaid lands
So by his father lost (1.1.99–108).

Our introduction to the militarized, action-oriented Fortinbras (whose name, of course,
means “strong in arms”), in a passage rife with concerns of property, inheritance, and state
power, exemplifies the generation-spanning entanglements, violence, and maneuvering
that nation-states foster, and also offers a profound and stark contrast to our introduction
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to Hamlet. And, in a certain way, the first scene serves as a microcosm of the play at large,
most importantly in its depiction of characters whose very existences, and even the idea of
human substance itself, raise fundamental questions—after all, they are witness to the
presence of a ghost. This world of fragmented consciousness (“A piece of him”) and
tenuous identity leads to an ingrained yearning and “sickness” of the heart, all of which is
beautifully depicted alongside business of state, generational disputes over land, and
impending violence. When Marcellus asks Horatio of the ghost, “Is it not like the King?”,
Horatio responds, “As thou art to thyself” (1.1.62–63). While the literal sense is clear
enough, there is a sense in which this is a strange reply, for the king’s ghostly self is not
his actual self, but an apparition, a spectral representation, the ghostlike image of a
person—in Denmark, identity is once removed, the image of a self.
After Claudius’s opening speech (1.2.1–39), which compared to the sublime of
scene 1 seems like empty administrative language, and after the ritualistic, mannered
courtly language that forms Laertes’s and Polonius’s request that Laertes be allowed to
return to France, Hamlet shatters the formal etiquette and artificial discourse with his first
line, the aforementioned “A little more than kin, and less than kind” (1.2.65). Hamlet’s
insult shows him as unwilling to play the courtly games of custom in the wake of his
father’s death. At the other end of the play, Hamlet mocks Osric’s ridiculously mannered
courtly speech (5.2.112–20), and comments to Horatio about Osric:

He hath much land, and fertile. Let a beast
be lord of beasts, and his crib shall stand at the King’s
mess. ‘Tis a chuff, but, as I say, spacious in the
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possession of dirt (5.2.86–89).

As Fitzmaurice points out, it is through Polonius and Osric, even in largely comic scenes,
that Shakespeare demonstrates the depth of corruption of the Danish court;84 this
demonstration is often achieved via an attack on hierarchy and custom. In the final
observation, “the possession of dirt,” Hamlet characteristically demonstrates the absurdity
of rules of hierarchy and wealth when laid bare and described in their most basic terms.
This leveling motif we will see at its strongest in the graveyard scene.
Among the sixteenth-century meanings of custom were “A habitual or usual
practice; common way of acting; usage, fashion, habit (either of an individual or of a
community)” and “an established usage which by long continuance has acquired the force
of a law or right.”85 The word applies to both individual habits as well as group or even
national ones, and also implies the transformation of something unnatural (i.e., socially
constructed) or arbitrary into something that becomes unconscious, habitual, seemingly
natural. In these senses the term functions much like ideology in its Althusserean
formulation: Althusser famously moved beyond the “false consciousness” paradigm of
ideology as articulated by Marx to define ideology as “not the system of the real relations
which govern the existence of individuals, but the imaginary relation of those individuals
to the real relations in which they live.”86 For Hamlet, “custom” is usually something to be
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up or snap out of on being told the truth…. In so far as we must always live within material
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discarded and overcome: it is “damned custom” (3.4.38), “that monster, custom” (3.4.168),
“a custom / More honored in the breach than the observance” (1.4.15–16); in the case of
his mother, he thinks it is custom that allows her to effortlessly act in a way he considers
inhuman. The concept of “habitus”—“the inculcation in men and women of a set of durable
dispositions which generate particular practices”—was crucial to Pierre Bourdieu’s
formulation of how ideology “takes hold in everyday life.”87 For Bourdieu, “through these
structured dispositions, human actions may be lent a unity and consistency without any
reference to some conscious intention. In the very ‘spontaneity’ of our habitual behavior,
then, we reproduce certain deeply tacit norms and values; and habitus is thus the relay or
transmission mechanism by which mental and social structures become incarnate in daily
social activity.”88
Polonius is the epitome of court ideology and custom in Hamlet, and thus Hamlet’s
seemingly deep hatred of him is unsurprising. Polonius tells Ophelia, after imploring
Laertes “to thine own self be true” (1.3.78)—a deeply ironic line, despite its out-of-context
appropriations as signifying a fundamental nugget of wisdom imparted by the play—that
“You do not understand yourself so clearly” (1.3.98), coming from a man who seems to
understand very little, least of all himself. Much like Lear in King Lear’s opening scene,
Polonius seamlessly equates love with financial transaction, exemplifying the process of

conditions … there can be no escape or awakening from ideology…. The direct knowledge
of our real condition … would simply be too painful to bear…. Hence the psychological
necessity of ideology.” Felperin does concede that literature can exist “partly outside the
ideological complex … by offering a certain distance from it,” though this requires
focusing on the “gaps” and “fissures” in a text to reveal the “‘marks’ of the social and
historical formations it incompletely conceals.” Felperin, “Political Criticism at the
Crossroads: The Utopian Historicism of The Tempest,” 35–36.
87
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reification that has gripped the court world: “Think yourself a baby / That you have ta’en
these tenders for true pay / Which are not sterling. Tender yourself more dearly” (1.3.106–
8); and, “Set your entreatments at a higher rate / Than a command to parle” (1.3.123–24).
The Player Queen in “The Murder of Gonzago” is careful to differentiate between love and
materiality: “The instances that second marriage move / Are base respects of thrift, but
none of love” (3.2.180–81).89 Ophelia, as a woman and as an object of erotic negotiation,
is a perfect example of an individual whose freedom and potential is constrained by rules
of custom and ideology, until ultimately her only outlet is madness, and then death.
Polonius’s concern for his daughter is mediated through anxiety over his own position:
“You’ll tender me a fool” (1.3.110), he remarks to Ophelia while warning her against
contact with Hamlet, whom Polonius sees strictly as “a prince out of thy star” (2.2.141).
Polonius makes clear throughout the play that his status as fully ingratiated to the king
trumps familial empathy. Hamlet’s loathing of Polonius, and his treatment of Rosencrantz
and Guildenstern, who, had they lived, might very well have ended up as versions of
Polonius, is part of his revulsion to the court world and its prevailing customs and norms.
One level of his solitariness, then, is his outsider’s critique (ironically from the position of
the ultimate insider) of that world, his intellectual separation from it, and his unwillingness
to participate. But his break from custom/ideology becomes much more radical when he
deconstructs not merely the behaviors of the corrupt Danish court but the basic, naturalized

This is a strong and consistent theme in much of Shakespeare’s work. See specifically
France in King Lear: “Love’s not love / When it is mingled with regards that stands / Aloof
from th’entire point” (1.1.233–35); and Antony in Antony and Cleopatra: “There’s beggary
in the love that can be reckoned” (1.1.15).
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hierarchical systems that sustain it. Rather than retreating back to the world he knows to
be corrupt and arbitrary, Hamlet delves further into alienation.
For a prince, Hamlet’s pervasive tendency of leveling, of blurring and mocking
hierarchical distinctions, is striking and ostensibly counterintuitive. It also goes beyond the
position of the satirist who points out social flaws and hypocrisy: Hamlet speaks from a
radically detached, solitary perspective that seems almost out of time and place, and in
doing so assumes his mantle of the hero of alienation. Commenting on Hamlet’s musings
on “the noble dust of Alexander” and “Imperial Caesar, dead and turned to clay” (5.1.203–
13), and Hamlet’s ideas of sovereignty more generally, Kiernan Ryan writes, “That such
contemptuous disenchantment with sovereignty and the baseless awe in which it expects
to be held by the world should be placed in the mouth of a prince makes it all the more
potent. It also confirms Hamlet’s possession at this point of a vision as declutched from
what passes for normality as the vision of the tragedy whose protagonist he is doomed to
play… The last line quoted, ‘But soft, but soft; aside. Here comes the King,’ encapsulates
the speaker’s alienation from the entire regime incarnate in Claudius … and through
Hamlet’s use of the term ‘aside’ … it glances at the key role played by staging … in framing
a virtual time and space that power cannot police.”90 In the process, Hamlet demonstrates
that subjectivity does not mean that people are “merely containers of disciplinary
discourses and … ideology,” but “in addition” subjects are “repositories, or potential
repositories, for psychic and social impulses resistant to the homogenizing, commodifying
dynamics of … instrumental reason.”91
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In the argument with Rosencrantz and Guildenstern over ambition, Hamlet
stretches out the conventional logic to conclude: “Then are our beggars bodies, and our
monarchs and outstretched heroes the beggars’ shadows’ (2.2.264–65), a statement which
posits beggars as real, and monarchs merely as shadows of beggars. Later, in conversation
with Claudius, Hamlet again enacts a radical leveling between beggar and king:

Hamlet: Your fat king and your lean beggar is but
variable service—two dishes, but to one table. That’s
the end.
King: Alas, Alas!
Hamlet: A man may eat fish with the worm that hath eat
of a king, and eat of the fish that hath fed of that
worm.
King: What dost thou mean by this?
Hamlet: Nothing but to show you how a king may go
a progress through the guts of a beggar (4.3.23–32).

Such discourse leads others to perceive Hamlet as mad, and interestingly his incisiveness,
his acute ability to transcend conventional rationality depends on his “antic disposition,”
his feigned madness, which places him in an even more solitary position than he initially
(at the outset of the play) occupies. He becomes like the riddling Fool in King Lear, who
speaks in cryptic logical puzzles, revealing profound insights into forbidden matters of
class and hierarchy, exposing the inherent artificiality of such distinctions. As Edgar
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comments about one of Lear’s leveling, anti-hierarchical speeches, “Reason in madness!”
(4.5.167): the paradigm applies to Hamlet as well. Furthermore, Hamlet at times embodies
an authorial persona (common for satirists), a key site of privacy/solitude, as we will see
in the next chapter. After encountering the Ghost, Hamlet famously calls for his “tables,”
in which to write:

O villain, villain, smiling, damned villain!
My tables—meet it is I set it down
That one may smile, and smile, and be a villain;
At least I am sure it may be so in Denmark. [Writes] (1.5107–10)

And of course Hamlet also writes “a speech of some dozen or sixteen lines” (2.2.541) for
the First Player to recite in the Murder of Gonzago.
When Hamlet questions Fortinbras’s captain about the Norwegian military venture
in Poland, the captain replies with surprising honesty to Hamlet:

Captain: Truly to speak, and with no addition,
We go to gain a little patch of ground
That hath in it no profit but the name.
To pay five ducats, five, I would not farm it…
Hamlet: Why, then the Polack never will defend it.
Captain: Yes, it is already garrisoned.
Hamlet: Two thousand souls and twenty thousand ducats
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Will not debate the question of this straw.
This is th’impostume of much wealth and peace,
That inward breaks, and shows no cause without
Why the man dies. I humbly thank you, sir (4.4.18–30).

The captain articulates an entirely pointless military operation: all these deadly maneuvers
and wasted lives for the “possession of dirt.” Hamlet clearly recognizes the absurdity of
the moment, the irrationality of nationalism, but he uses the motives for irrational violence
as a means to inscribe himself back into the role of revenger. For Fortinbras and Laertes,
adopting the role of revenger is an effortless, unreflective process, but for Hamlet it has
been one of conscious and unconscious rebellion:

Examples gross as earth exhort me:
Witness this army of such mass and charge,
Led by a delicate and tender prince,
Whose spirit with divine ambition puffed
Makes mouths at the invisible event,
Exposing what is mortal and unsure
To all that fortune, death, and danger dare,
Even for an eggshell…. I see
The imminent death of twenty thousand men
That for a fantasy and trick of fame
Go to their graves like beds, fight for a plot
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Whereon the numbers cannot try the cause,
Which is not tomb enough and continent
To hide the slain? Oh, from this time forth
My thoughts be bloody or be nothing worth! (4.4.47–67).

Again, we see Hamlet’s definitive recognition of the absurdity and futility of the moment,
all this senseless slaughter for the vain triumph of “a fantasy and trick of fame.” Yet he
ends his speech with “My thoughts be bloody or be nothing worth!”, demonstrating the
conflict of resistance and complicity, autonomy and interpellation. As the solitary figure,
he sees through the web of ideology, but also eventually acquiesces to his role as revenger,
finding in the immoral military action of Fortinbras a moral compass for his own violent
task. Hamlet resists his “assigned role” through alienation, but is still “forced to participate”
in the generic outcome of a revenge tragedy, despite his early radical resistance to genre:
“Almost as soon as he is interpellated by the Ghost as a revenge hero, Hamlet begins a kind
of unarticulated resistance to this interpellation. Singularly, he is a revenge hero who never
really formulates a plan for his revenge.”92 For Grady, Hamlet is “a demonic hero in
Lukács’s sense … a problematic figure unable to transcend the reified world in which he
is trapped, but equally unable to accept or ratify it.”93
Grady and Eagleton read the graveyard scene via Lacan, and specifically Hamlet’s
exclamation “This is I, / Hamlet the Dane” (5.1.257–58) as Hamlet’s reassertion of his
symbolic identity: “Hamlet has now ‘taken in’ the reality of his own death, has asserted
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himself in his claim to be ‘the Dane’ as his father’s successor and the enemy of his usurping
uncle, and has become the restored lover of a young woman he had previously seemed to
dismiss and denigrate. His actions, in short, in this light, are … based on a renewed sense
of his inherited place in the Symbolic Order of his society.”94 In his prior resistance to
symbolic identification, whereas Lacan himself saw this as reflective of Hamlet’s
narcissism, Eagleton sees ideological resistance: “Hamlet’s reluctance or inability to enter
the symbolic order, and his revulsion from the sexuality which reproduces it, are in one
sense regressive states of being…. But this psychological regression is also, paradoxically,
a kind of social progressiveness.”95 Hamlet reaffirms his symbolic mandate and enacts his
revenge on Claudius; but of course the play ends littered with corpses, including his own;
and in his final moments the tension between his symbolic identity and his inchoate desire
for a free, autonomous self resurfaces as he both annihilates the state of Denmark by
handing the reins of government over to Fortinbras, but also perpetuates it, his duty as son
and prince.
In the escape from corruption to preserve his own soul from taint, as in the epigraph
from Nietzsche at the outset of the chapter, Hamlet discovers not a liberating Dasein, as in
Sydney Mendel’s formulation in “The Descent into Solitude”: “The hero in his loneliness
discovers that he exists, that he possesses existence (Dasein), an existence real, certain, and
incurable … an existence prior to the Cartesian cogito, prior to all verbal formulations….
In short, through the descent into solitude the hero regains that pristine, subjective
knowledge of himself that he possessed prior to the emergence of the self with its
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concomitant dependence on other people.”96 Rather, he encounters a reminder of being
unable to fully escape the symbolic mandates that structure reality: he reassumes his role—
Hamlet the Dane, a divinity shaping his ends—and enacts the revenge demanded of him,
though ambivalence and tension remain even in the end. Shakespeare does not offer an
escapist version of solitude, but rather a darker confrontation that leads Harold Bloom to
label the play as “pragmatically nihilist.”97 Still, the escape from custom is fundamentally
an ethical move: Hamlet’s solitude enables not just a critique of the Danish court, but what
becomes a more fundamental critique of society and human relations. No wonder the
solitary outsider, the desire for privacy, was a dubious or threatening idea if it could
engender such thoughts and observations.
Nor does solitary alienation merely conjure up a hopeless, nihilistic vision. Rather,
as Robert Sayre has written, the seventeenth-century theme of retreat/solitude is in part a
“revolt against the conditions of a new social order,” a withdrawal, rhetorical or literal,
“from a society based on competition, antagonism, self-interest.” It is, in other words, a
“search for lost community.” However, since “the new community is not exterior … but
the interior ‘crowd’ within oneself,” then “the solitary is himself a community; he
communes with his ideas and his readings.”98 But, paradoxically, this community in the
solitary self speaks to a longing for a genuine, and genuinely humane, community. This is
what Kiernan Ryan labels “utopian realism,” which “‘has recognized what is and what
could be, within and beyond social condition.’”99 Solitude—whether literal, rhetorical,
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imaginative, performative—is cast as immoral in the early modern period but it functions
as a form of ethical engagement and critique, and within that critique, however seemingly
misanthropic, there is an embedded utopian impulse.
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Chapter 2. “A mazefull solitarinesse”: Sidney and Solitude

“Our showy errors”: Sidney’s Uneasy Desire for Solitude
On March 1, 1578, Philip Sidney (1554–86) wrote from London to his friend and mentor,
the Protestant Burgundian humanist Hubert Languet (1518–81):

My very dear Hubert. . . . You sharply accuse me with the term “laziness” [pigritia]
and meanwhile fall into the same fault yourself—or rather a greater one, in that I
become a better man through your letters, while mine must merely be empty noise
to you. And as is perfectly obvious, I am out of practice when it comes to style; and
my mind itself, if it was ever any good at anything, is now, through our cowardly
inactivity, beginning both to lose its powers without noticing and to be quite content
to give them up. For what is the point of stirring our thoughts to all kinds of
knowledge, if we are given nowhere to put it into practice to contribute to the
common good—which in a corrupt age we may not hope for? Who learns music if
not for delight? Architecture if not to construct buildings?1

1

Roger Kuin, ed., The Correspondence of Sir Philip Sidney, 2:816. The Sidney-Languet
correspondence, written in Latin, was originally printed in Heidelberg in 1633 by William
Fitzer: The most famous Hubert Languet’s political and historical epistles, formerly written
to the illustrious and noble Sir Philip Sidney … of the greatest use … to all students of
matters political and historical, and also to counsellors of princes and to those at the helm
of state. The letters survive only from this printed edition.
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This passage, ostensibly demonstrating the young courtier’s traditionally humanist concept
of the vita activa and his desire for more fruitful employment at court, is filled with the
playful erudition, the self-confidence juxtaposed with self-deprecation, and the intellectual
expansiveness that make Sidney’s correspondence so rich. It also exemplifies a thread that
runs through the Sidney-Languet letters that relates to a classically derived tradition of
debate but that also clearly has deep personal significance for Sidney: the conflict between
solitude and withdrawal, on the one hand, and social and political participation, on the
other.
Fittingly, given the tension between the personal and the political in the letters,
there is a discrepancy in the translation of this letter between Roger Kuin’s edition and
John Buxton’s translation that centers around “my” and “our.” Buxton renders what
corresponds to lines 4–6 above as: “and my mind itself, even if it was ever of any worth,
is beginning, through my wretched idleness, to lose strength without my noticing it.”2 He
emphasizes the personal, whereas Kuin highlights the possible public-political meaning:
Buxton’s “through my wretched idleness” is corrected to “through our cowardly inactivity”
in Kuin, with a corresponding footnote that reads: “The Queen’s reluctance to commit
herself to actual aid to either the Huguenots or the Dutch is a constant irritant to Sidney.”3
Embedded within these dual translations is the very public-private conflict with which
Sidney grapples: should his energies be directed outward or inward?

2

In Katherine Duncan-Jones, ed., Sir Philip Sidney: The Major Works, 282.
Kuin, ed., Correspondence, 2:816n3. Kuin’s translation is the more literally faithful: “et
ipse animus si forsan unquam aliqua in re ualuit, incipit iam pro ignavo nostro otio, uires
suas et sine sensu amittere et non illibenter remittere.”
3
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But regardless of the translation, it is indisputable that the correspondence is
dominated by an interest in governance, career, and current affairs—informational, as
opposed to literary letters, in Kuin’s terms.4 And so the brief moments over a span from
1573 to Languet’s death in 1581 when the discourse turns to the seemingly personal (still
always in the context of career), and to questions of withdrawal in particular, become even
more noteworthy and revealing, especially considering that such issues strongly animate
Sidney in fiction writing as well. In the correspondence and in the Arcadia, Sidney attempts
to transcend the commonplaces of the generic and derivative active life–contemplative life
debates, and to rearticulate solitude in fresh terms; but Languet’s rhetoric, which becomes
a reproachful persona that hovers over Sidney’s works, emphasizing the moral
incompatibility of solitude with the construction of the young Sidney’s identity, stalls this
articulation. By the time of Astrophil and Stella, solitude has become a near-tragic
situation. The partial, incomplete, and ultimately unsuccessful defense of solitude that
Sidney undertakes in the correspondence and the Arcadia cannot fully reach beyond the
moral and rhetorical landscape of the otium debates, but the very attempt hints at crucial
developments in the conception of solitude: the emphasis on authorial self-consciousness
and space—the creation of an authorial identity at a remove from the world and its ethical
shortcomings.
The perceived accusation of laziness (pigritia), referred to in the passage above,
runs throughout the Sidney-Languet letters, often lightheartedly, but tinged with anxiety;
it stems both from Languet’s lamenting the lack of letters from the much-younger Sidney
in contradistinction to Languet’s own diligence in writing, and also from the older man’s
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chiding of Sidney, in the quasi-paternal tone that Languet often adopts,5 for his periods
away from court and perceived tendency toward seclusion. As a result, Sidney is often
preemptively on the alert for the laziness trope: “But good God, who can now dare to
accuse me of laziness, when I write such a long letter?”; or, “I have recently written to
Lobbet, Banos, Andreas, Anselmus, and Matal. Lazy, me?”6 In the passage from March 1,
1578, quoted above, Sidney ironically acquiesces to the charge of laziness and idleness. He
then pivots to the rhetoric of functionality (“For what is the point of stirring our thoughts
to all kinds of knowledge, if we are given nowhere to put it into practice”), a key component
of the Ciceronian ethos derived from the ubiquitous De Officiis: private study must emerge
into public action, thus, as in the example Sidney gives, the study of architecture should
lead to the erection of buildings.7 As Cicero wrote: “If wisdom is the most important of the
virtues, as it certainly is, it necessarily follows that that duty which is connected with the
social obligation is the most important duty. And … service is better than mere theoretical
knowledge, for the study and knowledge of the universe would somehow be lame and
defective, were no practical results to follow.”8 In this same passage, Cicero advises that
solitude—often linked via otium to sloth and idleness, or pigritia—will lead to death.
The importance of Cicero cannot be overemphasized: Cicero’s ideal of the orator
forms “the ideal of the English gentleman … as the cultivated man of affairs,” the

In a letter from December 24, 1573, Languet calls Sidney “son” for the first time: “My
dearest son (for now I like to call you by that name)”: Kuin, ed., Correspondence, 1:69.
See Edward Berry, “Hubert Languet and the ‘Making’ of Philip Sidney,” 310.
6
Kuin, Correspondence, 2:782 (Sidney to Languet, October 10, 1577); 2:818 (Sidney to
Languet, March 1, 1578).
7
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ideological basis of the humanist-educated English governing class.9 The Sidney library at
Penshurst Place carried two copies of De Officiis, with a note in the catalogue manuscript
that Philip, while a student at Shrewsbury, purchased “a written booke being an abstract of
Mr Astons doinge of Tullies Offices.”10 In his 1580 letter to Edward Denny recommending
the books an educated man should read, Sidney—the “Scipio, Cicero and Petrarch of our
time,” as Sir Walter Ralegh had it11—placed Cicero second only to the Bible: Sidney first
refers to “Tullys offices,” or De Officiis, and then writes, “let Tully be for that mater your
foundation, next to the foundation of foundations, and wisdome of wisdomes, I mean the
Holy scripture.”12 Furthermore, Cicero’s Familiar Letters and Letters to Atticus were
thematically important to Sidney’s own correspondence.13
One can clearly detect Sidney’s own evocation of the commitment to practical
virtue from the Defence of Poesy (ca. 1579), where he sounds every bit the devoted
Ciceronian: “But when by the balance of experience it was found that the astronomer,
looking to the stars, might fall in a ditch … did proof … make manifest that all these are
but serving sciences, which, as they have each a private end in themselves, so yet are they

Dominic Baker-Smith, “Renaissance and Reformation,” 6.
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all directed to the highest end of the mistress-knowledge … which stands … in the
knowledge of a man’s self, in the ethic and politic consideration, with the end of well-doing
and not of well-knowing only…. So that, the ending end of all earthly learning being
virtuous action.”14 The sentiment of these lines corresponds closely to Sidney’s articulation
in the March 1, 1578 letter to Languet. And yet, in that same letter, Sidney quickly turns
from the traditional Ciceronian invocation to another, more skeptical register: “Yet, let us
see if we are not endowing our showy errors with a lovely yet painted face. For while the
mind is thus as it were drawn out of itself, it cannot turn its keenness upon itself, inwardly
to contemplate itself—a work with which nothing men can be energetically busy at can
compare. Can you not see me elegantly playing the Stoic? yea, I will be a Cynic if you do
not call me back.”15
First, the suggestiveness of the language stands out: the “showy errors” (“nobis
splendidis erroribus”) referring to the Ciceronian precept just alluded to in the letter, that
of acquiring knowledge solely for its functional result and use to the state, with splendidis
also carrying the meaning of glittering, which links it to the “lovely yet painted face”
(“pulchram sed fucatam speciem”), which seems attractive by artificial construction
(rhetoric), but if looked deeper into, if mined in terms of is and not seems, is exposed as
false.16 In contrast to this glittering falsity, which is deemed in the dominant thinking as
exemplary, stands inward contemplation without concern for utility or reputation or career,
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which emerges from Sidney’s letter as more valuable than the “energetically busy”
activities apart from such inwardness. For Neil Rudenstine, in his examination of leisure
in the Sidney-Languet correspondence, “the indolence and inactivity of mind [Sidney]
mentioned … scarcely suggest that he is engaged in very strenuous meditation or vigorous
self-scrutiny…. By the end of the passage, he all but admits that he has mainly been looking
for ways of rationalizing his idleness.”17 However, as will be discussed further below, if
literary activity was a significant part of Sidney’s withdrawal, the rhetoric of idleness and
frivolity in that regard was conventional—e.g., Sidney refers to his Arcadia as “this idle
work of mine” and “my toyfull Booke”18—and belies the authorial seriousness and
ambition clearly present in Arcadia, the Defence, and Astrophil and Stella. As Richard
McCoy writes of the Apology, Sidney “brings the same enthusiasm, intelligence, and
energy to this new undertaking that he brings to his political career. He also retains many
of the same concerns, for the problematic issues of his life emerge as central themes in his
writings.”19 Thus Sidney’s solitariness can be seen not as an indulgence in idleness, as
pigritia, or as the turning away from hard choices, but rather a potentially ethical and
literary commitment, but one almost impossible to justify or commit to fully, hence the
oblique, ironic treatment of the topic in the Arcadia.
In extolling the virtues of allowing the mind to turn “its keenness upon itself,”
Sidney articulates the turn inward toward desired self-contemplation and self-knowledge
that is so inextricably linked, via Montaigne, to solitude: “We have a soul able to turn in
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on herself,” Montaigne writes in “On Solitude,”20 or, in Florio’s 1603 translation (“Of
Solitariness”), “we have a mind moving and turning in itself; it may keep itself company.”21
Montaigne’s essay is imbued with a strong anti-Ciceronianism—a term often used in
another context and which requires a brief explanation. In discussions of fifteenth- and
sixteenth-century humanism, “anti-Ciceronian” is usually used in the context of debates
about imitation and Latin style; Sidney himself could be included in this camp: “So yow
can speake and write Latine not barbarously I neuer require great study in Ciceronianisme
the cheafe abuse of Oxford,” he writes to his brother.22 Languet warns Sidney as early as
1574 to “beware of falling into the school of thought of those who believe that the greatest
good lies in the imitation of Cicero, and waste their whole lives on it.”23 In this dissertation,
however, “(anti-)Ciceronian” refers to the ethos or ideology derived from Cicero and
appropriated and adapted in early modern culture. And it is this Ciceronianism to which
Montaigne objects: his ideal solitude, which necessitates not merely physical apartness but
a mindset that puts aside things outside the self, is in direct opposition to a Ciceronian
ethos—which he associates with glory, fame, and greed—and even to Ciceronian solitude,
which he labels “a ridiculous contradiction”: “He [Pliny the Younger] means [acquiring] a
good reputation, his humour being similar to Cicero’s who said he wanted to use his
withdrawal … from the affairs of State to gain life everlasting through his writings! … It
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seems logical that when you talk about withdrawing from the world you should be
contemplating things outside it.”24
But even absent the Montaignean rejection and mocking of Cicero, if one admires
the ethics of De Officiis, as Brian Vickers, for example, does, one still sees that its
ideological manipulation in early modern England cast withdrawal/solitude, or “inwardly
to contemplate” oneself, or really any form of intellectual deviation, as highly suspect and
problematic: “So much of this book [De Officiis] breathes such an atmosphere of charity
and mutuality that one understands why Erasmus and others could give it the highest
accolade…. Yet when this ideology of civic altruism was taken into social thinking, was
interiorized, became a norm, it sometimes resulted in violent disapproval of what was then
seen as socially deviant behaviour. Cicero had condemned the life of solitude as being
certain to lead to death, and Renaissance proponents of the active life vented their scorn on
those who tried to live outside society.”25
By “playing the Stoic” with Languet, in fact by going beyond the conventional
Stoic position in arguing for a turn inward for its own sake, 26 Sidney endorses an
intellectual position that was simply not viable for the life both he and Languet imagined
for himself. Hence the guarded, playful tone and the quip about the Cynics, before leaving
the topic and returning to Languet’s injunctions that Sidney get married. But at various
times and in numerous asides, the topic comes up over and over again in the
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correspondence, and cannot be explained away merely by pointing to a classical trope or a
tradition of humanist debate. In fact, such debates on the active versus contemplative lives
became in the Renaissance “exclusive and mutually incomprehending.”27 Montaigne
understood this and immediately sought to do away with the tradition in his opening
sentence of “On Solitude”: “Let us leave aside those long comparisons between the solitary
life and the active one.”28 These comparisons tend to be conventional rhetorical exercises,
either highly didactic or mock-polemic, and often with authors, such as Roger Baynes in
his Praise of Solitarinesse (1577), taking both positions, drawing rather unimaginatively
from Petrarch and Seneca, and with the sole goal of achieving a kind of pious and timid
“balance.” In his Defence, Sidney, like Montaigne, understands the pointlessness of such
debates: he mocks philosophers for neither delighting nor moving readers, but rather
“wrangling whether virtus be the chief or the only good, whether the contemplative or the
active life do excel.”29 Some of the vocabulary of these “wranglings,” of course, can be
found in Sidney’s letters and fiction; but Sidney attempts, in fits and starts, and in the face
of harsh moral condemnation, to move past the conventional, rhetorical debates and
articulate an authorial and ethical solitariness, distinct from otium, idleness, or religious
contemplative devotion.
Without implying that Sidney’s passionate interest in governance, a meaningful
political role at court, intervention in foreign affairs, etc., were any less than central to him
and his identity, we can take seriously his anxious interest in solitariness. As Rudenstine
writes, “if part of the Languet correspondence seems to reveal Sidney as a complex and
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divided personality, an equal portion sustains the traditional view of him as the ideal
courtier.”30 It is in that self-division that solitude emerges. And what the allure of
solitariness represents, in Sidney’s letters and fiction, is an alternative identity and a
necessary contradiction: the possibility of a self that is not determined by social strictures
or political commitments, an ambivalent fantasy of self-determination linked to an
authorial self-consciousness. But the allure of solitude or isolation is also a dilemma:
solitude can be a balm, what Melville referred to as “the silent grass-growing mood in
which a man ought always to compose,”31 or a torment, as it was for Montaigne before he
undertook his Essais as a way to structure and engage his neurotic isolation. These
questions don’t have the same moral baggage today that they did for Sidney, but they
remain relevant and especially so to conceptions of authorship—particularly a conception
of an authorial self that does not necessarily demand widespread publication. Philip Roth’s
Nathan Zuckerman, in prolonged retreat in the Berkshires, mirroring Roth’s own selfimposed writerly isolation in New England, writes: “I had ceased to inhabit not just the
great world but the present moment…. I’d been alone these past eleven years in a small
house on a dirt road in the deep country…. I see few people…. I don’t go to dinner parties,
I don’t go to movies, I don’t watch television, I don’t own a cell phone … or a computer.
I continue in the Age of the Typewriter…. I write for most of the day and often into the
night…. I write every day of the week—otherwise I’m silent. I am tempted by the thought
of not publishing at all—isn’t the work all I need, the work and the working?”32
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The Authorial Self
Sidney saw none of his works in print, nor did he seemingly intend for any to eventually
be printed. There are two possible exceptions: first, two sonnets in Henry Goldwell’s A
briefe declaratio[n] of the shews, deuices, speeches, and inuentions, done & performed
before the Queenes Maiestie… (1581) are attributed to Sidney.33 Second, Sidney
presumably intended for his Defence of the Earl of Leicester to reach a wider audience,
and his challenge at the conclusion of this defense—“And from the date of this writing,
imprinted and published, I will three months expect thine answer”—indicates, according
to H. R. Woudhuysen, that “it would be wrong … to give the impression that while he lived
Sidney was quite detached from the world of print.”34
Scant interest in print publication might seem to militate against viewing Sidney as
a forerunner of a modern authorial identity, but, in fact, an examination of Sidney’s writing
practices, such as in Woudhuysen’s Sir Philip Sidney and the Circulation of Manuscripts,
demonstrates Sidney as a possessive author par excellence. Woudhuysen sees Sidney as
the crucial figure in the resurgence of manuscript copying and circulation that occurs in
Elizabethan England, and particularly in its changing role from private to public: “[Sidney]
may have changed the private character of manuscript production, altering and reviving it
while at the same time seeking to preserve its origins, which he saw as primarily literary.
Sidney’s role in this process of changing manuscript culture can be related to his selfconsciousness as an author…. He might be said to have begun the creation of a literary,
reading public…. The writer, in his works, became a fictional character, became, up to a

33
34

See Ringler, ed., The Poems of Sir Philip Sidney, 345–46, 518–19.
See Woudhuysen, Sir Philip Sidney and the Circulation of Manuscripts 1558–1640, 210

59
point, a hero in his own right.”35 All of this makes Sidney an “unrepresentative” figure,
especially when compared to the next generation of writers; while Sidney’s works were
solicited in part due to the fame and identity of the author, this was unusual: “it may matter
to modern readers and editors whether a poem is or is not by Donne or Jonson, but their
contemporaries appeared to care little. There is some evidence that this was not always the
case with Sidney.”36 Further, Woudhuysen describes Sidney as being an “inveterate
reviser” of his literary works, who, after the possible illicit copying of the Arcadia, sought
to keep his work very much under his control.37
This view of Sidney and his authorial self-consciousness and desire for authorial
control contrasts with the conception of authorship and manuscript circulation and
composition found in, for example, Arthur Marotti’s important work on aristocratic
manuscript writing and circulation, John Donne, Coterie Poet. As Heather Hirschfeld
writes of Marotti’s work, “cooperative writing practices as well as the aesthetics of scribal
composition necessitate a rethinking of some poetry in terms of Foucault’s authorless
discourse because the poetry was ‘subject to reader emendation … to unconscious and
conscious revision.’” Manuscript culture, Marotti contends, “was far less author-centered
than print culture, and not at all interested in correcting, perfecting, or fixing texts in
authorially sanctioned forms.”38 In the hugely influential and much-debated “What Is an
Author?,” Foucault writes: “In our civilization … [t]here was a time when the texts that we
today call ‘literary’ … were accepted, put into circulation, and valorized without any
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question about the identity of their author…. A reversal occurred in the seventeenth or
eighteenth century…. [L]iterary discourses came to be accepted only when endowed with
the author-function.”39
Marotti’s work is part of a larger reevaluation of the author in early modern literary
studies, although the critical erasure of the author was primarily directed toward the notion
of dramatic authorship, where, ostensibly, the collaborative nature of composition along
with the “collaborative economies of the early modern theater”40 led scholars, influenced
by Foucault or a new materialist methodology, not just to advocate removing the author
“from the center of dramatic history,”41 but to claim that playtexts did not “deserve” an
author and that authorship’s importance to us is simply due to our being the “heirs of a
romantic conception of writing.”42 But it was not only the status of dramatic authorship
that came under interrogation: in some versions of the above claims, a larger argument
emerged, namely, that modern ideas of individuality, and therefore of authorship or
copyright, simply did not exist in early modern England, or that such a notion of the self
(“interiority,” “modern subjectivity,” etc.) was only just coming into being in this period,
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which still negates the author, aside from nascent conceptions of authorship beginning
around 1600.43 The idea of the singular, isolated author gave way to the author as a
“discursive formation embedded in particular historical conditions.”44 Much of this hinges
on a Foucauldian, anti-humanist narrative, rejecting “autonomous” or “essential” human
subjects, instead relying on cultural/discursive/performative constructions of self. Jonathan
Dollimore, a leading proponent of cultural materialism, writes that “anti-humanism, like
materialist criticism more generally, challenges the idea that ‘man’ possesses some given,
unalterable essence which is what makes ‘him’ human.”45 Such Foucauldian and
Althusserean anti-humanism—“the decentering of man”46—need not, of course, move us
inevitably toward a reductive problematic: asking us to choose between complete
autonomy or essentialism, on the one hand, and an entirely culturally determined,
interpellated identity on the other, where people are nothing but receptacles for discourses
of power and everything can be reduced to self-fashioning. (Jan Frans van Dijkhuizen
refers to the latter conception as “the grimly Foucauldian view … in which individuals are
merely the listless playthings of institutional forces.” 47) Such a framework, aside from
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ignoring a vast swath of middle ground between “essentialism” and “interpellation,”
doesn’t need authors because it would reduce all human agency and creativity to ideology,
marginalizing the affective and intellectual realms of literary fiction.
The “romantic notion” of authorship is caricatured as idealizing fantasy: “However
seductive is a romantic notion of artistic genius, solitary and sovereign, untouched by the
world, all artists work within a web of engagements with the world, work always and only
within the set of imaginative, material, and institutional possibilities that are available to
them.”48 This position seems to set up a straw man: those who advocate for a strong sense
of the author and possessive, authorial self-consciousness—the “romantic notion”?—
hardly argue that such authors are “untouched by the world”: in fact, as can be seen from
Sidney, his engagement with the world is a crucial lens through which to view his literary
fiction, and in no way compromises his status as author.49 Despite the caricature of the
“solitary and sovereign” author, a certain self-conception of authorship is inextricably
bound with solitude, not divorced from the world but, in fact, part of a fraught interaction
with the ethical and political entanglements of the world: a solitude, either physically or
imaginatively, that fosters a critical self-division and intellectual distance. While, as
Andrew Bennett argues, the author as outsider, as “uniquely separate from society,” is
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“fundamental to the emergence of the ‘Romantic’ author during the eighteenth century,”50
Sidney, through his interest in nonreligious solitariness, and despite being in many ways
the ultimate insider, begins to articulate and represent that “uniquely separate” authorial
space.

The discourse on solitariness and isolation between Languet and Sidney begins long before
Sidney’s much-debated rustication from court in 1579–80. The contours of Sidney’s
biography are well known and well documented, but a brief chronology of events,
particularly as they relate to literary composition and rustication, will be useful in drawing
out the personal interest in solitude. Following the Saint Bartholomew’s Day Massacre
(August 1572), which Sidney witnessed as part of an embassy to the French court, Sidney
spent three years on the Continent. While Sidney was in Italy in 1574, he and Languet,
whose correspondence began in the fall of 1573, exchanged letters concerning Sidney’s
course of study. Kuin describes Sidney as an “all-rounder: both physically active … and
bookish … he travels incessantly, yet is often in fragile health, pensive, and given to
melancholy.”51 Some of the early letters reflect the bookish, melancholy, pensive Sidney:
“I do not know,” Languet writes, “if it is advisable to concentrate on the study of
Geometry…. You need to reflect on your condition in life, and how quickly you will have
to be torn away from your present leisurely life of reading: that is why you need to spend
the little time you have left concentrating entirely on the most essential things. And the
things I call essential are those which it is shameful for those born to high rank not to know,
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and which later can be both ornament and a help to you…. What is more, as by nature you
are not very cheerful, that study will make you even more melancholy.”52 Here and
elsewhere in the letters, Languet seeks to bring to fruition the “great expectation” 53 that
had been placed on Sidney from a very young age—expectations that stand in direct
contradiction to a “life of reading,” to literature, and to withdrawal.
Languet continues to worry about Sidney’s propensity for isolating himself in
reading and thus damaging not only his prospects, but his health: “I do, though, warn you
to take great care of your health, and make sure not to damage it with too much study….
As by nature you are not particularly cheerful, you need to find companions whose honest
company will cheer you up.”54 Sidney’s reply validates Languet’s fear that Sidney might
be isolating himself in his studies, but denies that such isolation leads to his melancholy:
“I freely admit that often I am more melancholy than either my age or my occupations
warrant; but I know by experience that I am never less given to melancholy emotions than
when I stretch the weak powers of my mind to the utmost on something arduous and
difficult. But enough of this.”55
In May 1575, Sidney returned to England,56 and while his most frustrating setbacks
at court were a few years off, he immediately would have felt “the gulf between his
European persona and the realities of his life in England.”57 In February 1577 Sidney was
chosen by Elizabeth as a special envoy to the emperor Rudolph after the death of Rudolph’s
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father, Maximilian I. The twenty-two-year-old Sidney seems to have executed the embassy
brilliantly, and “this was in some ways the high point of Sidney’s career; he had made an
excellent impression on the European political and diplomatic class, and was seen at home
as a promising figure at Court.”58 But while the trip seems to have been a success and
Sidney’s achievements lauded, “one person … remained unconvinced: Elizabeth,” and “it
may have been at precisely this juncture that [Sidney’s] political fortunes started to
droop.”59 But Elizabeth’s possible disfavor was not the sole factor working against
Sidney’s career—Sidney worked on behalf of his father (who was in Ireland), as well as
the Earl of Leicester and Sir Francis Walsingham, and thus Philip became the de facto
enemy of that group’s enemies, the Earl of Sussex and the Earl of Oxford. Then, of course,
in 1579 there was the Letter to Queen Elizabeth Touching Her Marriage to Monsieur,
which Sidney wrote, probably at Leicester’s and Walsingham’s urging, to oppose
Elizabeth’s potential betrothal to the Catholic Duke of Alençon, François-Hercule. While
“there is no evidence that the Queen showed any signs of displeasure against him,”60 those
proponents of the marriage certainly did, and 1579–83 marks the “nadir” of Sidney’s
career.61 The attractions of solitude, as well as its abjection, would only become heightened
in these frustrating and fruitless times.
Mary Sidney, Philip’s sister, became the Countess of Pembroke after marrying the
Earl of Pembroke on April 21, 1577; with her marriage came several new homes, including
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Wilton in Wiltshire. Philip “quickly took advantage of these new residential possibilities….
In Wilton, Philip found an ideal rural retreat, to which he would return time and again over
the next few years.”62 In December 1577, we find Sidney at Wilton where on December
16 he writes the Earl of Sussex requesting an excused absence from court due to “occasions
bothe of helthe and otherwise.”63 Once again, an editorial divide between the
personal/literary and the public/political can be seen in the glossing of Sidney’s request.
For Katherine Duncan-Jones, Sidney’s time away from court has a distinctly literary,
withdrawn characteristic to it: in contrasting Sidney to some of his contemporary writers—
Gascoigne, Spenser, Lyly—who published to acquire or reinforce patronage, DuncanJones writes, “Sidney did not need these things in quite the same way. He had plenty of
‘business,’ as he often complains in his letters, and if writing poetry and fiction was one of
the things that kept him frequently for longish spells away from Court … literary activity
may even have hindered his chances of lucrative preferment.”64 In glossing Sidney’s
request to Sussex, she writes, “both of health and otherwise. One of the ‘occasions’
detaining Sidney at Wilton may have been the composition of OA [Old Arcadia], probably
begun earlier that year.”65 For Kuin, while he concedes that the reasons behind Sidney’s
request are unclear, he speculates that perhaps Sidney was working on something in
relation to his father’s duties in Ireland, which he wanted to have completed before his
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return.66 Whatever the exact, ultimately unknowable reasons for Sidney’s withdrawal, in
its context, the debates in the Arcadia about solitariness, love, and supposedly virtuous
action can be seen in part as reflecting tensions quite personal for Sidney: the dubiousness
of a desire for solitariness and of devoting oneself to literary fiction transforms in the
Arcadia into the chastised solitary lover, with romantic love, and the poetic acts and
mindset it inspires, standing in for the act of literary authorship. And, indeed, it was during
his time at Wilton in 1577 that Sidney likely began composing the Arcadia.
While composition of the Arcadia was begun at Wilton in 1577, it was completed
during the time of Sidney’s rustication from court in 1579–80.67 Debates about this year
revolve around whether Sidney’s withdrawal from court was mandated—that is, whether
he was officially ostracized after his Letter to Queen Elizabeth Touching Her Marriage to
Monsieur—or whether it was voluntary. The latter seems likely: a measure of prudence in
the wake of controversy. But again, a solitary tendency is seen in Sidney before the Letter
and his advisable, if not forced, withdrawal. On October 22, 1578, Languet writes, in a
letter otherwise occupied with Sidney’s desire for military action in the Netherlands, “I
find it deeply unpleasing that (as you write) you are bored with the life to which I doubt
not you have been called by God, and that you want to flee the light of your court, and
withdraw to places far from the society of men.”68 (Steuart Pears translates the last part of
the sentence as “betake yourself to the privacy of secluded places.”69) The letter of Sidney’s
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that expresses the notions to which Languet is responding does not survive. Languet,
predictably, argues forcefully against Sidney’s desire for rustication or long travels: “So
would you … deny your country your effort when she demands it? and that huge talent
God has entrusted to you, would you bury it? In the commonwealth as in a human body,
each member should serve in his own role…. The nobility … is employed for high office
and magistracy … and it is shameful for them … not to do that which pertains to their
duty.”70
Whether Sidney could achieve the “high office” that Languet sees him as destined
for, given his disadvantageous position at court, is irrelevant for Languet, who implores
Sidney to strive for Ciceronian virtu, the word everywhere in his letters and, consequently,
in Musidorus’s mouth in the Arcadia. Sidney himself seems to vacillate between a desire
for impulsive action—Languet has implied that Sidney has toyed with the idea of joining
the fight in the Netherlands before the queen has decided on the country’s course of action,
an idea to which Languet also strenuously objects—and a desire for withdrawal. In what
must have been a blow to Languet and his fervent hopes for Sidney as a model statesman,
the desire for withdrawal comes to fruition in the rustication of 1579–80, a period that
becomes a key moment in the history of English literature if not for the career of a
statesman.
Though the lack of surviving letters from Sidney to Languet forces us to speculate
on Sidney’s side of this debate (which is, however, given voice in fictionalized form in the
Arcadia), Languet and Sidney seem to engage in a disputation about the merits and
demerits of seclusion, a debate central to post-Petrarch humanism, but which even by this
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time had become ossified into conventional exercises, with the ideologically preferred
outcome not really in dispute. During Sidney’s extended withdrawal from court, Languet
writes a letter that implies that Sidney’s rustication was optional, and he implores him on
his own behalf and that of Sidney’s friends to reconsider his solitariness in the country:

But however many they are [Sidney’s friends], they wonder at your delighting in
so long a retirement; admittedly, they can easily believe that it is made exceedingly
pleasant for you by the company of those dearest to you, but they think you should
consider more carefully whether hiding yourself away there so long really suits
your station in life. They are afraid that those who are less aware of your inner
constancy may suspect that you are bored with the difficult life by which one strives
for virtue…. They also fear that the pleasure of a long retreat will weaken that
passion of yours to pursue the noblest goals, and that a love of the leisure you used
to despise will gradually steal into your soul. So they have on quite a few occasions
asked me to write to you about that.71

Kuin notes that “Languet is clearly aware of Sidney’s stay at Wilton though not, apparently,
of his intensive writing activity while there.”72 But it seems unlikely that even if Languet
had had knowledge of Sidney’s prolific fiction writing during this period that this would
have made any difference in the perceived need to censure Sidney for his withdrawal and
encourage him to return to public life. Romance and poetry were hardly pursuits that could
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compare to statesmanship; in fact, such dubious literary activity would have required moral
justification, and indeed did, in Sidney’s Defence, published posthumously in 1595 though
probably composed around this time (1579).
Languet bemoans Sidney’s “love of … leisure,” either ignorant of or not taking
seriously Sidney’s authorial activities; but even modern treatments of Sidney’s periods of
withdrawal speak of “indulged idleness,”73 though it is hard to imagine such rhetoric being
applied to Montaigne’s composition of his Essais, for example, not to mention more
modern examples of authors working at remove from society. In his periods of withdrawal,
Sidney composed the Arcadia, the Defence, Astrophil and Stella, and engaged in
experiments of versification, all the while acting as an “inveterate reviser”74 of his own
compositions: this output, ambition, and authorial commitment does not correspond with a
life of idle leisure, even if Sidney himself was compelled to use such rhetoric to describe
it.
Furthermore, leisure in the late sixteenth century did not necessarily connote a lack
of action or activity. Edmund Molyneux, Henry Sidney’s former secretary, writing in the
third volume of Holinshed’s Chronicles in 1588, said of Sidney:

Not long after his return from that journey [1577], and before his further
employment by her Majesty, at his vacant and spare times of leisure (for he could
endure at no time to be idle or void of action) he made his book which he named
Arcadia, a work (though a mere fancy, toy and fiction) showing such excellency of
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spirit, gallant invention, variety of matter, and orderly disposition, and couched in
frame of such apt words … so delightful to the reader … as nothing could be taken
out to amend it, or added to it that would not impair it, as few works of like subject
hath been either of some more earnestly sought, choicely kept, nor placed in better
place, and amongst better jewels than that was; so that a special dear friend he
should be that could have a sight, but much more dear that could once obtain a
copy.75

For Molyneux—who, as Duncan-Jones notes, had not been on good terms with Sidney76—
leisure seems to connote free time in order to perform some useful action or task; while he
uses the conventional language to classify the Arcadia (“mere fancy, toy and fiction”), its
composition does not equate to idleness, and his praise for the writing is glowing (although
Sidney would not have agreed that “nothing could be … added to it,” as he undertook a
full-scale revision in 1583). He also emphasizes the closeness and possessiveness with
which author Sidney attempted to keep his work. Despite Molyneux’s sentiments, written
a year after Sidney’s death, it is no surprise that, given the correspondence with Languet
and the opinions of Sidney’s friends and elders, his literary endeavors in this period of
retreat would incorporate the tension between political engagement and solitary
withdrawal, and the appeal and humiliation of solitariness.
Languet’s description of Sidney’s setup at Wilton is reminiscent of Petrarch’s ideal
solitude: Languet writes that Sidney is in “the company of those dearest to you”; Petrarch
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writes in De vita solitaria, “It will never be my view that solitude is disturbed by the
presence of a friend, but that it is enriched…. And so in embracing solitude I do not reject
friendship, and I do not fly from any individual unless he be of the sort whose character I
should shun in cities also…. The whole matter then comes to this, that I would share my
solitude like everything else with my friends, believing that Seneca spoke with true
humanity when he said that ‘no good thing is pleasant to possess without friends to share
it,’ and being assured that solitude is a great and sweet possession.”77 Sidney’s literary
endeavors in retreat at Wilton further echo Petrarch’s prescription for fruitful solitude: “For
there are some for whom the life of solitude is more grievous than death … and this will
happen particularly with persons who have no acquaintance with literature…. And indeed
isolation without literature is exile, prison, and torture: supply literature and it becomes
your country, freedom, and delight…. I am not unaware that I shall be violently attacked
at this point by those who think solitude is unfavorable to … the virtuous life.”78
Sidney spent his year removed from court immersed in literary pursuits—
completing Arcadia, composing letters to Edward Denny and his younger brother Robert,
and “along with his friends Edward Dyer and Fulke Greville … experimenting with trying
to write English verse using Latin quantitative prosody.”79 The method of composition of
the Arcadia, which Sidney reveals in the dedicatory epistle to his sister that was printed
with the first published edition, echoes the idea of Petrarchan social solitude: “Your dear
self can best witness the manner [of composition], being done in lose sheets of paper, most
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of it in your presence.”80 Again, none of this is to discount Sidney’s continual harboring of
desire for court employment and political engagement. But the desire and practice of
solitariness and withdrawal allowed the fostering of a literary identity in opposition to the
theater of politics, war, and professional frustrations. As Jean Starobinski writes of
Montaigne’s solitude, if the world is a “deceptive theater,” then one “feels the need to
create a private place for himself at a distance from the world…. To have secured the
possibility of occupying his own private territory … of withdrawing at any moment into
absolute solitude,” a “choice of identity in conscious opposition to the world.”81 Like
Montaigne, Sidney was financially independent, which allowed for space and time for
literary activity and immersion without concerns for patronage or even, in Sidney’s case,
publication.

In 1581 Sidney did return to court and was “extraordinarily active in social and political
affairs, but … after the spring of 1582 he retired from court and spent several months in
apparent inactivity on the borders of Wales.”82 According to Ringler’s timeline, it was
during this summer of “inactivity” that Sidney composed many of the poems that comprise
Astrophil and Stella.83 If Sidney was in what Stewart refers to as the “damp outpost” in
Wales,84 and not Wilton, while composing or ordering Astrophil and Stella, the setting of
composition does not appear to be the social/Petrarchan mode of solitariness Sidney
seemed to value at Wilton. This period of inactivity in courtly affairs in 1582 followed
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another series of setbacks for Sidney, and “the end of 1581 and the beginning of 1582 must
have been a miserable time for Sidney.”85 Sidney’s uncle, the Earl of Leicester produced a
son, ruining Sidney’s chances of advancement as he was no longer the heir to estates and
title, meaning “that Sidney had lost not only the prospect of a fortune, but also a means of
recovering his lost prestige.”86 Furthermore, the Duke of Alençon returned to England,
likely aggravating and worrying Sidney. And finally, Sidney’s friend and mentor Hubert
Languet died in September of 1581. If the issue of solitariness in Astrophil and Stella
appears abject and debased (a poet immersed in “neurotic solitude”87), and without the
deliberative ambivalence and possibility of Arcadia, Sidney’s biographical situation and
geographical location seem to correlate. Whereas the year of rustication involved writing
Arcadia for Mary and presumably with her present, as well as poetical experimentations
with Dyer and Greville, the composition of Astrophil and Stella may have been without
such social solitariness. However, the dejection and pain of such solitude still seems to
have been conducive to writing.
Furthermore, Languet’s death and the remembrance of his supportive exhortations
to engage in the active, political life may have been a source of sadness and guilt: “When
we lived together I had such an admiration for the keenness of your mind … for the gravity
of your judgement and for your noble and virtue-inclined soul … all the more as I saw that
those remarkable gifts of mind of yours were accompanied by magnificence of birth,
physical dignity, great expectations…. You sometimes used to say that by nature you hated
the clamour and enticements of the court, and that nothing would give you greater pleasure
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… than to spend your life in civilized leisure with friends…. I used to worry that you were
saying that seriously … but I thought that even if you had that in mind then, you would
change your mind with age.”88 Sidney, of course, did eventually fully reengage in public
life, in the fight against the Spanish that he so often discussed with Languet and from which
Languet had dissuaded him from entering rashly before the queen had committed the
country. He was appointed governor of Flushing by the queen and in September 1586, in a
skirmish near Zutphen, he was shot in the left leg above the knee while attempting to rescue
Peregrine Bertie, Lord Willoughby—infamously, he was not wearing his thigh armor and
he died of gangrene twenty-five agonizing days later.89

“I enjoy my solitariness”
The anxiety over his interest in literary solitude is a recurring theme in Sidney’s
correspondence with his father figure and mentor Languet. The construction of an alternate
identity emerging out of the tension between solitude and public participation is a
constitutive element of the Old Arcadia, reprising and expanding upon his debates with
Languet. I will focus on the disputation on solitariness between Pyrocles and Musidorus in
book 1. The solitary fiction writer in retreat from worldly affairs but dogged by persistent
and loving criticism from a mentor espousing Ciceronian notions of virtue becomes, in the
fiction, the solitary lover Pyrocles and his ostensible superego Musidorus; the pursuit of
literary fiction is represented by Pyrocles’s pursuit of amorous love. The ironies,
contradictions, and ambiguities are legion, and Sidney’s work is ultimately unable—or
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unwilling—to abide a Shakespearean complementarity,90 or free itself entirely from the
language and moral assumptions of the tired and formulaic vita activa–vita contemplativa
debates; but it demonstrates the nascent stages of a discourse of solitude that attempts to
emerge beyond the reductionist and perfunctory debates that precede it, and forms an early
step in the development of a Romantic conception of authorship.
Richard Helgerson’s Elizabethan Prodigals (1976) established a historicistbiographical framework for examining prose romances in the vein of Arcadia, finding
oblique biographical and cultural allusions in these works, revolving around the pattern of
a young man doing what he has been advised against and either suffering (most common)
for this deviation or being rewarded (less common) for it. The authors of these romances,
Helgerson argues, “had wasted their youthful time on the poetry and fiction of love just as
their protagonists waste time on love itself”; despite generic and artistic conventions, such
works were tapping into a felt anxiety, an attempt by the authors “to reconcile their
humanistic education and their often rebellious tastes and aspirations.”91 The humanistic
education is tied directly to the older generation and the paternal and quasi-paternal advice
and advice literature that these young gentleman would have been constantly exposed to—
some of the poet-sons of this generation, such as Lodge and Gascoigne, were even
disinherited.92 Helgerson reproduces a letter that Henry Sidney wrote to his then-twelve-
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year-old son Philip, a “letter of admonition” with “precepts … from a common stock,”
which sound something like Polonius’s advice to Laertes in Hamlet.93 Such advice
encompasses some of the rhetoric of active life–contemplative life debates that Montaigne
and Sidney seek to avoid, though it is generous to even call it a debate, as by the 1570s in
England the issue was fully settled: “Elizabethan fathers expected more of their sons than
virtue and wisdom. Those qualities, valuable as they were, hardly merited praise if kept in
seclusion. They were rather to be used and tested in an active life of service to the state.”94
Sidney, Helgerson argues, seems an unlikely figure to be included in the canon of
prodigals, as both his contemporaries and twentieth-century criticism saw him as resolving
the moral “antipodes that resisted the best efforts of the Elizabethan prodigals”—and the
primary justification for this conclusion was the Defence of Poesy.95 Helgerson recasts the
narrative of the Sidney who showed the way past the moral critics to the Sidney who
suffered from deep moral uncertainty that included an uncertainty about literature itself:
“In making Sidney the answer to their exculpating dream of a gentleman-poet, his
contemporaries necessarily ignored any second thoughts that he may himself have had….
[But] even in the Apology … he was unable to meet the accusation that poetry ‘was more
apt to allure men to evil than to frame any good in them.’ … What use is a defense that
abandons the only ground likely to be attacked?... With all comic, lyric, elegiac, and heroic
poetry that treats of love gone, what remains to be saved? Nothing of Sidney’s own original
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composition…. As a defense of the poetry that was actually being written in the last
decades of the sixteenth century, Sidney’s Apology fails.”96
And so in the Arcadia, written for an intimate, not a public audience, Sidney plumbs
those moral uncertainties, with recognizable correspondences between Sidney, Languet,
Henry Sidney’s advice, Philip’s time at Wilton, his desire for withdrawal and the carving
out of an authorial identity, and his obligation for political participation.97 A key term under
which this moral ambivalence plays out is solitariness; but Sidney is not merely involved
in a playful flouting of conventional moral precepts: he is attempting to stake out an
intellectual argument on solitariness that transcends the didactic and moralizing debates on
the active life–contemplative life binary, to move the terms of the debate, as Shakespeare
does in As You Like It and Hamlet.
Stephano Guazzo’s The Civile Conversation (1574), influenced by Petrarch, was
an important document for Sidney in the Arcadia. As Wendy Olmsted notes, “The Civile
Conversation may have been particularly attractive to Sidney because the interlocutor,
William Guazzo, has returned home from war, having served as a humanistically trained
courtier to a prince. William’s experiences at court have soured him on society, and he
withdraws from it to seek pleasure in solitude.”98 When Anniball, William’s
friend/physician, urges William to embrace “society,” William retorts that court life is
inherently “against his heart” and that he likes “solitarinesse so wel, as fishes doe the
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water.”99 The Civile Conversation goes on to unequivocally defend the ideals of the active
life over the life of withdrawal,100 whereas the Arcadia’s debate on the subject is more
conflicted and ambiguous. Solitariness in The Civile Conversation is rendered
physiologically as a disease: Anniball “insists that pleasure in studying is acquired by habit,
not nature, and that solitude produces ‘ill humors’ that distort one’s sense of pleasure …
even though William claims that he enjoys the ‘libertie,’ ‘pleasure,’ and ‘comfort’ that his
‘disease’ produces…. Anniball discounts Williams feelings by arguing that pleasure in
solitude is ‘counterfeite’ and that only one response can be ‘true.’”101 While The Civile
Conversation reflects the dominant and pervasive evaluation of solitariness, Sidney would
have had access to works that treat the subject differently. Contrarily to Guazzo, for
example, in the Petrarchan casting of solitariness, Petrarch seeks to define an active leisure
by which withdrawal is not rendered idle or inefficacious, but morally purposeful, as well
as individually fulfilling: “The theme of solitude and the comparison between these forms
[religious and secular solitude] recurred in Petrarch’s writings and was crucial to his
identity as a man of letters. As a poet interested in the moral reformation of society,
Petrarch shared with the monks their love for solitude, but rather than seeking sanctity in a
religious order, he chose to exert a positive influence in the world through his writings.”102
Leisure in solitariness should be work, specifically literary work, as Petrarch makes evident
through biblical study: “Where Jerome’s translation of the Bible says, ‘Take time,’ an older
translation said ‘Be active in your leisure.’”103 But, of course, the inevitable moral
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entanglements arise with the question, what is the status of solitariness if its cause is not
only study and morally enhancing writing, whether philosophy or fiction, but love, fantasy,
or erotic writing?
The initial depictions of seeking solitude or privacy in both the Old and New
Arcadias are suffused with negative connotations. In book 1 of the Old, the duke Basilius,
driven by his “vanity” to visit the Delphic Oracle, receives a disturbing and enigmatic
reply, upon which “he was resolved for this fatal year to retire himself with his wife and
daughters into a solitary place.... [W]here for his pleasure he would be recreated with all
those sports and eclogues wherein the shepherds of that country did much excel.”104 For
the governance of Arcadia in his absence, Basilius appoints a trusted replacement,
Philanax, who tries to dissuade Basilius from his decision, but to no avail: “But the duke,
having used thus much dukely sophistry to deceive himself, and making his will wisdom,
told him [Philanax] resolutely he stood upon his own determination…. Basilius, according
to his determination, retired himself into the solitary place of the two lodges, where he was
daily delighted with the eclogues and pastimes of shepherds” (OA 8–9). Unlike, for
example, Duke Senior’s banishment in As You Like It, Basilius’s removal to the pastoral
realm is voluntary, and thus can be evaluated in moral terms: his abdication and his seeking
refuge in what is repeatedly referred to as the “solitary place” or “desert lodges,” as well
as his reasoning behind this decision, are cast as unwise, rash, and full of self-deceit.
However, the decision also facilitates the story’s move into the pastoral, poetic world of
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eclogues and love-shenanigans. So seeking solitude may be vain folly in this case, but it
also initiates the carnivalesque play and poetic escapades that follow.
In book 1 of the New Arcadia, when the illustriously hospitable and much-liked
Kalander hears news of his son Clitophon’s dire predicament, he is highly distraught, “at
which his colour changing, he retired himself into his chamber, commanding his men
diligently to wait upon Palladius, and to excuse his absence with some necessary business
he had presently to dispatch.”105 Kalander seeks a private place in the house as a result of
emotional distress that leads to physical alterations; and while Kalander is careful, even in
the midst of his despair, not to neglect the duties of hospitality by informing his servants
to continue to wait upon his guest “diligently,” his absence discomfits Palladius. Through
a servant whom Palladius questions, readers hear of Kalander’s behavior in his chamber,
but we do not see him in this state. The narrative method, by not showing Kalander in
private, maintains an oratorical or public style. Thus Sidney stylistically values the
public/oratorical over the private/contemplative. Or, rather, there is only public discourse
or public life in the diegesis; even in “private,” characters are depicted as though
participating in a debate. Kalander’s isolation is not a period of contemplation and the
narrator is not privy to the inner movements of his mind. Instead, the servant reports,
“Which loss had stricken the old gentleman with such sorrow, as if abundance of tears did
not seem sufficiently to witness it, he was alone retired, tearing his beard and hair and
cursing his old age that had not made his grave to stop his ears from such advertisements”
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(NA 86). Solitude becomes the space to vent and indulge extreme emotions, inappropriate
in a public setting because one’s “reason is darkened” (NA 86).
The trope of solitariness in Arcadia then moves to the protagonists, the two young
princes Pyrocles and Musidorus. The narrator describes a seeming change in Pyrocles’s
demeanor and behavior (here using his pseudonym Daiphantus): “But such a change was
grown in Daiphantus that … he would ever get himself alone, though almost when he was
in company he was alone, so little attention he gave to any that spake unto him” (NA 109).
Sidney obviously liked the formulation of a solitude so forceful that it persists even in
company, as in Astrophil and Stella 27: “Because I oft in darke abstracted guise, / Seeme
most alone in greatest companie, / With dearth of words, or answers quite awrie.”106 The
description of Pyrocles’s and Astrophil’s behavior is parallel, and both, of course, suffer
from pangs of love, the ostensible cause of their solitariness. At this point in New Arcadia,
however, readers are as yet unaware of the cause of the change in Pyrocles’s behavior,
though he does begin to undergo physical transformation: “Even the colour and figure of
his face began to receive some alteration, which he shewed little to heed; but every morning
early going abroad either to the garden or to some woods towards the desert, it seemed his
only comfort was to be without comforter” (NA 109). Again, and crucially, readers are not
granted access to Pyrocles in his secluded state, walking through woods or garden; nor are
they privy to the nature of his contemplations—the discourse won’t allow such a retreat
from the public. What readers are granted, however, is a humanist disputation on the
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subject of solitariness, with Pyrocles representing Sidney’s epistolary and authorial self,
and Musidorus offering a stringent version of Languet’s paternal exhortations.107
Musidorus resolves to leave Arcadia, “seeing the duke’s court could not be visited,
prohibited to all men” (OA 12). In other words, Musidorus wants to be somewhere where
he can be a useful instrument at court and in public life, and thus there is no active, virtuous
reason to remain in Arcadia. Pyrocles resists the opportunity of return to court and the vita
activa, leading to the intellectual and personal confrontation. Musidorus reminds his friend
of his training in and love of virtue, fearing that his current contemplative state is a
deviation from his destined path: “A mind well trained and long exercised in virtue, my
sweet and worthy cousin, doth not easily change any course it once undertakes…. This
speech I direct to you, noble friend Pyrocles, the excellency of whose mind and well chosen
course in virtue, if I do not sufficiently know, having seen such rare demonstrations of it,
it is my weakness, and not your unworthiness” (OA 12). From Musidorus’s point of view,
virtue is entirely divorced from the private, solitary realm, setting up a clear and morally
conventional contrast between virtuous (public) action and idle (private) solitude. In
Musidorus, of course, one can hear Languet’s voice from the correspondence: “They are
afraid that those who are less aware of your inner constancy may suspect that you are bored
with the difficult life by which one strives for virtue…. They also fear that the pleasure of
a long retreat will weaken that passion of yours to pursue the noblest goals.”108 Both
Musidorus and Languet invoke their intimate knowledge of Pyrocles’s/Sidney’s past
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virtuous engagement and urge its continued course. Musidorus continues by observing, “I
have marked in you, I will not say an alteration, but a relenting, truly, and a slacking of the
main career you had so notably begun and almost performed” (OA 12), which again echoes
Languet’s, “I find it deeply unpleasing that (as you write) you are bored with the life to
which I doubt not you have been called by God, and that you want to flee the light of your
court, and withdraw to places far from the society of men.”109
Musidorus recommences his chastisement of Pyrocles’s solitariness in terms that
continue to recall the epistolary exchanges between Sidney and Languet: “that whereas you
were wont, in all the places you came, to give yourself vehemently to knowledge of those
things which might better your mind … and lastly, to put all these things in practice … you
now leave all these things undone: you let your mind fall asleep … and lastly, which
seemeth strangest unto me, you haunt greatly this place, wherein … you subject yourself
to solitariness, the sly enemy that doth most separate a man from well doing” (OA 12–13).
Here the language describing Pyrocles’s past vehement pursuit of knowledge recalls the
testimonies to Sidney’s scholarly/literary pursuits and curiosities, and also points out the
Ciceronian sin of not putting that knowledge to practice, reminiscent of Sidney’s own
paraphrasing of Languet’s Ciceronian argument: “and my mind itself … is beginning,
through my wretched idleness, to lose strength without my noticing it. For why should our
thoughts be aroused to various kinds of knowledge, unless we have some opportunity of
exercising them so that some public benefit may result?”110 Knowledge and study is
fruitless if not applicable to the business of state and public life, and solitariness is unnatural
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and leads to sloth and idleness. (The conventional sentiment, of course, relies on a possible
contradiction, since solitude may be a prerequisite for the creation and articulation of the
knowledge that eventually becomes practically useful.) And like Sidney, who in his letter
pivoted to a defense of non-utilitarian inward contemplation, Pyrocles even more
strenuously defends his solitariness, not merely acquiescing to the Languet-Musidorus
ethos. However, his defense is ambiguous in that he has not made the true terms of his
behavior known to Musidorus, thus making his defense that of a hypothetical solitariness
not necessarily connected to erotic love. Internally he admits a fault: “These words, spoken
vehemently and proceeding from so dearly an esteemed friend as Musidorus, did so pierce
poor Pyrocles that his blushing cheeks did witness with him he rather could not help, than
did not know, his fault” (OA 13).
Pyrocles first answers that he has not changed from his former state, but that
Musidorus used to gloss over his flaws out of love, but now has improved his mind so
much that he simply sees Pyrocles for what he is for the first time—“so that the change
you spake of falls not out by my impairing but by your bettering.” Then Pyrocles answers:
“I must needs say thus much … that I find not myself wholly to be condemned because I
do not with a continual vehemency follow those knowledges which you call the bettering
of my mind; for both the mind itself must, like other things, sometimes be unbent, or else
it will be either weakened or broken, and these knowledges, as they are of good use, so are
they not all the mind may stretch itself unto. Who knows whether I feed not my mind with
higher thoughts?” (OA 13). Pyrocles’s response, specifically his invocation of “higher
thoughts” than the merely essential to outward action and his implication that the mind
“may stretch itself unto” other areas, clearly echoes Sidney’s response to Languet when he
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writes, “Yet, let us see if we are not endowing our showy errors with a lovely yet painted
face. For while the mind is thus as it were drawn out of itself, it cannot turn its keenness
upon itself, inwardly to contemplate itself—a work with which nothing men can be
energetically busy at can compare.”111
Furthermore, Pyrocles claims, “I enjoy my solitariness,” and he cites it as the
condition that opens up the higher contemplative thoughts he is eager to pursue: “my
solitariness, perchance, is the nurse of these contemplations. Eagles, we see, fly alone; and
they are but sheep which always herd together” (OA 13–14). Here is an unequivocal,
eloquent, and robust defense of solitariness, linking it to critical insights and unique identity
(the solitary eagle) versus mindless conformity (sheep). Yet immediately this defense is
tempered by the narrator, who gives readers a lens into Pyrocles’s inner conflicts: “And
here Pyrocles suddenly stopped, like a man unsatisfied in himself, though his wit might
well have served to have satisfied another. And so, looking with a countenance as though
he desired he should know his mind without hearing him speak, and yet desirous to speak
to breathe out some part of his inward evil … he continued his speech” (OA 14). Again,
Pyrocles is aware that he is mounting a purely rhetorical, hypothetical defense of
solitariness, an ideal of high contemplations and intellectual self-sufficiency. In the reality
of the diegesis, his changed, solitary behavior is the result of passion and erotic love. In
this way, Pyrocles is a participant in a long tradition of necessary intellectual hypocrisy:
Petrarch defends literary solitude in virtuous, moralistic terms (religious, political,
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contemplative), just as Sidney defends poetry (linked via otium to solitude) in such terms
in his Defence, and both Petrarch and Sidney produce works, the Canzoniere and Astrophil
and Stella, respectively, that seemingly violate every moral tenet they otherwise espouse
in their defenses. Pyrocles knows that he is withholding crucial information from
Musidorus—information that would bolster Musidorus’s case, as it were—and that he
contains an “inward evil,” but he is both ashamed, and intent on winning the debate and
emerging as the superior rhetorician.
Musidorus, for his side of the debate, discerns that some “inward passion
prevail[s]” in his friend, and so he alters his rhetorical strategy. Originally, “having in the
beginning of Pyrocles’ speech which defended his solitariness framed in his mind a reply
against it in the praise of honourable action (in showing that such kind of contemplation is
but a glorious title to idleness; that in action a man did not only better himself but benefit
others; that the gods would not have delivered a soul into the body which hath arms and
legs … but that it were intended the mind should employ them … besides many other better
arguments which the plentifulness of the matter yielded to the sharpness of his wit)” (OA
15), he then chooses an attempt at empathy instead of argumentation. The use of
parentheses for what could have been the crux of Musidorus’s argument provides yet
another layer of complexity and irony: it gives the effect of rendering these debate points
as rather tired, over-rehearsed, and commonplace arguments against solitude, points of
advice often associated with the older generation; and so they are relegated as parenthetical,
nonessential, even trite, a formulaic response that Musidorus has considered but decides to
eschew.
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When Musidorus concedes that Pyrocles ably defends the solitary life, he insists
that such an eloquent defense makes him crave Pyrocles’s company, not his own solitude.
And he concludes by urging Pyrocles to defend solitude, but among “company” (OA 15).
Here Musidorus unwittingly invokes the Petrarchan mode of solitude, which can occur
among not only servants, but intimate friends. However, it is not the adoption of a social
solitariness that Musidorus wants of his friend: he clearly desires a full-fledged return to
court for Pyrocles and the resumption of the ceaseless pursuit of virtue—in other words,
the fulfillment of his friend’s great expectations. It is admittedly unclear, given the events
that occur throughout the rest of the Arcadia, where readers’ attitudes are intended to fall
on the issue of solitariness, indeed on moral issues generally.112 Indeed, neither is it clear
where the narrator’s opinion falls. For such debatable questions in the narrative, is it merely
up to the stronger rhetorician to convince readers? And how does our readerly identification
of Pyrocles with Sidney affect the debate and the moral consequences? Pyrocles argues
under false pretenses—in fact, the end he seeks is not solitariness at all, but the fulfillment
of erotic love—but Musidorus is unable to live up to his own moral declarations: he will
himself soon fall victim to the disease of love, which for Olmsted is a signal that Sidney is
thus “subject[ing] humanism to Protestant irony and critique. Excessive self-confidence
blinds people to the difference between themselves and the ideal of virtue.”113 Additionally,
Pyrocles himself does not change in the face of Musidorus’s critique: Blair Worden sees
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this as Musidorus’s philosophy “explod[ing] in his face,” whereas for Olmsted, Sidney
exaggerates both Musidorus’s and Pyrocles’s positions for a more complex exploration of
the issues.114 For Helgerson, “the narrator manipulates readers into sharing in the guilt” of
the characters and of Sidney himself: even though virtue “has its say more fully … than in
any other prodigal-son story,” in Arcadia, we are convinced into “accepting, even
welcoming, its overthrow.”115 If, at certain times, readers censure the solitariness of certain
characters—as in the case of Basilius—at other times we condone it, as with Pyrocles,
“until principle is irrecoverably lost in a maze of partiality.”116
Musidorus goes on to link Pyrocles’s solitariness with poetry: “or else you feed
sometimes your solitariness with the conceits of the poets, whose liberal pens can as easily
travel over mountains as molehills … especially when they put such words in the mouth of
one of these fantastical mind-infected people that children and musicians call lovers” (OA
15–16). The lover as poet/author connection seems to increase identification of Pyrocles
with Sidney and thus readers’ sympathies with his point of view (especially given the
original audience for the Old Arcadia), while also undermining Musidorus’s side of the
debate. As Woudhuysen notes, Sidney, in his fiction, is fascinated with the material
practices of writing, with pens, inks, paper and vellum, and letter-writing;117 he also
demonstrates the physical space of writing. Switching back to the New Arcadia,
immediately after the author/lover connection, the two men are interrupted, and return to
their “lodgings,” where Pyrocles begins “writing a few words which he left sealed in a
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letter against their return” (NA 114). Upon returning from a hunt and finding Pyrocles
vanished, Musidorus “lighted upon the letter which Pyrocles had written before he went
hunting, and left in his study among other of his writings” (NA 116). The retreat into the
private room in a state of emotional and intellectual turmoil (not unlike Kalander in the
book’s opening) is here linked to composition, in this case concerning “violence of love”
(NA 116). It recalls Petrarch, who, in his Ascent of Mont Ventoux, writes that “amid these
surging emotions … I came back in deep night to the little country inn from which I had
set forth before daybreak…. Then, while the servants were busy getting a meal, I retired to
a private room to write all this to you.”118
As Alice T. Friedman has documented in her book House and Household in
Elizabethan England, the sixteenth-century in England saw a number of architectural
changes, including increased space for social activity as well as separate private space,
small rooms such as studies or closets.119 Since, as was evident with Kalander’s seclusion,
servants would be present in the chamber, then the closet or study, as Mark Girouard has
written in Life in the English Country House, “was perhaps the only room in which its
occupant could be entirely on his own.”120 Such rooms, which “appeared all over large
houses—or indeed did not appear: they could often be secreted within massive interior
walls,”121 had two main functions: “private devotions, and a room for private study and
business.”122 This is not to posit a narrative of Renaissance individualism or rise of modern
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subjectivity from the so-called Great Rebuilding, or to echo Philippe Ariès’s assertion that
early modern England was the “birthplace of privacy” and that in the Middle Ages “nobody
was ever left alone”; Girouard himself writes that “the idea that there was no privacy in a
mediaeval house is based on a total misreading.”123 But even if, as for Alan Stewart, the
closet/studiolo functions as “topos” and not “an unmediated account of household
practice,” as less an “absolute truth” than “a powerful social myth functioning in a
particular way,”124 its association with solitariness and privacy (however performative,
rhetorical, or even public), and consequently its association with composition, renders its
inclusion in the Arcadia significant as the site of Pyrocles’s withdrawal from the socialritualistic hunting expedition in the midst of “surging emotions.”
Even in nature, Pyrocles creates a private space. When Musidorus, seeking out his
friend, comes upon an Amazon woman (Zelmane) living in the woods, who is actually a
disguised Pyrocles whom Musidorus does not yet recognize, he observes the woman: “But
this lady walked out-right till he might see her enter into a fine close arbour. It was of trees,
whose branches so lovingly interlaced one the other that it could resist the strongest
violence of eyesight; but she went into it by a door she opened, which moved him … to
follow her; and by and by he might hear her sing this song” (NA 131). The “close arbour,”
an ersatz closet, even has a door, and also is associated with poetry, as Zelmane sings a
song in verse, which is how Musidorus recognizes Pyrocles. Such a private, removed space
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of composition, of potential creative and personal freedom in opposition to the world, takes
on darker implications later in Sidney’s career, as we see in turning to Astrophil and Stella.

“A mazefull solitarinesse”
Sidney’s Astrophil and Stella was the first major erotic sonnet sequence by an Englishman,
helping to initiate a sonnet craze of the early 1590s.125 Sidney’s sequence further
demonstrates what Vickers has formulated as the “inherent ambivalence of otium.”126 In
the Ciceronian model, otium applied to a good end, whether public benefit or personal
morals, can be condoned because it is explicitly contrasted to otium otiosum, which leads
to vice and sin. But instead of being applied to a morally edifying end, Astrophil’s poetic
pursuit of Stella is designed to incite adulterous love. Poetry itself was degraded by some
of Sidney’s contemporaries as a “trifle” that distracted from serious affairs127—here, again,
we see overtones of the humanist anti-solitariness argument. So not only is poetry itself
cast in a dubious shadow in the English Renaissance, but love poetry, not to mention love
poetry with adulterous content, would be particularly hard to incorporate into a Ciceronian
or even a Petrarchan mode of solitariness and withdrawal—this has led to a long tradition
of reading Sidney’s sequence as ironic, in order to make it morally instructive.
Complicating Astrophil’s pursuit is its much-discussed biographical relevance to Sidney
himself, and Penelope Devereux (who became the Lady Rich on November 1, 1581). As
Richard Helgerson writes, “What we find is … a fictional exploration of certain
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fundamental tensions with just enough personal coloring so that its first audience might
easily have recognized the tensions as those generated by Sidney’s own life.” 128 But who
would have constituted this first audience?
In Sonnet 34, when Astrophil engages in a debate with his wit, there is the following
exchange: “‘Art not asham’d to publish thy disease?’ / Nay, that may breed my fame, it is
so rare: / ‘But will not wise men thinke thy words fond ware?’ / Then be they close, and so
none shall displease” (lines 5–8).129 Ringler glosses “close” as “kept private, not allowed
to circulate,”130 which seems to be exactly what Sidney did. Woudhuysen convincingly
demonstrates that Astrophil and Stella was kept very private by the standards of manuscript
circulation, and may not even qualify to be incorporated into the phrase “manuscript
publication.”131 Sidney had his personal papers of the sequence copied by a secretary or
scribe; he then read this fair copy and made alterations and corrections in his own hand,
which implies authorial control. Three copies were made from the corrected fair copy (none
of which survive), but the first, made for Sidney’s sister, was perhaps not until 1588, two
years after Sidney’s death.132 The sequence was kept within a tight and limited circle of
family and perhaps some intimate friends, such as Fulke Greville: in other words, it was
“private and inward.”133 The material privacy and closeness of Astrophil and Stella
correlates to its personal privacy and “inward torment,” which relates profoundly to the
abject, melancholy solitariness of the lover (Astrophil), and the solitariness of the
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aggrieved and grieving courtier (Sidney) unable to seize the liberating, exciting, resistant
potential of solitude that Pyrocles taps into.
Sonnet 1, written in twelve-syllable lines, indicating a familiarity with French
sonneteers,134 is a highly intertextual sonnet, very much about composition, and hinting at
the torment of solitariness. The first line, “Loving in truth, and faine in verse my love to
show,” carries a blatant and much-discussed pun on faine/feigne, which links poetry and
lying and “destabilizes Astrophil’s claim that he loves in truth, since the phrase … hints
that the act of writing poetry per se involves some degree of falsification.”135 The poem
echoes Petrarch’s opening Rime Sparse in calling for “pity,” though Petrarch requests pity
of his readers, Astrophil desires it from Stella. Of course, the “grace” Astrophil hopes to
win via “pity” is adulterous love. Sidney also echoes Du Bellay’s Regrets 4, ironically in
the lines, “Oft turning others’ leaves, to see if thence would flow / Some fresh and fruitful
showers upon my sunne-burn’d braine” (lines 7–8).136 The “others’ leaves” that Astrophil
consults to inspire his “sunne-burn’d braine,” end up impeding his poetic progress, until he
announces what is ostensibly a call for authenticity: “Biting my trewand pen, beating my
self for spite, / ‘Foole,’ said my Muse to me, ‘looke in thy heart and write’” (lines 13–
14).137 Astrophil has reversed the proper poetic method: begin with “invention,” then move
to words; Astrophil “first sought words (elocutio) rather than matter, and tried to find words
through imitation of others rather than by the proper processes of invention.”138 The
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masochistic ending to Sonnet 1 also demonstrates the tortured and extreme emotions
fostered by love, and the solitary space in which the act of writing takes place.
There are numerous sonnets in the sequence that involve interactions and debates
with a disapproving friend, many of which emphasize the public/private or
political/solitary split that so informs Sidney’s work and correspondence. Some of these
sonnets, such as 14, in which Astrophil tries to prevent his pursuit for Stella from being
labeled “sin,” mirror the debate between Musidorus and Pyrocles on love. Sonnet 21
explicitly addresses the political expectations that Sidney had generated only a few years
prior, remembering that “when Sidney wrote the sonnets (or gathered them into a
sequence), he was, and he was known as a politically, economically and socially
disappointed young man”139:

My wits, quicke in vaine thoughts, in vertue lame:
That Plato I read for nought, but if he tame
Such coltish gyres, that to my birth I owe
Nobler desires, least else that friendly foe,
Great expectation, weare a traine of shame.
For since mad March great promise made of me,
If now the May of my yeares much decline
What can be hoped my harvest time will be? (lines 4–11).
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Astrophil’s friend, sounding like Musidorus to Pyrocles or Languet to Sidney, expresses
consternation over his friend’s lack of virtuous pursuit and his ultimately unfulfilled
political ambitions. As Duncan-Jones notes, “mad March great promise made of me” is
probably a reference to Sidney’s travels and esteemed reputation on the Continent, and
perhaps specifically to his visit to the Holy Roman emperor in 1577. 140 The cause of
Astrophil’s frustration is, of course, his consuming and melancholic love for Stella; for
Sidney, as we have seen, literary pursuit and a desire for withdrawal may have contributed
to hindering court advancement. Love and (love) poetry were both activities of moral
dubiousness, and the link between writing in private withdrawal and being consumed by
love emerges powerfully. As in the Arcadia, the conflicted, tortured lover is a stand-in for
the writer of literary fictions. And both the author and the lover, of course, relate directly
to the ambivalence of otium, which was, in the Roman tradition onward, directly connected
to love-poetry: “One group … flaunted their otium, took it, indeed, as a defining
characteristic of the state in which they found themselves, being in love…. Otium is at
times the condition of paralysis in which love has plunged them, at other times the vacancy
which love will fill.”141 Even Petrarch, the champion of the contemplative life, scolds
himself in his mock-dialogue with Augustine for the mistakes he made as a result of loving
Laura. He confesses to having not, as a young man, pursued the difficult path to virtue,
opting for “sensual desires” instead; and he suffered a “melancholy love for being alone,
avoiding all our fellow-men,” as Augustine implores him to “avoid solitude.”142

140

Duncan-Jones, The Major Works, 360.
Vickers, “Leisure and Idleness,” 19–21.
142
Ibid., 114.
141

97
The changes in Astrophil’s demeanor invite queries and surmises from others, as in
Sonnet 23: “The curious wits, seeing dull pensivenesse / Bewray it selfe in my long setled
eyes, / Whence those same fumes of melancholy rise, / With idle paines, and missing ayme,
do guesse” (lines 1–4). Astrophil is clearly obsessed with something, but he has become
indecipherable, as the guesses of others are far off the mark. When he writes, “Some that
know how my spring I did addresse, / Deeme that my Muse some fruit of knowledge plies”
(lines 5–6), we can hear an echo of Sidney’s purported studiousness (which we saw in the
Languet correspondence) during his European travels.143 Those observing Astrophil either
assume scholarly pursuits or political engagement (lines 7–8) when clearly Astrophil
neglects thinking about the state business with which he should be occupied. In Sonnet 30,
Astrophil opens with seven questions asked of him by “busie wits” (line 12) regarding
international affairs, ultimately confessing, “I, cumbred with good maners, answer do, /
But know not how, for still I think of you” (lines 13–14). The questions, which would have
been topical in the summer of 1582, again reinforcing that as the time of Sidney’s
composition, do not interest Astrophil.144 Instead, as Sidney advocates in the letter quoted
above, Astrophil turns inward.145
On the two distinct forms of otium, Petrarch writes: “One is busy, which even in
very rest is doing somewhat, and busie about honest affayres, and this is very sweete: The
other is slouthful and idle, and geven onely to sluggyhnes, than which there is nothyng
more loathsome, or more lyke to the grave.”146 Astrophil at times is presented as extremely
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inactive, seemingly prone to the harshly negative configuration of otium. In Sonnet 34,
discussed above, after Astrophil has decided to keep his writing “close,” wit responds,
“‘What idler thing, then speake and not be hard?’” (line 9). Here is the humanist charge of
idleness and impracticality. Further charges of sloth or idleness could emerge from
Astrophil’s sleep poems, for example 38, which demonstrates inactivity and passivity due
to the dominance of imagination: “As soon as the apparition disappears the speaker
reawakens, yet Astrophil’s mind is not restored … rather, he awakes to find himself
impoverished and debilitated. The descent into inwardness, into ‘clos’d-up sense’ … leaves
Astrophil … preferring … the rule of ‘fancie’s error’ to reason.”147 Sidney opens himself
and his poetic alterego up for the harshest possible criticism concerning idleness and
frivolity in the midst of the serious business of state being ignored.
In Sonnet 51, presumably addressed to a courtier, Astrophil finds public discourse
“tedious and incongruous” with his consuming thoughts of Stella.148 In Sonnet 64, political
advancement, in a series of degrading images, is rendered insignificant next to Stella: “Let
all the earth with scorne recount my case, / But do not will me from my Love to flie” (lines
7–8). If the vita activa requires public life and the pursuit of virtue, Astrophil, who doesn’t
care “though some above me sit” (line 11), ironically finds his virtuous goal in Stella, and
presumably in his verse designed to woo her: “thou my Vertue art” (line 14). Where
Pyrocles indulges the “aristocratic fantasy” of the possibility of “seek[ing] virtue by
pursuing honorable love with a lady,”149 for Astrophil, not only is his love adulterous, but
all the rhetorical work to make the pursuit sound virtuous cannot escape the physical
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reality: “So while thy beautie drawes the heart to love, / As fast thy Vertue bends that love
to good: / ‘But ah,’ Desire still cries ‘give me some food’” (71.12–14). When Astrophil
seems to achieve some success in his pursuit of Stella, he depicts his achievements in public
and monarchical terms: “For Stella hath with words where faith doth shine, / Of her high
heart giv’n me the monarchie” (69.9–10). Stella’s favor is not simply superior to the life of
active courtiership, it amounts to making Astrophil a king.
Sidney defended poetry passionately in his Apology, but not the kind of verse that
comprises his sonnet sequence; likewise Petrarch’s defense of solitude in the De vita
solitaria does not include the solitude of the lover from his Canzoniere. Stemming from
the anxieties raised by the seeming incompatibility between the Apology and Astrophil and
Stella, there has been a long tradition, beginning shortly after the unauthorized publication
of Astrophil and Stella in 1591, of demonstrating how Astrophil and Stella functions
ironically and didactically. Thomas Moffett, who was a friend of the Sidney family, wrote
an early biography of Sidney (1594) to be presented to Sidney’s nephew. The biography
effaces or recasts both Sidney’s proclivity for solitariness in lieu of life at court, and his
proclivity for poetry itself. As Peter Herman demonstrates, Moffett tweaked Sidney’s
literary chronology in order to relegate his literary endeavors to adolescence.150 In
Moffett’s depiction, Sidney as an adolescent becomes involved in “sportive” arts
“unwillingly,” and

He amused himself with them after the manner of youth, but within limits;
he was somewhat wanton … but observed a measure and felt shame. On that
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account he first consigned his Stella … to darkness and then favored giving
it to the fire…. Later, when [Sidney] had begun to enter into the
deliberations of the commonwealth, he did not cling to his own pleasure, but
gave up love, poetry … and the other clogs upon the mind…. He devoted
himself wholly to watching over the interests of his fatherland.151

In the Moffett storyline, even the adolescent Sidney felt “shame” at his poetry, and upon
entering adulthood poured himself uninterruptedly into state service, not otium. When we
see Astrophil refer to his poetry as “toyes,” this conventional dismissive phrase accords
with the anti-poetic conception of the time, but seems entirely divorced from the Sidney
who, as Woudhuysen demonstrates, revised his work avidly and kept tight authorial control
over it.
Fulke Greville, who would have spent time with Sidney during his earlier periods
of rustication, does not manipulate chronology in his biography as Moffett does, but deemphasizes Sidney’s literary endeavors in accordance with the ongoing creation of a public
image of ideal courtiership: “The truth is, his end was not writing even while he wrote …
but both his wit and understanding bent upon his heart to make himself … not in words or
opinion, but in life and action, good and great.”152 Again, (public) action and (private)
poetry are not compatible, and Sidney’s legacy must be one of having unequivocally placed
greater importance on the public. The themes that Musidorus and Pyrocles argued over
with so much ambivalence in Arcadia continue to haunt Sidney posthumously.
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Sidney’s longstanding desire for periods of withdrawal, Petrarchan solitariness, and
the contemplative life of literary leisure notwithstanding, solitary space in Astrophil and
Stella becomes abject and tormented. Sonnet 96 is addressed to Astrophil’s thoughts and
depicts an oppressive, melancholy solitude, filled with tears and blackness: “Thought with
good cause thou likest so well the night, / Since kind or chance gives both one liverie, /
Both sadly blacke, both blackly darkned be” (lines 1–3). In both the nighttime and in
Astrophil’s inner thoughts there exists “a mazefull solitarinesse” (line 9), with “mazefull”
glossed as “frightening” or “bewildering.”153 The solitude-seeking and melancholic lover
was certainly a trope in such poetry, as we see in Ronsard:

The thickest part of a lonely wood, the steepest point of a forbidding rock,
the wildest spot on an isolated shore and the fearsome aspect of the most
silent caverns soothe my sighs and my lamentations to such a degree that it
is only by seeking the solitude of a most secret shade that I feel I am being
cured of this raging love, which is driving me mad in the most verdant
months of my age.154

While the “grieving lover comforted by the solitude of nature is frequent in the verse of
Petrarch and his imitators,”155 Astrophil does not seek comfort in nature, but is more often
penned up in his chamber, sleepless, neurotic, and tormented—solitariness is not a balm
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but a burden. In sonnet 98, Astrophil addresses his bed, and reveals his anxious, lonely
isolation:

With sweete soft shades thou oft invitest me
To steale some rest, but wretch I am constrained,
… to turn and tosse in thee.
While the black horrors of the silent night,
Paint woe’s black face so lively to my sight,
That tedious leisure marks each wrinckled line (lines 5–11).

The alliteration of “s” that permeates the poem calls forth the somnolence Astrophil feels
but which he cannot remedy with sleep. “Leisure,” the literal meaning of otium, has become
“tedious” for Astrophil. Contrast Astrophil’s “tedious leisure” to the “dignified ease” that
Languet chastised Sidney for desiring; and Astrophil is not lured by the “privacy of
secluded places” that Languet knew were so appealing to Sidney. If those secluded places
are for Sidney’s poetic creation synonymous with his torment, we can perhaps detect an
alteration in Sidney’s own feelings and thoughts toward his isolation. And if Ringler’s
timeline is accurate, the composition of Astrophil and Stella takes place not merely in the
midst of personal and professional turmoil for Sidney, but perhaps away from the milieu
of shared seclusion at Wilton, and in the “damp outpost” in Wales instead. Physical,
intellectual, and emotional interiority connotes wretchedness and failure. When Astrophil
confronts the “envious wits” in sonnet 104, he writes, “Ah, is it not enough, that I am
thence, / Thence, so farre thence, that scarcely any sparke / Of comfort dare come to this
dungeon darke, / Where rigrows exile lockes up all my sense?” (lines 5–8). For Astrophil,
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the solitariness by which the mind turns “it keen sight inward” has become a dark dungeon
of abjection.

Sidney’s periods of withdrawal and their accompanying literary activity form a prototype
of Romantic authorship—the author as outsider, as “uniquely separate from society.”156
This is not, however, the idealizing notion of some essential, pure, autonomous, and
untouched self, even if that is indeed the underlying fantasy of solitude, but rather a
conflicted and ambivalent struggle between public and private selves, a participation with
the world and not a retreat from it. Sidney strives to create a new identity, one in opposition
to the world, and through the literature that is a product of his alienation and voluntary and
forced retirements to critically engage, even if ultimately unable to fully follow through on
his critique, to move beyond his public role of would-be courtier and seeker of virtue.
Ultimately mired in self-division and guilt and shame, the solitary author doesn’t achieve
the fantasy of a self liberated from the state—a private, inward self that can compensate
for the failures and frustrations of the public, professional, symbolic self—but the very
attempt to create a world elsewhere begins to point toward the utopian impulses of
withdrawal that will animate the literature of solitude.
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Chapter 3. “Hereafter, in a better world than this”: Shakespearean Solitude and the Uotpian
Imagination.

Introduction
The are two dominant modes of solitude in the early modern period—exilic, social, pastoral
solitude, on the one hand, and misanthropic, individualist solitude, on the other. Both are
found in Shakespeare’s works: As You Like It representing the former, with the character
of Jaques serving as a bridge to the latter, found most forcefully in Timon of Athens. At
first glance these two strands of solitude seem incompatible, yet both speak to the longing,
both spoken and implicit, to build Le Beau’s “better world.” But this utopian impulse is
not presented as a simplisitic wish: as Hugh Grady writes, “Shakespeare’s category of the
utopian possesses that rare quality of self-reflexivity, of an understanding of some of its
own limits and weaknesses.”1 The moral ambivalences and contradictions of solitude
contribute both to the liberating utopian imagination but also to its darker underside, its
limitations and problems.
Timon of Athens is Shakespeare’s most explicit treatment of solitude—as we’ve
seen thus far in this dissertation, solitariness carries connotations of metaphysical isolation,
alienation, inwardness, distinctiveness, etc. However, in Timon the subject is the seemingly
more straightforward, hermitic notion of solitude, a withdrawal from society and people to
pursue a life of physical aloneness that, in Timon’s case, offers a space for vicious satiric
commentary:

1
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Timon will to the woods, where he shall find
Th’unkindest beast more kinder than mankind.
The gods confound …
Th’Athenians, both within and out that wall;
And grant, as Timon grows, his hate may grow
To the whole race of mankind, high and low (4.1.35–40).2

Notice here, like Hamlet’s “A little more than kin, and less than kind” (1.2.65), the pun on
“kind”: it emphasizes Timon’s (desired) separation/difference from the rest of mankind,
and also echoes the breaking of the bond that differentiates man from beast, famously
formulated by Aristotle: “He who is unable to live in society, or who has no need because
he is sufficient in himself, must be either a beast or a god.”3 This is the bond that Coriolanus
refers to when he responds to his mother’s pleading with him to spare his birthplace: “out,
affection! / All bond and privilege of nature break” (5.3.24–25).
Shakespeare’s larger conception of solitariness/solitude hasn’t come under much
scrutiny, though what has been written about solitude in the plays frames the topic,
appropriately, in terms of the active life–contemplative life debates that were a feature of
elite Renaissance intellectual and political culture, Tudor-Stuart England very much
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included. These often moralistic and didactic debates, which became a staple of humanism,
with roots in Greek and Roman culture as well as a medieval Christian tradition, tend to
either unequivocally endorse the vita activa,4 or, in the case of the supposedly more
balanced or ambivalent approach, to endorse it implicitly, by arguing for a sense of
moderation in which withdrawal never really functions as real alternative—for example,
some theoretical period spent away from court, perhaps in solitary scholarly pursuits, could
elevate one’s mind and abilities for the eventual return to the life of virtuous engagement
in civil affairs. Often the position of solitude becomes entirely rhetorical, with personas on
opposing sides of the debate undertaking “an exercise of ingenuity, where attention is
drawn to the discovering of the arguments that can be made.”5 For an English example,
Roger Baynes’s 1577 Praise of Solitarinesse, despite the title, “gives pro and contra
arguments in full. The keynote is balance, as it is struck, for example, in the typically
Senecan conclusion: ‘A wise man therefore ought chieflye to knowe, howe best to applye
both time and place, as well unto Solitarinesse as to Societie’ (Miiiv).”6 In some instances—
particularly in the Lucianic or Menippean tradition—this approach allowed for satirical
critiques of court life, with its tendencies toward flattery and vanity;7 but the solitary, if not
totally condemned, almost always stands simply for contrast, as a trope whose function is
to open up those critiques, an alternative that is meant to remain at a distance, not to be
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indulged in or pursued. This is why Montaigne, who did actually practice periods of
withdrawal/solitude, eschews the active life–contemplative life debates—“Let us leave
aside those long comparisons between the solitary life and the active one”—and formulates
a solitude that doesn’t rely entirely on physical separation or withdrawal, but rather is a
fundamental component of the self, the “room at the back of the shop”: “It is our own self
we have to isolate and take back into possession.”8
A good deal of terminological confusion plagues the society-versus-solitude
debates, as they draw on a long Greek and then Latin tradition and the various vernacular
equivalents of the Greek and Latin terms. One result of this terminological uncertainty is
the expansion of the concept of solitude; of course, absolute solitude is, essentially, an
impossible category, aside from certain extreme cases or excessively punitive prison
sentences. Thus the term has to be enlarged to include bands of exiles or Petrarchan social
solitude or Stoic psychological positioning or various modes of contemplation, study, or
leisure; in Timon of Athens, Shakespeare demonstrates the literal impossibility of solitude,
as Apemantus and Timon either do not or cannot successfully remove themselves from
company, and in fact depend on the concept of the other to position themselves and, more
fundamentally, to define themselves. Thus society-versus-solitude debates render solitude
variously as “solitude à deux” or a separate society of individuals set against the dominant
society; this more expansive meaning deflects criticism that the solitary is unkind,
beastlike, or misanthropic, but also eventually puts the concept of actual
aloneness/isolation in danger of becoming completely elided: “the terms [of the debate]
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themselves lose solidity, or the opposed poles become bridged or even interchanged.”9 This
is why Jaques is such a crucial figure in As You Like It, specifically his refusal to reintegrate
at the play’s conclusion: among the communal solitariness of the forest, he remains an
outsider. Among the celebratory reintegration into formal society, Jaques sounds the
discordant note, seemingly intent on undertaking a more radical form of solitude than the
performative, satrirical kind he has practiced throughout the play.
As we will see, Shakespeare’s exploration of solitude in As You Like It and Timon
of Athens both departs from and incorporates the terms of the active life–contemplative life
debates, and it also reverses the standard fantasy-reality paradigm: ultimately, one does not
indulge in the fantasy of solitude just to escape the corruption and despair of society, but
rather in one’s embrace of solitude, a much more unsettling discovery is made—it is society
and social life that is structured by fantasy. This reversal is especially evident in Timon,
whereas in As You Like It this discovery hovers at the play’s fringes, and is able to be
ignored by all but Jaques as the characters happily relinquish a life of relative freedom in
the forest, forgoing the excitement of utopian possibilities. For Timon, this discovery of
the fraudulence of “real” life is both liberating and yet too traumatic to be fully realized:
these are the “short, quick probings at the very axis of reality” that Herman Melville saw
in the “dark characters” of Shakespeare, particularly Timon.10 Timon ultimately saves
Athens via a kind of self-sacrifice, an extreme negation of the self: it is in this sense that
Timon can be said to be utopian, as utopia is as much about negation as affirmation. As
Frederic Jameson writes, “The Utopian idea … keeps alive the possibility of a world
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qualitatively distinct from this one and takes the form of a stubborn negation of all that
is.”11 As Timon says, “And nothing brings me all things” (5.2.73).

In Brian Vickers’s philological study of otium (of which solitude is an important aspect),
he contends that Shakespeare’s take on the subject conforms to what he sees as the
predominantly negative attitude of the period: “Many characters in Shakespeare express a
truly Roman detestation of otium.”12 Focusing more on the connotations of idleness
inherent in otium, though as he notes any type of solitariness was often quickly and
moralizingly linked to that notion, he cites as an example of this “detestation” Hamlet’s
father’s Ghost’s approval of Hamlet’s seeming virtuous enthusiasm for revenge: “I find
thee apt; / And duller shouldst thou be than the fat weed / That roots itself in ease on Lethe
wharf, / Wouldst thou not stir in this” (1.5.32–35).13
For Cathy Curtis, Shakespeare’s treatment of the active life–contemplative life
debate demonstrates more ambivalence than Vickers allows, an ambivalence she also finds
in much of the debate outside of Shakespeare, as in More’s Utopia:14 “Such ambivalent
attitudes persisted in England up to the Jacobean period in which Shakespeare composed
his last plays. The educational and moral treatises of Tudor England and the practice of
servants of the crown such as William Cecil reveal the ubiquity and importance attached
to both sides of the argument.”15 Through a brief look at several plays that involve a person
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of political importance who retreats, at least temporarily, from a position of power,
including King Lear, the duke-friar in Measure for Measure, Duke Senior, Prospero, and
Hamlet, Curtis concludes that Shakespeare revels in the paradoxes of the debate over
withdrawal and offers “a multiple and at times contradictory perspective on sensitive
political questions which clearly preoccupied an early modern audience…. If the hazards
and burdens of dedication to the vita activa are made evident by Shakespeare, the
possibility of renewal is offered by the pastoral idyll and a period of contemplation from
which new perspectives can be gained before a return to political life.”16 Again, the
treatment of withdrawal is ultimately always about the inevitable, and morally superior,
return, with solitude taken seriously only by what it can offer in one’s re-immersion in
society.
Finally, Janette Dillon’s monograph Shakespeare and the Solitary Man has two
objectives. First to give more nuance and flexibility to the definition of solitariness in
Elizabethan England: “Self-love, detachment, a contemplative bent, a sense of individual
superiority, a cultivation of distinctiveness, any anti-social or even simply asocial behavior,
might be seen by the Elizabethans as a form of solitude.”17 Second, she posits a cultural
narrative in which solitariness transitions from a category of pure moral dubiousness to a
semi-rebellious position that became the focus of a cult in the 1590s and finally, in the
seventeenth century, to an accepted, domesticated solitude that was about retirement and
“monied leisure and moral self-satisfaction rather than a flagrant challenge to social
values.”18 She ties this narrative of solitariness to ideas of interiority and individuality, as
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opposed to supposed medieval communal self-definitions. We should of course be wary of
this characterization of the Renaissance inauguration of a modern self, the development of
inwardness, or an awakening of autonomous individuality in lieu of communal, corporate
identity; but clearly there is a renewed interest in solitariness in Elizabethan and Jacobean
England and an attempt at refashioning and re-appropriating solitude, which in previous
literature functions largely as a “tragic predicament,”19 and Dillon’s book helpfully tracks
this shift through Shakespeare’s oeuvre. Her reading of Timon of Athens, alongside
Macbeth, continues to show a division in Shakespeare over solitude: “They present the
solitary man as villain-hero, simultaneously noble in his isolation yet morally condemned
for voluntarily seeking it out. The audience must condemn these men for their studied
rejection of the social bonds which should define their humanity and yet pity them for their
very isolation, perhaps even admire them for the defiance with which they face up to the
solitary way they have chosen.”20
This chapter draws on these works on Shakespeare’s treatment of solitude, but also
attempts to supplement the historicist contextualization of solitude by putting the question
in dialogue with approaches to the plays that have focused on issues of ideology,
psychoanalysis, and utopia.

“To liberty, and not to banishment”:
Solitude as Social Critique and Utopian Yearning
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While solitude can be linked to excessive individualism in the period, it often,
paradoxically, stands in for a communitarian impulse, either indirectly, where a yearning
for withdrawal based on disgust at the world contains simultaneously the desire for a
“better world,” or directly, through representations of communities of “solitaries” trying to
forge alternatives to court life. For Robert Sayre, the seventeenth-century theme of
retreat/solitude is in part a “revolt against the conditions of a new social order,” a
withdrawal, rhetorical or literal, “from a society based on competition, antagonism, selfinterest.” It is, in other words, a “search for lost community.” This desire, this search, can
be expressed by works that focus on a solitary character, as “the theme of retreat to solitude
is often informed with the ideology of the order it spurns; it is in many cases itself an
expression of the new individualism.”21 This is what Sayre means by the paradox of
“community in solitude,” which he sees as representative of the “far limits of solitude” in
the period—a kind of implicit acknowledgment of the “solitude within society,” a variant
of Marxist theories of alienation, that will come to dominate in nineteenth- and twentiethcentury literature.22 But the idea of community in solitude, an alternative or “lost” society,
can be explicitly addressed, I would argue, through the trope of exile: thus “community in
solitude” is not merely that which is contained within the individual outsider, but what
happens when a group of outsiders or outcasts come together. Both misanthropic,
individualist solitude and exilic social solitude can speak to a utopian longing.
Shakespeare’s As You Like It is a play that touches on so many of the crucial issues
surrounding the idea of solitude and withdrawal in the period: it participates in and critiques
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the pastoral mode of solitude; it offers an exiled community as a counterpart to the social
and political world of the court, a social experiment of sorts; it speaks to a longing for a
“better world than this” but also confronts the harshness and realities of such attempts; and
it also contains the solitary figure par excellence—mocked and yet elevated, a figure of
derision and satire yet also a source of wisdom and audience affection—Jaques. For Sayre,
a work such as As You Like It should be seen in the sociopolitical context of the
development of a society where the “competition of each individual against all others,
following their private interest, is the general rule” and “the impersonal and antagonistic
relationship of exchange constitutes the basic network of bonds in the social fabric”: in
other words, “human relations become ‘reified’” and the consequence is the realization that
society is structured around “illusory communities” that are in fact only based on selfinterest.23 While not explicitly discussing this play (he focuses on French literature of the
period), Sayre’s portrait here seems an accurate description of the pre-forest world in As
You Like It.24
When Shakespeare’s foppish courtier Le Beau advises Orlando to flee the court in
order to escape the vengeful usurper, Duke Frederick, he ends his plea with a projection of
a better future: “Sir, fare you well. / Hereafter, in a better world than this, / I shall desire
more love and knowledge of you” (1.2.268–70). This is one of many striking instances in
the play when a character expresses clear recognition of the shortcomings of the world as
it is, and consequently yearns for a society where human interaction is not inhibited by the
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vagaries of court power and competition. The contrast between the world of the court and
the world of nature (in this case, the forest) is a trope of traditional pastoral, and of
Shakespeare’s source material for As You Like It, Thomas Lodge’s Rosalynd (1590). As
You Like It participates in the pastoral genre, though skeptically: Shakespeare complicates
the court-forest dichotomy on both ends. He uses the discourse of exile and communal
solitude to question the possibility of creating an alternate form of social organization freed
from the strictures of the court/state. The trope of exile does not function only as generic
convention or plot device, but as a phenomenon that has historical and contemporary
implications running alongside its metaphorical and literary meanings. Shakespeare
radically changes and enhances the material bestowed on him by Lodge and by pastoral to
explore Le Beau’s “better world.” As You Like It both problematizes hierarchy and systems
of social distinction, and, through the literal and symbolic meanings of exile provides a
nonsimplistic utopian wish fulfillment for the audience. Ultimately, the play cynically
seems to deny, or at least to defer, the transgressions it embraces as nearly all the characters
are reinscribed into their socially mandated roles at the end. Jaques, solitary to the end,
forms the major exception to this seeming capitulation.
Shakespeare does not depict life in the forest and the exile community through a
purely idyllic lens. Rather, the difficulties of that life are made abundantly clear. And this
is one way in which the play denies naïve utopian longings, even as it simultaneously
indulges in utopian projections. We are shown an alternative society, but it becomes subject
to its own contradictions and hardships. 25 The forest represents a slackening of social
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hierarchies—but not an abolition. The exiled characters seem close to conceiving a new
system of governance, but they cannot quite cast off the now useless titles and rituals of
court life. We hear of the carefree “golden world” that even Charles, the bloodthirsty
wrestler, seems genuinely to long for; as Grady writes, what we hear of the banished world
has “the aura of utopia.”26 Yet both in practical and political terms the forest is merely a
less stratified, exploitative place, and one which is quickly and happily relinquished at the
play’s conclusion. The incompleteness of utopian fulfillment, however, indicates a more
serious engagement with social questions than a quasi-magical pastoral transformation
would.
It is the status of exile, both compulsory and voluntary, and thus the formal severing
of ties with the court/state, that allows the egalitarian potential of the forest of Arden to be
tapped into. The ultimate insiders, the Duke and his lords, are turned into outsiders; and
through their outsider status they construct a new life in the forest, even with the pleasures
and comforts they have had to renounce. And exile itself, removal from allegiance or
connection to a state, more than the forest and its various magical connotations, is the
condition in As You Like It that allows for the partial, though decidedly incomplete,
reinvention of the self and society. Jane Kingsley-Smith has demonstrated that banishment
and exile were not merely distant memories in Elizabethan and Jacobean England, as legal
historians had previously contended, but rather realities of statutory law and royal
proclamation. In fact, banishment and exile were “particularly favoured by Tudor and early
Stuart monarchs,” and were inflicted for a variety of reasons in decrees spanning from 1562
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to 1605.27 Exile developed into a method of “self-reinvention”28 for some of those whom
it was forced upon (or who chose it in lieu of other legal punishments). It also, like
solitariness itself, represents a loss of the social self—a notion both invigorating and
frightening. The idea of self-alienation is hinted at in the play through Celia’s pseudonym,
Aliena. The loss of identity that follows the loss of one’s nation allows new potential selves
to emerge—Rosalind as Ganymede, Celia as Aliena, Jaques as a fool, Touchstone as a
lover. But Shakespeare’s representation of exile in As You Like It, and the incomplete
utopian society that the exiles construct in Arden, intimates that a more radical severing of
the self as it had been constructed to the point of exile may be a sacrifice demanded to
achieve a fuller reinvention of human society. Exile in the play serves as a dream of an
unfettered self amid a communal solitude, but like a dream it evaporates in the end.

The play’s opening lines, delivered by Orlando, reflect immediate anxiety over social status
and raise important complications. The play begins with a fraternal and internecine conflict
that has arisen due to primogeniture, as Orlando protests that his brother Oliver has violated
his duties as laid out by their father: “It was upon this fashion / bequeathed me by will but
poor a thousand crowns, / and, as thou sayst, charged my brother on his blessing / to breed
me well—and there begins my sadness” (1.1.1–4). Louis Montrose writes of the play’s
opening scene: “Shakespeare’s opening strategy is to plunge his characters and his
audience into the controversy about a structural principle of Elizabethan personal, family,
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and social life.”29 As evidence that there would have been keen audience interest and
perhaps empathy to the conflict arising from primogeniture, Montrose writes, “In the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, primogeniture was more widely and rigorously
practiced in England—by the gentry and lesser landowners, as well as by the aristocracy—
than anywhere else in Europe.”30 Despite his ingrained assumptions, Orlando continues to
seem aware of the arbitrariness behind these conventions, as when he says to his older
brother, “The courtesy of / nations allows you my better … but the same tradition takes not
away my blood” (1.1.43-5). Montrose describes the phrase “Courtesy of nations” as
“Orlando’s indictment” of primogeniture;31 and Orlando clearly sees such a law, which
creates a familial hierarchy, as a product of state law, as opposed to the inherent superiority
of one sibling over another. When it suits his needs Orlando openly recognizes the
unnaturalness of law and power; yet in his relationship with Adam, and in his concept of
his place in the world, he sees his “blood” as a natural entitlement of superiority.
The play transitions from one internecine confrontation to Charles, the Duke’s
wrestler, giving an account of another:

the old Duke is banished by his younger
brother, the new Duke, and three or four loving lords
have put themselves into voluntary exile with him,
whose lands and revenues enrich the new Duke. (1.1.95–98)
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With Charles’s summary to Oliver of what is “old news” to him but not to the audience,
Shakespeare offers a mirroring of the conflict between Oliver and Orlando. In the Dukes’
case there has been the usurpation of primogeniture: Duke Frederick has cast off this
“courtesy of nations” and consolidated his own position with his brother’s property and
money. As Grady observes, “treacheries of brother against brother recapitulate and vary a
more socially consequential familial treachery within the state.”32 Charles goes on to depict
the current condition of Duke Senior and those in “voluntary exile” with him:

They say he is already in the forest of Arden, and
a many merry men with him; and there they live like
the old Robin Hood of England. They say many young
gentlemen flock to him every day, and fleet the time
carelessly, as they did in the golden world. (1.1.109–13).

The concept of “voluntary exile” is crucial: this is the rhetorical position that both Petrarch
and Montaigne adopted in their retreats into solitude—the “choice of identity in conscious
opposition to the world” that Starobinski discusses.33 Even Charles, who later in the scene
will be using rhetoric of violence and competition, manages to evince a wistful longing for
life in Arden, and the so-called “golden world.” Although Shakespeare will in part debunk
this idyllic pastoral myth, Charles’s words form a hope for, quite simply, something better.
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In Charles’s imaginary world of Robin Hood, where no one has to toil for a living, 34 there
is even a different conception of time—an alternative time that is crucial to Shakespeare’s
comedies: “Commodified, calibrated, linear time is the spawn of early modern capitalist
society at its most invasive and extortionate, colonizing human consciousness so
completely as to redefine the landscape of the mind, transmuting the innermost contours of
the self into the mentality demanded by the market.”35 Forest or exiled time is to be whiled
away in banter, verbal games, and song. Shakespeare makes nothing unproblematic,
though, and shows that time in the forest among the exiles must also be devoted to securing
food and warmth for survival. But in Charles’s mythologized conception, he senses a
freedom from bondage, a freedom from the state, and instrumental to such a reverie is
transcending time, or at least reshaping it. Even deep within the world of the court there
seems to be a latent desire for emancipation, for some kind of communal withdrawal in the
forest; though Charles’s language soon hardens, the desire he expresses lingers.
Duke Senior’s opening address to the men in Arden both validates and tempers
Charles’s imaginings:

Now, my co-mates and brothers in exile,
Hath not old custom made this life more sweet
Than that of painted pomp? Are not these woods
More free from peril than the envious court? (2.1.1–4)
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The Duke attempts to rally Amiens and the other lords in the face of a cold winter and a
dearth of material comforts. This is not a paradisiacal utopian vision, but still a community
of “co-mates and brothers in exile”: the condition of exile, an absence of a state, is what
makes the men “brothers” and equals.36 The Duke’s locution brings to mind Charles’s
analogy of the “golden world” with the phrase “old custom,” which refers to the supposed
practices of that earlier age.37 While eliciting the “golden world” indicates a removal from
court excess and individualism manifested in greed and vanity, it does not refer to an entire
elision of class distinctions. It is clear that although the exiled men are “co-mates,” Duke
Senior remains the leader in Arden, and the lords attend him with utterances of “my lord.”
Also, Amiens refers to Jaques as “Monsieur,” which “indicates that Jaques is a nobleman
of higher standing than his companion lords.”38
Further complication over the conception of the “golden world” comes in the third
scene of act 2, when Orlando invokes the old world to praise Adam’s loyalty:

O good old man, how well in thee appears
The constant service of the antique world,
When service sweat for duty, not for meed! (2.3.57–59)

Here the “antique world” accentuates the obedience of the indentured servant, who does
not serve merely for his reward, but rather from a sense of duty. This, it seems, is the best
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compliment Adam can hope for. For Adam, the analogy of the “old world” that at other
times in the play, as we have seen, carries egalitarian connotations, only reinforces his
genial servility. However, as Grady writes, within the milieu of feudal relations, Adam
enacts a form of rebellion:

This rhetoric of feudal bonds should not obscure for us … that Adam has in fact,
by throwing in his lot with Orlando, stepped outside of the customary network of
feudal relations; his customary bond, after all, is to the heir Oliver, not to Orlando.
Rather than reassert the stability of the regulated feudal labour customs, he has
violated them by asserting his own independence and becoming an outlaw with
Orlando.39

The similarity between the contradiction Orlando manifests in the opening scenes—
decrying what seems to him an arbitrary product of law as opposed to a natural hierarchy
(primogeniture), while uncritically accepting Adam’s position as naturally inferior—and
the exile community’s denunciation of the court life while maintaining some of its
hierarchical logic, supports Elliot Krieger’s notion of a continuity between the court and
forest worlds (what he refers to as the primary and second worlds): “I see the primary and
second world not as juxtaposed alternatives but as part of the same continuous
representation of reality—single nature’s double name. The second world develops from
the contents of the primary world.”40 Krieger, however, relegates the utopian second world
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to frivolous aristocratic fantasy that blurs and mystifies class distinctions.41 But the
contiguity between the two worlds that he rightly detects, as opposed to a simplistic
dichotomy, as well as the unfulfilled utopian potential, does not diminish the utopian
experiment’s seriousness. This is not to say that it is “radical” as opposed to Krieger’s
“conservative,” but rather that the effort to create an alternate society through a withdrawal,
both voluntary and enforced, into communal solitude both exposes and falls victim to
ideological contradictions and does not blur or mystify class distinctions, but rather
magnifies their power and intractability.
Duke Senior’s language exemplifies the ambivalence of hierarchical distinctions in
the exile community. It is both ripe with notions of equality and recognition that the court
world is flawed, even despicable, yet maintains stratified distinctions that are products of
that world. The communal withdrawal to the forest, the severing of selves from the life of
ambition that Petrarch and Montaigne deride, does not allow the characters to immediately
dismantle the ingrained assumptions and naturalized hierarchies that have hitherto shaped
their existences. As Hamlet, in his solitary resistance against state corruption, realizes, one
of the pitfalls of solitude is how tethered our selves are to the world we seek to discard,
either by turning inward or isolating oneself or joining an exiled community. The
characters in Arden—and, in fact, even the characters who remain in the court—express
desire for a new life in the forest, and to a certain degree, temporarily, they achieve it—but
it is incomplete.
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Fundamentally complicating the pastoral court-forest dichotomy, Shakespeare
presents us with Corin and his predicament. Like contemporary squatters in the Midlands,
Corin does not own the land on which he lives and works:

Fair sir, I pity her,
And wish, for her sake more than for mine own,
My fortunes were more able to relieve her;
But I am shepherd to another man,
And do not shear the fleeces that I graze.
My master is of churlish disposition,
And little recks to find the way to heaven
By doing deeds of hospitality. (2.4.74–81)

Instead of the carefree, solitary shepherd, we have an unkind, despotic landlord, and the
shepherd who does not own the flocks he tends, and is at the mercy of his master’s “churlish
disposition.” As seen from the example of Corin, the forest in itself is not a magical arena
where exploitative relationships cease to exist and people are automatically granted the
right to pursue harmonious ends. Corin’s position is emblematic of a kind of early modern
alienation of labor. Thanks to the angry master’s prolonged absence, Ganymede and Aliena
will buy the cottage and the shearing business and keep Corin on in his position as “feeder,”
but with increased wage—so his relationship to his labor remains unchanged. Shakespeare
takes the time to outline Corin’s situation in some detail, and offers more than what would
be necessary to merely secure the plot machinations (to give Ganymede and Aliena access
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to the cottage throughout their forest stay). This particular depiction of forest/shepherd life
reinforces the notion that it is exile, more than something inherent in the green world, that
enables utopian formulations.
Despite the transference of hierarchy from the court into exile, there is still a
reappraisal of the dominant value system among the exiled men, often through song. At
Jaques’s request to “warble,” Amiens and the other Lords sing:

Who doth ambition shun,
And loves to live i’th’ sun,
Seeking the food he eats
And pleased with what he gets,
Come hither, come hither, come hither.
Here he shall see
No enemy
But winter and rough weather. (2.5.34-41)

The implication of the exiles’ new ethos comes to fruition when Orlando bursts onto the
scene in Arden. He enters upon Duke Senior, Jaques, Amiens and the other men with his
sword drawn, prepared to rob food for himself and Adam. After a brief exchange, Orlando
is shocked by the Duke’s invitation to, “Sit down and feed, and welcome to our table”
(2.7.105). “Speak you so gently?” (2.7.106) he muses, and goes on to invoke the theme of
time once again:

130
But whate’er you are
That in this desert inaccessible,
Under the shade of melancholy boughs,
Lose and neglect the creeping hours of time. (2.7.109–12)

Orlando associates the generosity of the exiles with a loss and “neglect” of time; “the
creeping hours” again signifying the linear, regimented time of the court world, which in
the forest/exiled world, in a community of “seeking the food he eats,” is not applicable.
The Duke concedes that he and his men “have seen better days” (2.7.120), but for readers
or spectators such a statement seems incongruous. While undoubtedly these men have seen
more prosperous days, the utopian energy of Arden is what engages the imagination of the
audience.
When the Duke, after Orlando’s exit, tells his men, “Thou seest we are not all alone
unhappy” (2.7.136), we again see a sense of ambivalence over the exiles’ condition, the
loss, as well as the reinvigoration, of banishment. Shakespeare greatly mitigates the exile
community’s anger and bitterness from his source material, increasing the appeal and
potential of exile; but he does not entirely eliminate the exile’s lament. We know the exiles
don’t miss “mortifying temporal teleology”42 or the excesses of ambition and greed—they
are explicit in celebrating freedom from these burdens. Just as Rosalind has found power
and fostered love through her guise as Ganymede, the Duke and his lords have found a
kind of liberation from the court and seem largely to comprehend the incompatibility of
justice with their former condition: and yet both Rosalind and her father happily undo their
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transformations at the play’s conclusion, as the reintegration is referred to as “new-fall’n
dignity.”
Orlando, as we have seen, is highly concerned about and has a great deal of anxiety
over lineage and class, and is the character who remains most embedded in economic
concerns throughout the play, even in exile. When Oliver, now converted from his prior
cruel self, tries to convince Orlando that he will marry Aliena, Orlando is at first hesitant:
“Is’t possible that on so little acquaintance you / should like her?” (5.2.1–2). Oliver then
reassures Orlando by speaking of property and revenue:

It shall be to
your good, for my father’s house and all the revenue
that was old Sir Rowland’s will I estate upon you, and
here live and die a shepherd. (5.2.9–12)

Orlando immediately replies, “You have my consent” (5.2.13), leaving little doubt as to
his priorities. This arrangement will in fact make both marriages—Oliver to Celia, Orlando
to Rosalind—possible, as Orlando gains the rights of primogeniture, rights that Duke
Senior will also momentarily regain, thus making Orlando a fit husband for a Duke’s
daughter. The relinquishing of the world of communal solitude has begun to occur, and the
world of property and social contracts begins to regain prominence. It even seems to take
a benign supernatural intervention to reinstate “order,” or a proper structure of authority,
as the god Hymen appears to, “make conclusion / Of these most strange events” (5.4.121–
2). Rosalind, who in the forest world, disguised as Ganymede, “wittily asserts her
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independence … and establishes her own household,” has possessed a “controlling power
over affairs in the forest. But this power lapses when she relinquishes her male disguise
and formally acknowledges her normal status as daughter and wife. In a ritual gesture of
surrender, she assumes the passive role of mediatrix between the Duke and Orlando.”43
When Rosalind turns to her father and says, “To you I give myself, for I am yours,” and
then turns to Orlando, “To you I give myself, for I am yours” (5.4.105-6), we feel ourselves
swept back to the world of the court.
Hymen’s appearance and the blessing of the various marriages is quickly followed
by the first appearance of Jaques de Boys, brother to Orlando and Oliver, who comes to
tell all of Duke Frederick’s mysterious conversion at the hands of a religious old man on
the “skirts” of the forest, and how “All their lands restored to them again / That were with
him exiled” (5.4.159-60). The crux of the reintegration back into a highly regimented,
hierarchical world is Duke Senior’s final speech, which stands as a kind of unconscious
elegy to the loss of the utopian potential that had begun to blossom when connection to the
court had been severed by exile:

And after, every of this happy number
That have endured shrewd days and nights with us
Shall share the good of our returnèd fortune
According to the measure of their states.
Meantime, forget this new-fallen dignity
And fall into our rustic revelry. (5.4.167–72)
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The irony is in the Duke’s use of the word “share,” which of course had been what his men
had genuinely been doing while in exile, only now it is conditioned with the line
“According to the measure of their states”—in other words, “in proportion to their rank.”44
We have moved from the unconditional sharing of food with Orlando, to a reminder of the
reality that awaits when the forest is abandoned and the exile over. As the audience will
feel a tinge of sadness at seeing Rosalind reduced to playing the obedient daughter and
wife, so will we lament the end of exile and the community in solitude. In some sense, we
as spectators or readers are like Jaques at the end: endlessly searching for answers, he is
unwilling to return to the world of the court, but neither is he entirely convinced as to the
efficacy of forest life.
Contrary to the readings of the play that seek to uncover its support for the existing
social order, Kiernan Ryan argues that Shakespeare’s comedies, As You Like It included,
“are indeed not concerned with ‘preserving a good already reached’ under existing social
conditions. They are committed to envisaging forms of life liberated from whatever forbids
the free play and shared satisfaction of justified desires.”45 In the ending of As You Like It,
“we are being urged to regard the denouement as a frankly imaginary resolution of conflicts
that remain unresolved outside the theatre.”46 In other words, the ending cannot magically
elide and contain everything that has preceded it. And it certainly cannot eliminate the
needs and desires that produce fantasies of exile and communal solitude that the play
engages.
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But what, finally, of Jaques? As You Like It presents readers and audiences with an
example of genuine “community in solitude”; but it also presents a recalcitrantly solitary
character—the character, in fact, who most perfectly embodies the ambivalences of
solitude in early modern England. Jaques refuses to meaningfully integrate into society,
whether the courtly one or the green world; his solitude is both condemned and elevated,
and he embodies the fundamental paradox of the solitary. However, he is seldom actually
alone: his solitude depends on his ability to verbally joust with others, to offer social and
cultural critiques to an audience. In this way he exemplifies the inherent contradiction of
the solitary, that is, “the presentation of this cult of the private, uncommunicated self
through exaggerated public display.”47 Here we return to Alan Stewart’s notion, discussed
in chapter 1, of early modern solitude as transactional and performative. This seeming
hypocrisy accounts for the sense that Jaques is affected, is a “poseur,” in Harold Bloom’s
words. As Bloom notes, Jaques, like Touchstone, is Shakespeare’s own invention, not
found in Lodge’s story: while he is a “poseur,” a ripe target for Rosalind’s mockery, he has
a “fine complexity,” and “Shakespeare grants his melancholic a dignified end…. Jaques
departs with a flair…. And we wonder again whether he does not speak for a partial
Shakespeare, perhaps the man rather than the poet-playwright.”48
Jaques is the melancholic solitary among the community of solitaries; if pastoral
“portrays a way of life associated with the contemplative ideal, with retirement, privacy,
reflectiveness,”49 then Jaques is the outsider among the outsiders. Though neither does he
represent a Petrarchan ideal of lofty solitary contemplation—like Pyrocles, he falls short
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of the mark, and in fact in many ways is a figure of derision and scorn. While for William
Hazlitt, Jaques was “the only purely contemplative character in Shakespeare” whose “only
passion is thought,” Alan Brissenden sees him entirely as a pathetic and mocked caricature
worthy of our pity and scorn.50 Jaques as the wise truth-teller that the audience identifies
with is a phenomenon of modern theatrical interpretations, a post-Romantic glorification
of solitude and the outsider, perhaps. And yet his role at the play’s conclusion is crucial.
The mechanism that allows the celebratory reintegration into normal society,
discussed above, is the withdrawal into contemplative solitude of the formerly evil Duke
Frederick, as recounted by Jaques de Boys: “And to the skirts of this wild wood he came /
Where, meeting with an old religious man, / After some question with him was converted
/ Both from his enterprise and from the world” (5.4.154–57). This is followed by Duke
Senior’s call for “rustic revelry” (5.4.172), which is then rejected by Jaques, who seems
fascinated by Duke Frederick’s conversion: “To him will I. Out of these convertites / There
is much matter to be heard and learned”; he then declares his apartness from the others:
“So, to your pleasures; / I am for other than for dancing measures” (5.4.179–80, 87–88).
Duke Senior implores Jaques to be part of the community—“Stay, Jaques, stay”—but to
no avail: “To see no pastime, I. What you would have / I’ll stay to know at your abandoned
cave” (5.4.189–91).
As Dillon notes, “This is the only one of Shakespeare’s plays which ends with the
decisions of two characters, Jaques and Duke Frederick, to withdraw from the life of
mutual participation to which the others are returning, in favour of a life of solitary
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contemplation.”51 Furthermore, “Of these two who choose the solitary extreme at the end,
only Duke Frederick does so in the true medieval spirit, offering penitence and devotion in
reparation for his evil wordly life. Jaques chooses a much more sixteenth-century solitude,
choosing in a spirit of sceptical enquiry and experiment.”52 For Judy Kronenfeld, while
Jaques has, throughout the play, been representative of a frivolous solitude, a “fashionable
inactive solitude,” a parody of self-obsession, his resolution at the play’s end demonstrates
an “entirely new tone of humility…. Jaques’s … capacity for genuine insights and
judgments, based on neither self-flattery nor self-pity, are in fact the necessary preamble
to a more genuine seclusion; they allow us to accept his final retreat as more than a pose.”53
While this is a slightly overly moralistic reading, Kronenfeld is certainly right that there is
a new attitude toward solitude here hinted at by Jaques. And its effect is to cast a shadow
over the play’s ending, to “undercut” the harmonious ending: “He questions these orderly
solutions, and is a fragmenting and divisive influence on the ideals of love, marriage, and
good fellowship.”54
Jaques position at the end is not, however, merely to diminish the good cheer.
Rather, it is a reminder that there is something unsatisfactory in the return to the court, in
the eliding of the utopian possibilities of the communal solitaries in exile. For Kiernan
Ryan, there is still a powerful “utopian resonance” at the play’s conclusion, precisely
because of this dramatized gap between what the audience knows could be and what will
be: “For the persons of the play, the denouement may signify a reinstatement of the status
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quo ante, the just restitution of lands and rights, and the reaffirmation of family bonds and
sexual norms through nuptial celebrations; but for the audience watching those celebrations
in the wake of what Arden has revealed, it means much more than that.”55 Jaques’s “other
than for dancing measures,” his lingering and now more committed solitude, is what helps
sustain the utopian energy and social critique of the play beyond the seemingly festive
reintegration to the court world.

“I had rather be alone”
“Baffling,” “curious,” “unfinished,” “abandoned,” “a mistake”: these are just some of the
adjectives regularly applied to Timon of Athens, referring to both the content of the play
and the process of its composition.56 The play has often been dismissed as an incomplete,
half-formed experiment in invective and satire, heavy on allegory and characters without
depth or subtlety. This viewpoint of the play as experimental hasn’t led to only negative
evaluations, however—for example, Kiernan Ryan sees Timon as both a “theatrical
thought-experiment, which accounts in part for its abstract, almost allegorical,
diagrammatic form” and as central to Shakespeare’s artistic vision.57 The play and its
strangeness has also provided fodder for biographical conjecture: E. K. Chambers believed
that Shakespeare failed to finish the play due to a mental breakdown; Harold Bloom thinks
that “it is perfectly legitimate to substitute Athens for London, and the fortyish Shakespeare
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for the noble Athenian,” and he further speculates that the sexual revulsion expressed in
the play is a likely indication that its author suffered from venereal disease.58
A commonplace observation about the play, which ostensibly adds to the sense of
it as something unfinished or marginal, is that it seems never to have been performed in
Shakespeare’s lifetime. However, as Wells and Taylor note while discussing theories that
the play is radically unfinished in their textual companion to the Oxford complete works,
“These theories all place great weight upon the absence of direct evidence for
contemporary performances of the play, and this lacuna is now often cited as evidence the
play was never performed. But we also possess no … evidence that As You Like It, More,
Troilus, All’s Well, or Antony were performed.”59 Timon, of course, has had its defenders,
the most hyperbolic champion of the play being G. Wilson Knight, who in The Wheel of
Fire claimed that “in no other play is a more forceful, a more irresistible, mastery of
technique … employed. But then, no play is so massive, so rough-hewn into Atlantean
shapes from the mountain rock of the poet’s mind or soul, as this of Timon…. For this play
is Hamlet, Troilus and Cressida, Othello, King Lear, become self-conscious and universal;
it includes and transcends them all.”60
The question of authorship has also long vexed Timon (at least since the nineteenth
century): to what extent do parts of the play seem supposedly non-Shakespearean, and can
textual inconsistencies be accounted for by the presence of multiple hands? The scholarly
consensus is now that Timon is a coauthored play by Shakespeare and Thomas Middleton,
with Middleton responsible for “the tawdry masque and banquet scene, spiced up with
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witty commentary on the part of the cynic Apemantus (1.2), the scenes of attempted
borrowing (3.1 to 3.3), the debt-collecting sequences (parts of 2.2, 3.4) and most of the
sections involving the faithful steward, Flavius. Shakespeare took the meatiest scenes for
himself, such as the long opening sequence … [and] he reserved most of the final two acts
for himself: the vehement vituperation of the forest scenes as well as the elegiac and muted
ending.”61 For Wells and Taylor, coauthorship, combined with the likelihood that the text
(1623 Folio) was set from foul papers, accounts for inconsistencies (e.g., the conversation
between Flavius and Ventidius that is arranged in 2.2 but never occurs) or oddities that
have led others to see the play as unfinished or abandoned; they speculate that “Timon is
only distinct from most other foul-paper texts in that it is of joint authorship. The
characteristics of the underlying manuscript are those of a collaborative rough draft in
which each author’s contributions were in his own hand. The task of imposing overall
consistency and coherence was not taken as far as it might haven been in a prompt-book.”62
While theories of collaborative authorship, textual corruption/incompletion, and
Timon’s seemingly precarious place in the Folio—replacing Troilus and Cressida when
that play was moved from the other tragedies—have rendered Timon as somehow marginal
to Shakespeare’s oeuvre, for Harold Goddard, “it is beyond comprehension how anyone

61

Anthony B. Dawson and Gretchen E. Minton, introduction in Arden 3 Timon of Athens,
5. See also Wells and Taylor, Textual Companion, 501, for a more detailed (hypothetical)
breakdown of sections supposedly by Middleton. The sentiment of coauthorship is of
course not universal: see Karl Klein’s introduction for the New Cambridge edition of the
play, 62–65, cited in Dawson and Minton, 2n2. I will use “Shakespeare” throughout in
referring to Timon’s author in order to avoid confusion or an awkward construction such
as Shakespeare-Middleton, and in recognition that which lines are by which writer is
speculative, however informed and rigorously tested.
62
Wells and Taylor, Textual Companion, 501.

140
could doubt that Timon himself … is a product of Shakespeare’s imagination.”63 Rather,
as the “emotional twin of King Lear,” the play is a “safety valve through which
Shakespeare blew off excess thought and emotion…. He seems to let himself go and to
express through the mouth of Timon exactly what he thought and how he felt about
humanity at some moment of mingled anger and disillusionment … with mankind.”64
While such speculations about the emotional state of the (co)author must, of course, remain
speculative (and are representative of a long-out-of-fashion critical idiom), Goddard’s
crucial larger point, which speaks directly to what Melville saw in the play and its solitary
protagonist, is that Timon is not an anomaly but “an extreme embodiment of that scorn of
humanity of which flashes are observable in Shakespeare’s works almost from the
beginning, that contempt which in Hamlet and the ‘dark’ Comedies and some of the
Sonnets becomes conspicuous.”65
Interestingly, it is the Poet and the Painter who set the tone at the play’s opening,
and who reveal the sickness and venality of the Athenian society depicted. Such pervasive
political and social corruption was a pressing concern in Jacobean England, giving the play
an immediately recognizable context for contemporary audiences.66 The Poet and Painter
are joined at first by the Jeweller and the Merchant, perhaps more obvious representatives
of Apemantus’s lament “Traffic’s thy god” (1.1.239), but the Poet and Painter are in no
way outside the world of flattery, deceit, and acquisitiveness; rather, they are full
participants, dependent on the system of patronage to which many writers were subjected
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in Jacobean England. In one of the play’s deep ironies, the Poet is a satirist, and in his
initial description to the Painter of what he is working on to present to the overgenerous
Timon, he predicts exactly the trajectory that the tragedy will take. Describing Timon’s
situation, he notes that Timon “Subdues and properties to his love and tendance / All sorts
of hearts” (1.1.58–59): as with Polonius in Hamlet, here again is a seamless equating of
love/affection with the transactional, material, or commercial—“properties” meaning “to
make one’s own property,” “to take hold or possession of.”67 He goes on to describe his
story of personified Fortune at the top of a hill calling Timon up to herself from among the
throngs “of all deserts” (1.1.66) below; upon this ascent, the others follow Timon, visit
him, flatter him, seem to assist him. However,

When Fortune in her shift and change of mood
Spurns down her late beloved, all his dependants,
Which laboured after him to the mountain’s top
Even on their knees and hands, let him fall down,
Not one accompanying his declining foot. (1.1.85–89)

While the Poet’s motives are no different or more elevated than the other characters who
leech off of Timon, he seems to possess some insight, and it has been suggested that Timon
might have done well to actually read the Poet’s satire. But Timon fundamentally relates
to his society differently than the other characters: his identity is constructed entirely
around the fantasy of bounty, the symbolic role of “noble Timon,” and thus he adopts the
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viewpoint of the naïve, as opposed to cynical, believer: referring to a work by the Painter,
he remarks, “these pencilled figures are / Even such as they give out” (1.1.163–64).
The other characters are all aware of the rules of the game they play: they flatter,
they lavish compliments, they are rewarded; they have no illusions about genuine loyalties
or bonds. For example, when the Poet and Painter seek out Timon, now Misanthropos, in
act 5, they have heard he has reacquired gold and they explicitly plan to make themselves
seem dedicated to him to receive his bounty. The entire plan revolves around seems and
not is: they will appear to have been loyal and will be remunerated. Again, Shakespeare
uses the language of financial transaction in reference to human bonds, with the Painter
plotting that they should “tender our loves to him in this supposed distress of his”
(5.1.13)—“supposed” in that they assume that Timon’s fall from wealth must have been a
performance to test the merit of his friends, a test they seek to pass by feigning loyalty. In
a moment reminiscent of Hamlet seeing through the pretense of his false friends
Rosencrantz and Guildenstern—“Were you not sent for? Is it your own inclining?... Come,
deal justly with me” (2.2.275–77)—Timon understands the motivations of his even more
false admirers: “You’re honest men. You’ve heard that I have gold, / I am sure you have.
Speak truth; you’re honest men” (5.1.73–74).
With the Timon of the first half of the play, however, and his mode of heedless,
naïve belief, we are presented with an extreme case of what in psychoanalysis would be
called a fetishist disavowal—essentially, a denial of a reality that one consciously perceives
and knows: “Timon pursues his reckless course in full knowledge of the consequences, yet
hides that knowledge from his conscious thought.”68 It is not that Timon lacks knowledge,
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or even insight from those willing to tell him the truth (whether allegorically or directly)—
not only the Poet but Apemantus explicitly and repeatedly lays out for him the
phantasmatic nature of his belief in others: “Thou giv’st so long, Timon, I fear me thou
wilt / give away thyself in paper shortly. What needs these feasts, / pomps, and
vainglories?” (1.2.238–40). Timon’s steward Flavius, who, unlike Apemantus, is more
restrained in his ability to chastise Timon, sees clearly the path that Timon’s bounty is
taking: “’Tis pity bounty had not eyes behind” (1.2.157). When Timon begins to
understand the direness of his situation he reproves Flavius for not having let him know
this could happen, to which Flavius responds: “You would not hear me” (2.2.123), and
describes the many times he demonstrated to Timon with his account books the reckless
course he was pursuing. Timon has full knowledge, but he chooses to not know, chooses
the “spurious society” of the cosmopolitan:69 “Nay,” he replies to Apemantus’s prescient
chiding, “an you begin to rail on society once more, I am sworn / not to give regard to you”
(1.2.241–42). Thus, the disavowal: “I know it, but I refuse to fully assume the
consequences of this knowledge, so that I can continue acting as if I don’t know it.”70 It is
another of the play’s ironies that Timon’s mindset makes him solitary from the outset:71
not only does he seem to have no family, no genuine friendships, but he is as apart, as
distinct from the other characters as Apemantus is. But in his solitariness and largesse, he
is the god, not beast, of Aristotle’s formulation, quoted above: “[Timon’s friends] set him
apart, god-like and singular as the phoenix to which one senator compares him.”72
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Timon’s fetish, so to speak, is gold—or, more specifically, the bestowing of it
through bounty on others. For Coppelia Kahn, the Poet’s allegory of the “sovereign lady”
Fortune (1.1.64–89)—which “blends Fortune’s body with that of mother earth” and,
through the image of Timon “bowing his head against the steepy mount,” is suggestive of
“a baby with its head on its mother’s breast”—depicts Fortune from the infant’s
perspective.73 But, “In the final movement, Fortuna is no longer nurturant mother but fickle
mistress.” From this rejection by and separation from the mother, Timon is dropped into
the world of masculine competition, alienation, and deceit: “the implicit logic of the fantasy
in the Poet’s fable … is … because men first know the world as something separate from
a mothering woman, she is held responsible for the outrages and terrors of the world men
come to know.”74 Thus the deep irony when, later, it is digging in the “common mother”
(4.3.177) that Timon finds gold. The “common [i.e., universal] mother” is also “general
[i.e., universal] excrement” (4.3.435), thus, as Kenneth Burke explains in “Timon of Athens
and Misanthropic Gold,” what Timon finds is “a foul form of gold … an ironically Midaslike gold, fecal gold, gold as defined by the touch that turns everything into the idea of
corruption everywhere.”75
I’ll return to Burke and Timon’s invective as Misanthropos below, but first, what
is it that Timon seeks through his excessive, even desperate, bounty? Timon’s bounty is,
quite simply, a hyperbolic representation of desire, articulated by Lacan: “Man’s desire
finds its meaning in the desire of the other, not so much because the other holds the key to
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the object desired, as because the first object of desire is to be recognized by the other.”76
By tying others to him through munificence and ostensibly asking nothing in return—but
of course implicitly asking for praise, flattery, and the constant naming of courtly
compliment (“Most noble Timon”; “Most honour’d Timon”; “worthy Timon,” etc.)—
Timon actually seeks the most fundamental form of recognition, to overcome the
separation allegorized in the Poet’s depiction of Fortuna casting him off. 77 This desire
cannot be articulated in language—to do so would be to acknowledge the constitutive
solitude of the self78—and thus “in the desperate and vain attempt to articulate desire, the
desiring subject continually moves from one demand to another.”79 Timon’s demands are
that others unconditionally accept his extraordinary, and extraordinarily self-destructive,
generosity.
When Timon’s reality is revealed to him as an elaborately constructed fantasy, he
undergoes a seemingly radical transformation, choosing abject solitude over the now
revealed to be false Athenian society. His renunciation, which takes the form of an
apostrophe to the walls of Athens that asks for confusion and destruction to be sowed in
the city, concludes with his tearing off his clothes: “Nothing I’ll bear from thee / But
nakedness, thou detestable town” (4.1.32–33). This gesture, representative of Timon
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shedding his symbolic identity, unmasking himself to the world, is reminiscent of Lear’s
“thou art the thing itself. Unaccommodated man is no more but such a poor, bare, forked
animal as thou art. Off, off, you lendings! come, unbutton here” (3.4.98–101). But whereas
Lear acts out of an attempt at empathy toward Poor Tom, in a recognition of the sameness,
when symbols are cast aside, between king and beggar, Timon emphasizes his singularity,
his lack of kinship with any, even “the babe / Whose dimpled smiles from fools exhaust
their mercy” (4.3.118–19). Timon is as extreme in his vicious isolation as he was in his
excessive bounty. Ironically, Timon’s solitude as Misanthropos is structured around a
series of visitations—Flavius, Apemantus, Alcibiades, Phyrnia and Timandra, the Painter
and Poet, three unnamed thieves—indicating that he has not descended into a kind of pure
experience of solitary self-discovery.80 Rather, Timon is as entirely dependent on the other
for self-definition as he was as Timon the god of bounty.
There is, however, an ethical element to Timon’s attempted solitude, an
unwillingness to any longer participate in the charade of Athenian life.81 Shakespeare drew
on two contradictory sources for Timon: an anonymous comedy based on Lucian’s secondcentury Timon the Misanthrope, and the brief accounts of Timon in Plutarch’s Lives (in
“Alcibiades” and “Antony”). In the former, Timon is a figure of derision, mocked for overthe-top misanthropy, and in the epilogue forced to repent his solitary ways in exchange for
audience applause. References to Timon in other late sixteenth- and early seventeenth-
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century literature “suggest that Timon did not come down to the Renaissance as a tragic
figure, but instead as one to be laughed at or observed with curiosity.” 82 Janette Dillon
concurs: “For the Elizabethans, Timon was the archetypal solitary, his very name a
synonym for solitude,” and his solitude is consistently condemned. 83 However, the
Plutarchan tradition, from which Shakespeare primarily draws, “does not portray him
[Timon] as a figure of ridicule.”84
Shakespeare is fashioning a tragedy out of the story of a figure that had become a
shorthand for excessive misanthropy, a kind of didactic negative exemplum. For Kiernan
Ryan, Shakespeare’s attraction to a non-comic Timon derives from the same critical space
as his attraction to the character of the wise fool: “The figure of the licensed fool resonates
so strongly with Shakespeare, because as a dramatist he claims and exercises the same right
to expose the inhuman strangeness of the social conventions … that constricted life in his
time,” and thus, “Timon’s utter misanthropic disenchantment with the world as it is
constitutes the most extreme instance of the attitude that ultimately animates all
Shakespeare’s drama.”85
As an example of this insight, gold, once the ultimate object of desire for its ability
to fund Timon’s maniacal giving, is now the deeply corrupt substance he uncovers from
the womb of the earth and which exemplifies his newfound position as outsider who sees
the arbitrariness of something previously naturally accepted:
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What is here?
Gold?....
Thus much of this will make
Black white, foul fair, wrong right,
……………………………………
Ha, you gods! Why this, what, this, you gods? Why, this
Will lug your priests and servants from your sides,
Pluck stout men’s pillows from below their heads.
This yellow slave
Will knit and break religions, bless th’accursed,
… place thieves,
And give them title, knee, and approbation
With senators on the bench. (4.3.25–38)

But Timon combines the mad wisdom of Hamlet with a sometimes over-the-top frenzy that
even exceeds Lear’s: he urges Alcibiades to make war on Athens and

Let not thy sword skip one.
Pity not honoured age for his white beard:
He is an usurer. Strike me the counterfeit matron;
It is her habit only that is honest,
Herself’s a bawd....
Put armour on thine ears and on thine eyes
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Whose proof nor yells of mothers, maids, nor babes,
Nor sight of priests in holy vestments bleeding,
Shall pierce a jot (4.3.110–126).

These violent images and intimations of complete annihilation keep the audience alienated
from Timon, but, ultimately, as much hate as Timon spews he is also “a lover of the truth,
and through his mad generalizations about mankind that love and truth somehow manage
to shine.”86 As evidence for this claim, Goddard cites the results of Timon’s railing against
the thieves—they reconsider their choices: “He’s almost charmed me from my profession
by persuading me to it” (4.3.443–44). In an updated version of Goddard’s argument, Ryan
sees a utopian vision embedded in the play, but one articulated “through negation rather
than affirmation,” through “Timon’s protracted howl of rage at a society shamelessly
inured to the heartless individualism that sacrifices the shared interests of its members to
rabid self-interest.”87
But Timon’s loss of his prior identity and his embrace of solitude also results in a
narcissistic, hysterical break, in which he adopts the role of a kind of obscene superego.
His newly constructed identity of Misanthropos relies entirely on the discourse of
invective, which actually demonstrates that he is still caught in the desperate cycle of
demand-desire-recognition, as before. Invective, as Burke writes in his essay on Timon, “is
a primary ‘freedom of speech,’ rooted extralinguistically in the helpless rage of an infant
that states its attitude by utterances wholly unbridled…. If rage is the infantile prototype of
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invective, it is a kind of ‘freedom’ that must soon be subjected to control, once articulacy
develops.”88 His invective, therefore, plays into the same dynamic as his earlier bounty,
but instead of recognition as “worthy Timon,” he demands it for the new identity of
Misanthropos. When Apemantus comes to visit Timon—both their solitudes positioned
against the presence of another person—Timon is confronted with the mirrored other that
he has in some sense based his new identity on: “Here is a dramatist’s perfect way of
embodying, by a wholly realistic altercation between two contestants, such a principle of
reflexivity as would prevail if Timon were to have fallen into fantastic quarrel with his
mirror-image, under conditions that allow it to answer back.”89
The two solitaries proceed to debate the nature of their respective identities.
Apemantus claims that Timon as Misanthropos “dost affect my manners” and that Timon’s
new self is “a nature but infected, / A poor unmanly melancholy sprung / From change of
fortune” (4.3.199–204). Nicholas Rowe (1674–1718) emended “infected” to “affected,”
which many editions, including Arden 3, still use, since it “picks up on Apemantus’ original
accusation … which the cynic then reiterates in what follows: Timon’s behaviour is an
act—he is playing a role. F’s reading [‘infected’] suggests merely that Timon has caught
the disease of his society.”90 This accusation of affectation, of performance, has some truth
in it, of course, but Timon’s break from his former identity is stronger than Apemantus
credits: he claims that if Timon had gold again he would immediately return to his prior
life; but we know that Timon does indeed possess wealth through the gold he has dug up,
and yet still chooses to remain the solitary, invective-spewing outsider.
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Again, there are elements of both Timon as narcissistic performer and Timon as
genuinely changed, uncompromising social critic. Timon and Apemantus move on from
this debate about the nature of Timon’s transformation to an aggressive, vindictive
misanthropy contest:

Timon: Would thou wert clean enough to spit upon.
Ap.: A plague on thee! Thou art too bad to curse.
Timon: All villains that do stand by thee are pure.
Ap.: There is no leprosy but what thou speak’st.
Timon: If I name thee. I’d beat thee, but I should infect my hands.
Ap.: I would my tongue could rot them off.
Timon: Away, thou issue of a mangy dog!...
Ap.: Would thou wouldst burst!
Timon: Away, thou tedious rogue!
[He throws a stone at APEMANTUS]
I am sorry I shall lose a stone by thee.
Ap.: Beast!
Timon: Slave!
Ap.: Toad!
Timon: Rogue, rogue, rogue! I am sick of this false world, and will love naught.
(4.3.351–68)
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In this mirrored debate / invective contest, the two solitaries exemplify the process of
identity formation: “The potential for display of aggressive behavior is increased as the
child, in his identifying with others, begins to take upon himself the desires manifested in
the others’ behavior. In modeling oneself on another, one is also modeling one’s desires on
those of the other, and the inevitable consequence of this is an aggressive rivalry between
the child and the other for the object desired by the other.”91 The desired object, in this
case, is solitude, but specifically a fantasy of solitude—autonomous, free from the need for
others, invested with meaning—that neither character is fully able to achieve. At the same
time, the performance of solitude, alongside all the bile and anger, serves an important
social function: exposing social contradictions, hypocrisies, and injustices, temporarily
lifting the collective ideological veil.
Invective, then, functions on multiple levels: trenchant, if venomous and hysterical,
social critique; the representation of Timon’s ultimate dependence on the other, his need
for recognition and his desire for but inability to actually be solitary; and as a quasicathartic release for the audience. If the language spoken by the solitary represents a
“‘freedom’ that must soon be subjected to control,” this gives “full expression to a desire
that is intrinsic to the nature of language, but that becomes variously suppressed by the
fears and proprieties that make up our ‘second nature.’”92 By watching Timon, we can
indulge in the violation of the suppression of desire, throwing propriety aside, and have our
fears and unspoken (even unspeakable) intimations aired, if ultimately attenuated and made
bearable by his ultimate erasure and the restoration of order in the figure of Alcibiades.
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Shakespeare’s treatment of solitude in this enigmatic play is particularly dark and
complex: in escaping ideology, in shedding symbolic and imaginary identities, the solitary
protagonist doesn’t find the pure, unfettered fulfillment and freedom of the self, the myth
of romantic solitude (who you “really” are); rather, the “real” of the fantasy is discovered
and confronted, and if not returning to (false) society, the hero seems only capable of selfannihilation:93 “So when we wish to attain in the subject what was before the serial
articulations of speech, and what is primordial to the birth of symbols, we find it in death,
from which his existence takes on all the meaning it has.”94 Or, “And nothing brings me
all things” (5.2.73), as Timon says. In the process, the audience can confront and
acknowledge their own communal anxieties and premonitions about the nature of what we
call reality, the falseness and deceit of others and yet our dependence on the other, the
constant ideological immersion, societies structured by arbitrary hierarchical distinctions
and codes of behavior; but through the annihilation of these solitary characters and the
supposed return to order in the plays’ conclusions—via Alcibiades, in this case—those
exposed anxieties can be blurred or repackaged. As with As You Like It, what is left behind?
A utopian aura, to use Grady’s term, here achieved via extreme negation: “Every tirade [of
Timon’s] vindicates ex negativo the ideals of equality, mutuality and community, and the
human potential to achieve them, that are betrayed by the organized enslavement of human
beings to the pursuit of profit by the few to the detriment of the many.”95
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Chapter 4. Mackenzie’s Apologia for Solitude: The Man of Letters versus the Man of
Action

Introduction
In 1665 an anonymous book was published in Edinburgh with the title A Moral Essay,
Preferring Solitude to Publick Employment, And all it’s Appendages; such as Fame,
Command, Riches, Pleasures, Conversation, &c. The book was reissued in 1666 with a
“cancel title”1 that contained the author’s name: George Mackenzie (1636/38–1691), a
prominent Scottish lawyer and politician, who became lord advocate in 1677. Most copies
of this edition were destroyed in the Great Fire of London, as indicated in a letter from
Abraham Cowley—an ardent devotee of the theme of solitude/retirement—to John Evelyn,
who authored a response to Mackenzie’s book in 1667: “Since I had the honour to receive
from you the reply to a book written in praise of a solitary life, I have sent all about town
in vain to get the author, having very much affection for the subject, which is one of the
noblest controversies both modern and ancient; and you have dealt so civilly with your
adversary, as makes him deserve to be looked after. But I could not meet with him, the
books being all, it seems, either burnt or bought up.”2
Mackenzie’s work, which has often been dismissed as impractical, “hedonist,”3 or
immoral, should instead be read as an important social critique, composed by someone who

1

Brian Vickers, ed., Public and Private Life in the Seventeenth Century: The MackenzieEvelyn Debate, facsimile edition, ix.
2
W. Bray (ed.), Diary and Correspondence of John Evelyn, 1:196; quoted in Vickers, ed.,
Public and Private Life, x.
3
Vickers, ed., Public and Private Life, xxii.
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was profoundly involved in public life, confronting the deep moral ambivalences of such
a life. The work is composed relatively early in Mackenzie’s career: he would go on to
become Scotland’s most articulate proponent of absolute monarchy, yet his work on
solitude reflects doubts and criticisms of the idea of sovereignty. Mackenzie posits a
rhetorical form of solitude that has great importance in the history of the concept: in the
genealogy of solitude, Rousseau is the immediate heir to works like Mackenzie’s.4 This
chapter will lay out and examine Mackenzie’s argument, followed by Evelyn’s rebuttal,
before looking closely at some details of Mackenzie’s life and political career, particularly
from 1660 to 1666—the early years of the Scottish Restoration and the years preceding
and coinciding with his tract on solitude. Political and social turmoil in Scotland are
essential to understanding the impulse behind Mackenzie’s discourse of solitude. I will also
read Mackenzie’s work alongside his involvement in the witchcraft persecutions that
plagued Scotland in the years preceding his publication of his tract on solitude, drawing
from Andrew Lang’s early twentieth-century biography of Mackenzie, which sets up a
narrative of an irreconcilable private versus public Mackenzie. I will then examine the
Mackenzie-Evelyn debate in the larger context of postwar English retirement poetry,
exemplified by Cowley.
The poetry and writing of rural retreat and solitude in the Restoration period has
been described as indicative of a “Restoration attitude” of Epicurean leisure, 5 and
Mackenzie’s work has been lumped into this category, of which Cowley is the most wellknown representative, along, ironically, with Evelyn, Mackenzie’s “opponent.” Maren-

4

Robert Sayre, Solitude in Society, 48–53.
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Ideal, 232.
5
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Sofie Røstvig has described the calm that swept over England after the Restoration: with a
“relaxation of tension came a fondness for leisured ease.”6 However, this depiction of
England cannot be extrapolated to Scotland: the years from 1660 to 1689 in Scotland were
filled with deadly and intractable conflicts between royal ministers and the Covenanters.7
It is this specifically Scottish post-Restoration environment that influences Mackenzie, not
the supposed dignified, aristocratic ease portrayed in England. This context, along with the
generic expectations of works on solitude, also helps to explain the seeming paradoxes of
the debate: Mackenzie, a Royalist, writes a tract that contains much criticism of the idea of
sovereignty; both Mackenzie and Evelyn argue the position that represents the opposite of
their personal commitments—Mackenzie the very public, active, ambitious figure, Evelyn
a practitioner of the gentlemanly solitude.
Mackenzie’s work—which has received scant scholarly attention despite the fact
that his debate with Evelyn “set the standard” in the period for discussions of solitude
versus society8—has either been dismissed as immoral or it has been relegated to a brief
mention as yet another example of the classically derived beatus ille tradition. This
tradition, so-named by Røstvig, was “originally created by Horace and Virgil on the basis
of partly Stoic and partly Epicurean ideas,” and “came to attract many European poets of
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.”9 However, as with the other authors examined

6

Ibid., 229.
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nobility, the lairds, the burghs and the kirk formed themselves into a committee known as
the Tables and produced a National Covenant that bound its signatories to resist
innovations in religion.” See Mark Kishlansky, A Monarchy Transformed, 138.
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in this dissertation—Montaigne, Sidney, Shakespeare—what makes Mackenzie’s work
interesting is in how it deviates from and complicates the various traditions (e.g., activelife–contemplative-life debates, beatus ille, country life vs. city life, Horatian retirement,
etc). Instead of only offering quasi-philosophical maxims, Mackenzie draws on the
retirement tradition to stage a stinging social critique, in the process of which he inverts
the notion of virtue (key to most humanist refutations of solitude, and indeed Evelyn’s)
from a public to a private notion. He develops a multifaceted strand of solitude that has at
its basis not the Epicurean luxury of which he was accused, but rather an impulse that is
both escapist and fundamentally ethical. First, there is a fantasy of solitude that serves as a
quietistic escape from the moral quandaries of public life through a rhetoric of inwardness
and communion with nature. Second, as a reaction to corruption, greed, factionalism, and
competition, there is the development of the idea of “community in solitude”10: in other
words, “one flees from the solitude of conflicting interests in society to the solitude of
community in rural retreat.”11 This is a form of individualism, I argue, that masks a longing
for the possibility of a genuine and humane community. Third, the classically derived
retirement genre allows a safe or undetected space to air controversial, even radical, ideas,
which could never be expressed in the author’s public, political life if he wanted to continue
to have a public, political life. In this sense, a treatise on solitude is, paradoxically, a form
of political engagement.

The Debate

This is the term that Beesemyer uses when discussing Robert Sayre’s thoughts on
Mackenzie’s text. See Bessemyer, “Crusoe the Isolato,” 89.
11
Robert Sayre, Solitude in Society, 47 (italics in original).
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Mackenzie’s work is dedicated to “The Right Honourable, John Earl of Crawford,” which
refers to John Lindsay, the Seventeenth Earl of Crawford (ca. 1598–1678). Lindsay was a
prominent Covenanter, but was deprived of his office when the Cromwell-backed
Covenanter regime in Edinburgh came to power, due to his prior involvement with the
Engagement, the secret 1647 negotiations between Charles I and Scottish commissioners
for a possible new alliance. Lindsay returned to public life in 1651, opposing “the
Cromwellian advance” and allying with Charles II. He was captured in Alyth in the same
year, and imprisoned in the Tower of London and then Windsor Castle until the Restoration
in 1660; he briefly returned to public life but retired in 1663 “rather than accept the revival
of episcopacy.”12 It is this solitary retirement from a very active public life that prompts
Mackenzie’s dedication. “That I should choose your Lordship for my Patron,” Mackenzie
writes, “is no act of virtue … for, being the best Pattern for solitary persons, ye were the
person who deserv’d most to be the Patron of solitude it self: especially, having oblieged
it so far, as to prefer it to that rival against which it now disputes for precedency; and
prefer’d it, after it’s adverse party had been your old acquaintance, and had offer’d to bribe
you … with a purse heavy enough to have weighed down a light spirit” (6).13 By declining
supposed riches and fame, by choosing privacy over publicity, Lindsay paradoxically
achieves true virtue: “But, though fame should not thus gratifie you, yet virtue (who hath
so few deserving followers now…) will recommend you to succeeding ages, both to let see
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Information in this paragraph from John R. Young, Oxford Dictionary of National
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All citations to Mackenzie’s and Evelyn’s books, which are printed together in the
facsimile edition cited above (Public and Private Life, ed. Vickers), will be given
parenthetically.
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that she wants not her Trophees even in this dotage of the world … and to engage others,
by this act of gratitude, to a dependence upon her” (8).
The virtue is paradoxical because in the ubiquitous Ciceronian ethos (or at least as
it was appropriated and developed in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century England), virtue
is entirely a result of public endeavor; Mackenzie attempts to transform it into the private
realm. In this sense, we have traveled back to Musidorus’s and Pyrocles’s debate on
solitariness and virtue in the Arcadia, where Musidorus insists that virtue is entirely
divorced from the private, solitary realm, while Pyrocles insists that his solitariness opens
him up to higher, loftier thoughts than public action does. We should remember that while
there was an aura of respect for contemplation and withdrawal centered around Ficino and
Neo-Platonic thought in the later fifteenth century (though it remained a minority view), in
England the debates were never “conceived … in Ficinian terms, between philosophical
mediation and the distractions of society, but in Ciceronian terms, between involvement
for the common good and selfish opting-out to pursue individual pleasure or profit.”14
Mackenzie, by contrast, is trying to make vulgar pleasure and personal profit the purview
of public not private life. Lindsay, for Mackenzie, demonstrates the superior ethical choice
of rejecting both fame and riches for a personal and private sense of morality/virtue. This
is why, in defending public life and public virtue, Evelyn, as noted in his title (Publick
employment and an active life prefer’d to solitude, and all its appanages, such as fame,
command, riches, conversation, &c…), must also defend “fame” and “riches.”
Mackenzie’s treatise is addressed to an imaginary character named Celador, and he
tells Celador that the purpose of his book is in “paralleling greatness and solitude, as to
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their moral advantages” (10). This notion of “greatness,” and of what it means to be
esteemed a great man—usually a ruler—is the central point of division between Mackenzie
and Evelyn. “In ballancing the employements of Solitude, with these of greatness,”
Mackenzie turns to ambition as a quality of the latter. Ambition infects minor courtiers and
officials who desire nothing more than higher position and favor with no other motive than
to have others beneath them. They are willing to “run over” their neighbor for preferment
(11, 19). It also infects legendary rulers and their thirst for conquest: “Did the conquest of
all that the Sun sees, restrain, Alexander from weeping, because he could conquer no more?
No. For, Ambition is like hunger, which though it is once satisfied, continues no longer so,
then it hath for a little time prey’d upon what was at first presented to it” (19–20). Later,
Mackenzie again makes reference to Alexander, remarking that he spent his time “running
like a mad man up and down the world, and killing every man who would not call him
master” (116). What solitude offers in contrast to ambition, “greatness,” and the violence
it engenders, is a “virtuous inactivity” (27):15 this is an important phrase, as “inactivity” in
this period is almost by definition something that cannot be “virtuous.” Mackenzie places
the two terms together, representative not of the “sloth” of which he will inevitably be
accused, but rather of a moral abstention from acquisitive, self-interested politics.
The critique of ambition and greed, as well as the suspicion of the hypocrisy latent
in the constant invocation of the Ciceronian injunction to public life, are reminiscent of
Montaigne’s opening to “On Solitude”:

The 1665 editions prints this as “virtuous in activity,” a telling typo that converts the
meaning of the phrase entirely.
15
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And as for that fine adage used as a cloak by greed and ambition, “That we are not
born for ourselves alone but for the common weal,” let us venture to refer to those
who have joined in the dance: let them bare their consciences and confess whether
rank, office and all the bustling business of the world are not sought on the contrary
to gain private profit from the common weal. The evil methods which men use to
get ahead in our century clearly show that their aims cannot be worth much.
Let us retort to ambition that she herself gives us a taste for solitude, for
does she shun anything more than fellowship?16

Montaigne, like Mackenzie, turns acquisitiveness and the relentless drive for profit into a
product of public life, though solitaries were accused of such greed and selfishness. He
sees ambition and the drive for greatness as “cloaks” for selfish and unsavory motives; and
he charges that it is not the solitary but the ambitious man who ruptures fellowship and
community. This will also be a crucial point for Mackenzie, and it points to the idea that
the desire for solitude/withdrawal and a community within the self may actually speak to
a desire for a lost community, a kind of utopian impulse that is deflected and then sought
in the self.
In contrast to the interpretation of ambition that permeates Montaigne’s and
Mackenzie’s works stands not only Evelyn, but Cowley’s first biographer, Thomas Sprat,
who ultimately disapproved of Cowley’s withdrawal from public life and blamed lack of
ambition for the poet’s deteriorating health in solitude. While Cowley’s epitaph captures
his desired self-image, “Here, Passenger, beneath this Shed, / Lies COWLEY, tho
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entomb’d, not dead; / Yet freed from human Toil and Strife, / … / Who in his Poverty is
neat, / And even in Retirement, Great,” Sprat’s rendering presents the predominant
moralized reading and reminds us what kind of censure the proponent of solitude, whether
actual (in Cowley’s case) or more purely rhetorical (in Mackenzie’s), would face:

Who can here, Sir, forbear exclaiming on the weak hopes, and frail condition of
humane Nature? For as long as Mr. Cowley was pursuing the course of Ambition,
in active life, which he scarce esteem’d his true life; he never wanted a constant
health and strength of body: But as soon as ever he had found an opportunity of
beginning indeed to live … his contentment was first broken by sickness, and at
last his death was occasion’d by his very delight in the Country and the Fields,
which he had long fancied above all other Pleasures.17

As Vickers points out, the prevailing notion in England, as exemplified by Robert Burton’s
warning, “Be not solitary, be not idle,”18 and derived primarily from De Officiis, was that
solitude essentially lead to death: when Cicero’s “ideology of civic altruism was taken into
social thinking, was interiorized, became a norm, it sometimes resulted in violent
disapproval of what was then seen as socially deviant behavior. Cicero had condemned the
life of solitude as being certain to lead to death.”19

Røstvig, The Happy Man, 212–13. See Thomas Sprat, “An Account of the Life and
Writings of Mr. Abraham Cowley,” in The Works of Mr. Abraham Cowley, 7th ed., 1700.
18
Vickers, ed., Public and Private Life, xviii.
19
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For Evelyn, “great men” and rich men are good, benevolent, and virtuous, and this
view earns him praise as “a vigorous proponent of virtue” whose “sense of economic
reality, and the benefits of the circulation of money, shows [his] superior practicality and
grasp of the world.”20 Mackenzie sees something else in the ethics of being a great man
and in the realm of commerce and wealth: the inherently corrupting desire to have control
over others: “The satisfaction received in commanding others, is admir’d as one of the
ravishing advantages of publick Employment: And the soul of man in this, seems to have
retain’d still a false appetite of being like to it’s [sic] Maker” (68). To fuel this desire,
human bonds and basic ethics are sacrificed: “Have ye not seen great men forc’d to
abandon their most deserving friends, forc’d to connive at, and oft to congratulate the
promotion of their greatest enemies? will they not be sometimes oblieg’d to put on a
constrain’d countenance, feign an unnatural mine, and express what is diametrically
opposit to their thoughts; all which are servitudes which greatness exacts from us” (28).
This breakdown of bonds and community through what “greatness exacts” eventually
“destroyes … reason” and creates “restraints” on human freedom: “So they are against
virtue, in being opposite to what our reason would … exact of us” (28). Again, virtue here
is divorced from the realm of greatness/politics, which for Mackenzie is about rapacious
self-interest. It is ironic that in a tract on solitude, the active life is lamented for its lacking
in genuine friendship and human connection. As Mackenzie writes, “albeit society were to
be valued at the rate imagin’d, yet solitary persons injoy more the sweets of society, than
great men do: for in all addresses to these, the addressers consider only what is fit for their
private interest, and little else is added, besides the dropping of a flattering expression or
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two” (69). This is one of the few times, as Irene Beesemyer notes, that Mackenzie engages
the paradox of “community in solitude,” or “that man’s soul comprises a vast world
within,” echoing a distinctly Montaignean “back-shop solitude” of drawing into oneself to
attain what a dishonest, corrupt, factional, war-torn society has failed to provide.21
What emerges from Mackenzie’s analysis of so-called great men is the sense of an
endless cycle of futility, violence, and self-interest, with little if no sense of a common
good. He establishes this theme using ancient examples, and then segues from that
immediately into the recent Civil Wars in England and Scotland:

Not only amongst rivals, one of two pretenders satisfie, by their fall, the rage of
fate, but when it hath assisted the one to destroy the other, it then turns it’s fury
against the late victor: Thus Pompey and Cesar’s blood purpul’d equally the swords
of murderers, agreeing in nothing but their destiny. Hannibal beats the Romans;
Scipio beats Hannibal, and the Romans banish Scipio. Bellisarius makes Gilimer
King of the Goths ridiculous … and Fate renders Bellisarius yet more ridiculous,
driving him to beg, with this expression, bestow but a farthing upon Bellisarius.
And it is most observable, that during our civil wars, four most eminent persons,
who did head contrary, as well as different parties, did all loss both their heads, and

Beesemyer, “Crusoe the Isolato,” 89. For Beesemyer, there is a direct line from
Mackenzie to Robinson Crusoe: “It seems to me Defoe picked up on Mackenzie’s unusual
notion of community and solitude along with the subsequent argument that man’s soul
comprises a vast world within, and in Robinson Crusoe wove these two threads into a
representation of community within the self, with conversations ‘among’ the selves.’” Ibid.
For Montaigne’s advice to “set aside a room … at the back of the shop,” see Montaigne,
“On Solitude,” 270; for the use of the phrase “back-shop solitude,” of course derived from
Montaigne, see Beesemyer, “Crusoe the Isolato,” 95.
21
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their fortunes in the quarrel; whereas it might have been expected, that at least one
of the opposits, should have worn unfadeing lawrels (43–44).

The only thing that seems assured from the machinations of great men is mutual
destruction, and, of course, ensuing chaos for ordinary people. The dream of the “unfadeing
lawrel” causes only anguish.
Mackenzie’s focus in his critique of greatness is often specifically on sovereigns,
or even the idea of sovereignty, a fascinating paradox for someone who pragmatically
became a staunch Royalist. If a society is founded “upon the favour of a Prince, if in a
Monarchy; and then ye must confess them oft-times subject to all the caprices of a lofty
humour, licenc’d by the extent of his power, to equal his power and his humour; and
entic’d, by the instigation of enemies or rivals, to stretch his humour beyond his allowed
power” (40). When sovereigns fall to ruin or are killed due to their abuses of power, those
who succeed them tell themselves they will be different, that it is a matter of individual
character and not a systemic failure: “And albeit others are not deter’d from embracing
those honours under which their first owners have been crush’d upon the account, that they
imagine their Predecessors ruine to have flow’d from some personal frailty or error, against
which they are confident they can guard” (35). However, the correct conclusion,
Mackenzie contends, is that it is the idea of greatness itself that corrupts, that encourages
sovereigns to err, overreach, betray their duty, and thirst for even more power.
We might recall that in Gonzalo’s famous utopian speech in The Tempest, derived
from Montaigne’s “Of the Caniballes,” the ideal society imagined relies on there being “No
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sovereignty,” to which Sebastian quips, “Yet he would be king on’t.”22 This is, of course,
a much-debated speech, but it has been argued by Kiernan Ryan and others that both the
positing of a utopia without a sovereign as well as Gonzalo’s self-contradiction in being
unable to truly envision a society without one, forms the central point: “The main point of
the entire exchange is irreducible, however, to … [an] endorsement of either party at the
expense of the other. Its main point is not that the creation of a genuine commonwealth of
truly ‘innocent people’ … is impossible, but that the fundamental obstacle to its creation is
sovereignty.”23 Ryan also points out that this critique of sovereignty, which morphs into a
critique of greed, is in sync with the viewpoint of Raphael Hythloday in Thomas More’s
Utopia, a text that participates in the tradition that Mackenzie and Evelyn are engaging.
For Hythloday, “When I consider and weigh in my mind all these commonwealths which
nowadays anywhere do flourish, so God help me, I can perceive nothing but a certain
conspiracy of rich men procuring their own commodities under the name and title of
commonwealth. They invent and devise all means and crafts, first how to keep safely
without fear of losing that they have unjustly gathered together.”24 Hythloday’s is a
summary with which Mackenzie—or at least the authorial figure behind A Moral Essay,
Preferring Solitude—would no doubt agree, given his critique of sovereigns, riches, and
greatness.
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While for a contemporary of More’s or Shakespeare’s, the idea of a society not
governed by a sovereign is almost impossible to conceive (as in “the latter end” of
Gonzalo’s commonwealth forgetting “the beginning,” or even the fact that More’s Utopia
was founded by King Utopus),25 and while in these texts and others, such as King Lear,
“one can discern a direct subterranean link to the English Revolution and the execution of
‘the great image of authority’ in the sovereign shape of Charles I,”26 no such mental barrier
or foreshadowing exists for Mackenzie: he writes from the vantage point of 1665, sixteen
years after the execution of Charles I, and five years after the Restoration. The discourse
on solitude that Mackenzie’s work embodies is one that, couched in some of the standard
rhetoric of retirement literature, allows a safe space to express not only unconventional,
but radical opinions. In contrast to the muddled moral situations and shifting allegiances of
political life, solitude is pure, uncompromised, an escape from realpolitik. This fantasy of
escape is complemented by a fantasy of radicalism and disobedience, expressed through
the language of social critique and satire.
Mackenzie’s book contains a brief section on the “Motives to solitude from
religion”: the devotional aspect of pro-solitude tracts, particularly those English examples
that draw on Petrarch’s De vita solitaria, is a very important one, as, for example, in Samuel
Daniel’s The Prayse of Private Life (ca. 1605).27 The devotional section in Mackenzie’s
work, however, feels strangely perfunctory; it begins thirty-six pages into the book and
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opens with a somewhat anxious explanation for why it has not come earlier: “Seeing as of
all other things, so of our thoughts the first-born should be sacrificed to our almighty
Maker; I therefore resolved, to begin my first discourse with these reflections…. But, since
Orators recommend the last place in our discourse, to the strongest perswasives … I shall
therefore in this last place … recommend to you, to consider, that God possesses more
excellencies … than can be fully contemplated” (45). Despite the claim here, the devotional
section is not the “last place” in the discourse—it begins on Mackenzie’s page 37 and
continues to page 49; the treatise then continues to page 112. Clearly Mackenzie’s focus is
elsewhere—a secular critique of greatness and supposed virtue—but a defense of solitude
simply cannot exist without a section trumping its conduciveness to religious devotion and
contemplation.
The devotional section seems designed to counter the charges of hedonism that
nonetheless were (and still are) leveled at Mackenzie. Elsewhere he takes pains to
distinguish the kinds of pleasures he thinks should be sought in solitude. While solitude is
more pleasurable than public life, pleasure is “an act of the fancy, and consequently of the
soul,” and thus it is “contemplation,” and not “sensual pleasures” that “arise from exterior
objects,” that one pursues in solitude (81–82). Mackenzie’s central point in his religious
section involves the benefits of solitude for devotion, shifting from secular to religious
contemplation: “solitude is the true forge of the purest devotions” (51). He invokes a quasiRomantic communion with nature, particularly mountaintops, and cites biblical figures,
such as Moses on Sinai, who were called away from “the populous camp” (49). If such an
escape into nature is not available, then the closet will serve: “God Almighty, who because
he is the object as well as enjoyner of our devotions … hath commanded us to retire into
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our Closets (the most solitary of all our rooms) and to make these yet more retired, hath
ordained us to close our doors behind us when we make any religious applications to him”
(50–51). But there is the concern, Mackenzie concedes, that God seemingly did not desire
man to be alone. Mackenzie uses society’s corruption as a way out of this impasse: “It was
I confess Gods own verdict of man, that it was not good for him to be alone, but this was
when because of his congenial innocence, he needed not fear the contamination of society;
but to demonstrat what the hazard of being in company is: even Adam could not live one
day in it, and live innocent, for the first news we hear of him, after that Eve was associat to
him, is, that he had forefeited that native purity” (48). While this comment participates in
the conventional misogynistic representation of Eden, in which Eve acts as the corrupter
of pure Adam, it also allegorically expresses the breaking down of both religious and civic
community through corruption and internecine conflict, here uniting with the secular
argument of the treatise.
According to Robert Sayre (discussed especially in chapter 3 in relation to As You
Like It), a work such as Mackenzie’s must be seen in the sociopolitical context of the
development of a society where the “competition of each individual against all others,
following their private interest, is the general rule” and “the impersonal and antagonistic
relationship of exchange constitutes the basic network of bonds in the social fabric”: in
other words, “human relations become ‘reified’” and the consequence is the realization that
society is structured around “illusory communities” that are in fact only based on selfinterest.28 Mackenzie, of course, participates in a tradition that arises from classical
literature; however, “an ‘influence’ … can never in itself explain its adoption at a given
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moment nor the specific configuration it is given. A classical motif is adopted only when
it corresponds to the needs of a new social situation.”29 If the seventeenth-century theme
of retreat is in part a “revolt against the conditions of a new social order,” a withdrawal,
rhetorical or literal, “from a society based on competition, antagonism, self-interest,” then
it can manifest itself as a “search for lost community.” However, “the theme of retreat to
solitude is often informed with the ideology of the order it spurns; it is in many cases itself
an expression of the new individualism…. The new community is not exterior … but the
interior ‘crowd’ within oneself. The solitary is himself a community; he communes with
his ideas and his readings.”30 This is what Sayre means when he says that Mackenzie
undertakes the paradox of “community in solitude,” which he sees as representative of the
“far limits of solitude” in the period—a kind of implicit acknowledgment of the “solitude
within society,” a variant of Marxist theories of alienation that become prevalent in
nineteenth- and twentieth-century literature.31
In Sayre’s framework, Mackenzie’s work reflects a kind of nascent awareness of
the larger social and economic forces that made the search for community in solitude an
important motif, and represents a symptom of a supposed bourgeois individualism.
However, it’s important to note that Mackenzie actively uses the tradition of apologias for
solitude as a vehicle for a social critique of the self-interest that Sayre sees as the catalyst
for retreat or the desire for retreat. We see this, for example, in his relentless satire of
competition: “not only do the enemies of a fallen Grandee insult over his misfortunes, but
even these who were his former well-wishers, are (to avert the jealousie of those who
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occasioned his fall) necessitate to enveigh most bitterly against his memory” (37). While
Sayre claims to offer a historical context for what has otherwise been treated as a
philosophical universal—solitude/alienation as existential angst, the universal condition of
mankind, etc.—it is important to acknowledge more specific historical contexts than the
increased development of a rapacious, commerce-based, self-interested society, namely,
the traumas and factionalism in the wake of the Civil Wars.
As part of his critique of the illusory nature of power, Mackenzie makes specific
reference to the late protectorate: “And to convince us, that power and command conceals
what strength and energie there is really in the Governours wit, reflect but a little upon
those pitifull rebels, who govern’d lately this Countrey, and did seem most wise, whilst
they were vested with power: Of which, being now again devested, their wit falls far short
of the first cast” (64). And, aside from explicit invocations of “pitifull rebels” who were
“vested with power,” other moments in Mackenzie’s text, particularly those that allude to
internecine conflicts, whether within a family or a country, seem to recall recent history:
“A private man is not oblieged to oppose his Relations, fight against his Country, give his
own Judgement the lye; all which are but the meanest impositions that some Princes lay
upon greatness: and why should men purchase, at so dear a rate, the liberty to serve others,
which is all that greatness can bestow?” (71). This passage, in its pointing out the paradox
of fighting for so-called liberty in order to be servile, also reflects another consistent thread
throughout Mackenzie’s work: the absurdity of social customs and even hierarchies. In this
sense, Mackenzie adopts the position of the satirical outsider dispassionately viewing a
performance: “I know no securer box, from which to behold it, then a state of solitude …
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in contemplating the reelings of the multitude, the excentrick motions of great men, and
how fate recreats it self in their ruine” (90).

Evelyn’s response to Mackenzie, Publick Employment and an Active Life Prefer’d to
Solitude … In Reply to a late Ingenious Essay of a contrary Title, has been described as a
“devastatingly skilful rejoinder rejecting Mackenzie’s showy elevation of leisure over
business,” and as a “decisive refutation.”32 This assessment of the debate is undoubtedly
true, insofar as it is read on an entirely literal level, and without consideration of the
historical and political contexts of Mackenzie’s work. Evelyn engagingly distills the main
humanist arguments for the active life, drawing from the standard sources such as Cicero
and Plutarch, despite his disingenuous statement that “On the other side, it must be granted,
that he [Mackenzie] has all the Topics and Discourses of almost all the Philosophers who
ever writ” (134). Though Evelyn’s argument is more susceptible to critique than has been
allowed (discussed further below), from a practical, literal point of view—e.g., if everyone
were solitary who would serve as doctors? Who would provide material necessities or run
a country? Wouldn’t endless leisure alone get boring?—he successfully undercuts
Mackenzie’s side of the debate. One might ask, however, why does reading these texts in
such a literal fashion seem to be the only option? Yes, it is a “debate,” but Mackenzie’s
work was written as a stand-alone book, a literary and rhetorical exercise in defending
solitude.

Clare Jackson, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, s.v. “Mackenzie, Sir George”;
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In responding to Mackenzie’s criticism of hierarchy and social custom—“What can
it advantage any man that another bows to him? It can neither cure Gout nor Gravel” (70)—
Brian Vickers uses Falstaff’s catechism on honor as a counterpart—“Can honour set a
leg?... Or take away the grief of a wound,” etc.—writing, “the answer to Falstaff is that
only medicine will cure a wound, or alleviate the gavel, and that neither respect nor honour
are to be blamed for not so doing.”33 But is this really the answer to Falstaff? Is the speech
not so famous rather because it makes a larger point, whether ultimately defensible or not,
about blindly pursuing what society calls honor, the inherent violence of honor, the “bubble
reputation”?
Evelyn goes on to demonstrate the pitfalls and impracticalities of complete
withdrawal and solitude, especially if undertaken as a common practice throughout a
society: “The Commonwealth is an assembly regulated by active Laws, maintain’d by
Commerce, disciplin’d by Vertue, cultivated by Arts, which would fall to universal
confusion and solitude indeed, without continual care and publick intendency” (150). His
main argumentative strategy is to tie solitude to sloth (e.g., “this despising of glory is the
mother of sloth” [144]) and virtue to public activity, a standard English-humanist
appropriation of Ciceronian precepts. And, again traditionally, a Christian justification for
the public life complements and overlays the classical: man should imitate God, which
does not entail that one “sit still and do nothing” (including, presumably, the tradition of
religious contemplation), since God is “always so full of Employment, that the most
accurate Definers of him, stile him to be Actus purus, to denote his eternal and
incomprehensible activity…. The lives of Great Persons should resemble that of the Gods,
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who delight in such actions as proceed from beneficence” (138–39). Here and elsewhere
Evelyn betrays his reverence for and belief in (as least as espoused by the authorial persona
of this particular work) the fundamental ethical goodness of “great men,” which, as we
have seen, is in stark contrast to Mackenzie’s analysis of the powerful and ambitious.
Evelyn goes on to argue that while solitaries claim to be shunning ambition and
fame, they actually rather hypocritically desire it; their solitude is ostentatious and “lie[s]
concealed too apparently; since it does but proclaim a desire of being observed” (142).
There is an echo here of Timon’s critique of Apemantus’s solitude and later Apemantus’s
critique of Timon’s solitude from Timon of Athens: solitude can be about pride, about a
showy, affected, public display of being solitary. Evelyn also links solitude to melancholy,
“the basest of humors” (153), and echoes Robert Burton’s Anatomy of Melancholy, in
which isolation leads to extreme inactivity and ultimately death: “Be not solitary, be not
idle,” Burton writes.34 Most people who withdraw into solitude, Evelyn contends, find an
empty and unhappy life: “for little do solitary persons profit, without a mind adapted for
it; Wise men only enjoy themselves, not the voluptuous or morose” (180); without the
pursuit of virtue, inherently public for Evelyn, without erudite conversation, “Men must …
come under the Category of brutes, to have no appetites besides eating and drinking; no
passions, save the sensual” (167).
Another important argument against solitude that Evelyn employs is the “shameful
abdication of Princes” (159): disaster, he claims, ensues when great men or leaders
abdicate and retire to solitude. Such withdrawal has the effect of radically destabilizing a
country and upsetting hierarchy and order. Literary-critical opinion of early modern history
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has taken this sentiment to be the uncontested dominant view, and thus Evelyn appears to
make an irrefutable point from the perspective of a contemporary reader. Support for these
assertions often reference abdications or tendencies toward seclusion in fictional rulers,
such as Sidney’s Basilius or Shakespeare’s Lear or Prospero, as further evidence of the
status quo position. However, as Richard Strier has demonstrated, the issue is not as
straightforward as the commentary leads one to believe. In his reading of King Lear in
Resistant Structures, Strier uses a historicist argument to debunk “the assumption … that
the division and abdication are the great mistakes from which the tragic action flows,”
which of course “is one of the most well-entrenched assumptions in Shakespeare
scholarship…. The ‘scholarly’ assumptions that division of a kingdom and abdication
would necessarily have been perceived as disastrous mistakes by an early seventeenthcentury audience are among those ‘truths’ that hardly need proving anymore.” Strier
contends that both the play’s internal logic and contemporary political thought on the
history of Europe “does not support the normal view.”35 As part of his evidence supporting
this claim, Strier points to the very famous and well-known example of Charles V:
“Historically, the most famous case of a reigning monarch … abdicating his throne in order
‘To shake all Cares and Businesse from [his] Age’ … was a spectacular success. Charles
V, the most powerful ruler by far in sixteenth-century Europe, retired to a monastery and
passed the kingship of Spain to his absent son … with no problem whatever.”36 And, in
fact, Mackenzie, in his pro-solitude argument, explicitly mentions Charles V’s example
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(18, 49). Thus, the difference between Evelyn and Mackenzie on this matter is less a clearcut debate victory for Evelyn than it otherwise seems from the (few) critical assessments
of the debate.

A fascinating twist to the Mackenzie-Evelyn debate is that each author argues for the
position that seems to contradict his actual life. Mackenzie was a busy, well-known, and
active lawyer and politician (not yet perhaps famous in 1665, when he authored his treatise,
but well on his way), as well as an author (his Aretina, or, The Serious Romance [1660] is
often referred to as the first Scottish novel). Evelyn, on the other hand, was a famous
proponent of gentlemanly solitude. Writing to Cowley in 1667, he explains that his answer
to Mackenzie does not necessarily spring from his deepest convictions:

You had reason to be astonished at the presumption, not to name it affront, that I
who have so highly celebrated recesse, and envied it in others, should become an
advocate for the enemie, which of all others it abhors and flees from. I conjure you
to believe that I am still of the same mind, & that there is no person alive who dos
more honor and breathe after the life and repose you so happily cultivate and adorne
by your example: But as those who prays’d dirt, a flea, and the gowte, so have I
Publiq Employment in that trifling Essay, and that in so weake a style compar’d to
my antagonists, as by that alone it will appeare I neither was nor could be serious;
and I hope you will believe I speake my very soul to you.37
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Some of this is conventional modesty topos, but Evelyn’s commitment to retirement can
also be seen in his 1659 plan for a lay monastery, a place to pursue “a sober, godly, and
scientific life.”38 Further, in Evelyn’s diary there are testimonies to his personal taste for
solitude and in his interest in private rooms and gardens: he writes that he has “built … a
study, made a fishpond, Iland and some other solitudes & retirements at Wotton.”39 In “The
Garden” (a short essay followed by a Pindaric ode), Cowley, trying to give up worldly
ambition and live a retired, rural life, praises Evelyn for realizing the ideal: “All that I my
self am able yet to do, is only to recommend to Mankind the search of that Felicity, which
you instruct them how to Find and to Enjoy.”40 In his letter to Cowley, Evelyn claims that
it is in his professions of loving solitude, not in his defense of public life, that he speaks
his “very soul”: the debate with Mackenzie, then, belongs to the tradition of paradox.
But aside from the academic-debate tradition of paradox, each treatise also
represents a fantasy of sorts. For Evelyn, his defense of public life is a fantasy that virtue
in the end wins out, and thus powerful figures and rulers are ethical, honest, and only with
the good of the commonwealth in mind. Consider his remembrances of Charles I:

With what constancy, spirit, and resignation did our Royal Martyr unjustly suffer
… is not certainly to be parallel’d by any thing posterity has recorded, save that
grand Exemplar our blessed Saviour…. Tell me yet you admirers of solitude, in
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what corner of your Recesses dwelt there a more excellent soul?... Where was there
a more sincere man in his actions? a more constant devote[e] to his Religion?...
Look on him then as a King … and all that a good and a most vertuous Prince can
be to his subjects, and you have the pourtraicture of our Charles opposed to all the
petty Images of your solitary Gentlemen” (182–84).

Furthermore, Evelyn’s fantasy is that commerce and money do not breed greed, ruthless
competition, rampant self-interest, but a healthy, harmonious society; therefore, there is
nothing untoward for the solitary to escape, and he indulges only his own ego and sloth
and voluptuousness. It is, in other words, a fantasy that the status quo works, that we can
trust in the post-Restoration powers ruling justly, just as Charles I had before his execution.
It also represents a difference in medium between diary/letters and a published treatise—
the difference between a private and public persona.

Mackenzie’s Career
For Mackenzie, the fantasy of solitude is multifaceted. A look at his career and the deep
ambivalences and contradictions that shape his reputation helps us to understand the appeal
of solitude and the kind of cathartic release of social critique, particularly one focused on
a critique of “greatness.” Much later in his career, in 1684, Mackenzie “produced what has
subsequently been acclaimed as ‘the most powerfully argued of all seventeenth-century
expositions of the theory of absolute monarchy’”:41 in many ways, his tract on solitude is
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anomalous, deviant even. What is the motivation behind such unorthodox, and seemingly
out-of-character, positions?
After the Restoration, Mackenzie was readmitted to the Edinburgh Faculty of
Advocates (those who are licensed to appear as advocates in Scottish courts),42 and in 1661
occurred “the first great event of his public life,” when he served as counsel for the First
Marquis of Argyll, who was accused of high treason.43 Mackenzie’s defense, though
unsuccessful, has been deemed “courageous” by posterity: “Aware that an argument ‘might
escape us which might be interpreted in itself as treason’…, Mackenzie nevertheless
contended that, with no Act of Indemnity passed in Scotland, regarding Argyll’s former
compliance as perfidious established a dangerous precedent, since all Scots had been
‘forc’d to be the idle Witnesses’ of the usurpation, even by paying Cromwellian taxes.”44
Mackenzie “had a hopeless cause to plead…. His sympathy was clearly with his client. In
defending Argyll he pointed out to the Parliament … that the new Indemnity for Scotland
has not yet been issued, and that, if they condemned Argyll for ‘compliance’ they made a
dangerous precedent against themselves, for all had, at one time or another, ‘complied’ and
been in Argyll’s situation.”45 Argyll had taken leadership of the Covenanters in the Civil
War, and while Mackenzie passionately defended him, his politics were not aligned with
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“covenanted Presbyterianism”46—in fact, much later he was to become the Covenanters’
mortal enemy. But at some personal and professional risk, Mackenzie seems to have taken
a principled stand in an effort to move past factionalism and the continuing enmities over
the Civil Wars. In the end, however, Argyll was executed, his head placed on a spike at the
Old Tolbooth of Edinburgh.
In Scotland between 1661 and 1662, more than 650 people were accused of
witchcraft, a zealous frenzy of superstition and hysteria that resulted in scores of executions
by burning. Witches and the rhetoric of witchcraft paranoia served Royalist interests:
“Discussion of witchcraft and supernatural phenomena permeated all levels of lateseventeenth century Scottish culture…. Living under a monarch whose authority was
widely regarded as being of divine ordinance, witches represented ‘the perfect antagonists’
in terms of their perceived ability to exert supernatural powers to the detriment of the
commonwealth.” As a result, “agents of Charles II’s divinely-endowed authority … were
thus entrusted with eliminating such demonic threats.”47 Mackenzie was one of those
charged with this task. But witchcraft paranoia didn’t just serve Royalist ends, but also
Presbyterian/Covenanting ones: “From a radical presbyterian perspective, however, the
language of late seventeenth century witchcraft also supplied a powerful rhetorical tool,
since it was constructed around ‘the Scottish idiom of covenant-making and covenant-
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breaking.’… Scottish political theory coincided neatly with political theology to ensure
that committed presbyterians thereby regarded the toleration of erastian prelacy as a
‘diabolical form of covenant-breaking.’”48 Mackenzie’s deep skepticism toward these
witchcraft accusations put him in a lonely position.
Mackenzie, as a poorly paid justice-depute, was involved in the trials,
demonstrating sympathy for the usually elderly and poor so-called witches, and “disturbed
by the ways in which he believed ‘poor Innocents die in Multitudes by an unworthy
Martyrdom, and Burning comes in fashion,’ and he therefore insisted on the strictest
degrees of judicial rigour and impartiality.”49 Judges, he laments, “burn persons by the
thousands as guilty of this crime,” and “the accused are usually poor ignorant creatures.”50
However, Mackenzie and the other justice deputes in these witchcraft trials were “promised
a share of ‘the fines and escheats’ of prisoners found guilty” in order to “stimulate [their]
zeal.” In Lang’s sympathetic, though not uncritical, account, “This was a premium upon
severity, but Mackenzie saved as many as he could of the unfortunate men and women
whom he pitied; and it seems probable that he … did much to abate the frenzy for accusing
people of sorcery.”51
Such an offer—essentially, money in order to find people guilty—for someone in
the “almost unpaid office of Justice Depute,” and someone with lofty political ambitions,
represents a moral quandary: such quandaries, in fact, would become the story of
Mackenzie’s career, and he didn’t always acquit himself with the reputation for intellectual
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courage that he did in the witch trials. And even in these witch trials, “in a certain kind of
cases,” he supports convictions, such as when the accused “are proved to have exercised
‘sympathetic magic,’ … by burning or pricking puppets taken to represent persons whom
they are proved to hold in hatred. Here we have the evil intention.” However, “tales of
metamorphosis and other silly stories Mackenzie inclines to regard as purely impossible.
As far as he dared, he counteracted the baneful superstitions fostered by the clergy in
England and Scotland.”52 He left the office of justice depute in 1653, lamenting that some
of the cases he tried “went against his conscience.”53 For Clare Jackson, while Mackenzie
refused entirely to deny witchcraft’s existence, he was “particularly suspicious of the
virtually assured convictions produced in trials conducted on Privy Council commission”
and he “argued that it was only through rigorous and impartial judicial investigation into
each case … that ignorance could be overcome. The alternative of resorting ‘to kill one
another, because we cannot comprehend the reason of what each other do,’ he deplored as
‘the effect of a terrible distraction.’”54 Such a position represented a strategy of trying to
“transcend ecclesiastical controversy through abstract moral rationalism” and “espous[ing]
an essentially non-doctrinal religiosity to escape the constraints of creedal warfare.”55
With the backdrop of recurring religious and political sectarianism, Mackenzie, in
1663, wrote Religio stoici (Relgion of a Stoic), which addressed “the Fanatics of All Sects
and Sorts” and “The madcap zealots of this bigot age.” The tract argued against religious
persecution, making the case that no theological idea is so secure that it “justifies so much

52

Ibid., 44.
Ibid., 46.
54
Jackson, Restoration Scotland, 190.
55
Ibid.
53

187
violence in such things. Are we not ready to condemn to-day, as fanatic, what yesterday
was judged jure divino. And do not even those who persecuted others for their opinions,
admire why they should be, on that score, persecuted themselves?”56 In the conflict
between Episcopists and Presbyterians, the former associated with Charles II and state
laws, the latter with the Covenanters, Mackenzie chooses the former, believing that “ruin
… came from Knoxian ideas, and from clerical pretensions”: “As every private Christian
should be tolerated by his fellow subjects to worship God inwardly according to his
conscience, so should all conspire to that exterior uniformity of worship which the laws of
his country enjoin.”57 In this work, Mackenzie’s future troubles with the Covenanters can
be glimpsed: for Mackenzie, the zealousness of the Covenanters “supposes our most
merciful God to be of the same temper with these pagan deities, who desired to have their
altars gored with blood.”58
In 1666, as advocate for Dundee, Mackenzie participated in prosecutions resulting
from the Pentland Rising, a village rebellion of Covenanters against soldiers who were
mistreating an elderly man accused of defaulting on a fine for not attending governmentmandated church services. While marching toward Edinburgh, the Covenanters clashed
with soldiers near the Pentland Hills: many were killed, and over a hundred taken prisoner,
most of whom were subsequently executed. Mackenzie’s “Bluidy” epithet was earned later,
when, as a member of Scottish Parliament from Ross-shire, and having “gradually
relinquished his role as opposition defender of popular liberties,” he undertook “vigorous
prosecution of prominent covenanters”: “the extremist covenanter Richard Cargill
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‘excommunicated’ Mackenzie from ‘the true Church’ for his ‘constant pleading against,
and persecuting to death, the people of God,’ as well as for his ‘ungodly, erroneous,
phantastic, and blasphemous tenets, printed to the world in his pamphlets and pasquils.’”59
Mackenzie’s own religious inclination has been described as ecumenical, but with an
increasing emphasis on outward conformity; his belief in absolute royal authority also
increased throughout his life. His political and prosecutorial actions were undertaken, he
claimed, with the sole goal of “civil peace.”60
Lang’s biography of Mackenzie is structured around the contrast of character versus
career: it hypothesizes a privately ethical and introspective person caught up in the moral
entanglements of public life—a “clash between Mackenzie’s bon naturel … and his
environment.”61 The division in Mackenzie’s reputation between principled advocate and
bloody persecutor can be seen in the remembrances of him in Walter Scott’s Tales of a
Grandfather. At one point Scott quotes a passage from Mackenzie that illustrates “the great
Advocate’s pity for the most pitiable class of mortals, the women accused, tortured, led to
the stake by the parish minister, and burned among the curses of the populace for the crime
of witchcraft.” In another passage, Davie Deans, in rejecting someone as advocate who is
related to Mackenzie, refers to, “a man that has the blood of the Saints at his fingers’ ends?
Didna his uncle die and gang to his place wi’ the name of Bluidy Mackenzie? and winna
he be kenned by that name sae lang as there’s a Scot tongue to speak the word?”62
Ultimately, Lang concludes, Mackenzie can only be described by antitheses and paradox:
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“The man remembered as a ruthless oppressor had a heart full of pity for the poor, and
pleaded earnestly for the practice of Christian Socialism. He who strove to compel the …
Presbyterians to ‘make the laws of the country their creed,’ … heartily applauded the most
eccentrically aberrant wanderers from the fold of the Church, the Quakers.”63 Mackenzie
emerges as a man who ultimately “acted against the grain of his character,” again
highlighting a disconnect between private morality and public action, or between the “man
of letters”—the authorial self—and the “man of action.”64

Cowley and “beatus ille” versus Mackenzie
Treason stemming from earlier actions against Charles I, rampant witchcraft persecutions
and gruesome executions, the resurfacing of intractable religious and monarchical conflict:
these are the various moral and political issues that dominate Mackenzie’s career and life
up to 1665. A dream of solitude, then, is hardly surprising. Mackenzie’s prospects of
becoming a powerful public figure inevitably involve a mixture of moral compromises,
opportunism, a hopeless desire for peace, principles conflicting with self-interest, ethically
muddled or ambivalent options. Solitude, by contrast, is idealized as clear and pure, free
from the constant machinations and shifting allegiances and battles of conscience. It is an
escape from realpolitik into a realm of learning, the cultivation of the self, rural tranquility,
and peace. And yet this escapist vision of solitude, while certainly part of Mackenzie’s
treatise, is not the dominant feature of the work: the articulation of the beatus ille tradition
takes a back seat to a sustained social critique in the vein of the solitary outsider.
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Cowley was among the most enthusiastic proponents of the beatus ille tradition and
of rural retirement. We can get a sense of its tone and objectives, in contrast to Mackenzie
(despite his often being lumped into the tradition), from looking at some of Cowley’s odes
and translations, which often praised rural simplicity and evoked a quasi-pastoral
contentment:65

With how much joy does he beneath some shade
By aged Trees reve’rend embraces made,
His carless head on the fresh Green recline,
His head uncharg’d with Fear or with Design?
By him a River constantly complains,
The Birds above rejoice with vari’ous strains,
And in the solemn Scene their Orgies keep
Like Dreams mixt with the Gravity of sleep,
Sleep which does always there for entrance wait,
And nought within against it shuts the Gate.66

Røstvig argues for a rather strict separation between rural odes (Cowley’s dominant form
was the Pindaric ode) and pastoral, in contrast, for example, to Renato Poggioli, who
examines “the pastoral of solitude” and “the pastoral of self” through lyrics such as
Marvell’s “The Garden.” See Poggioli, The Oaten Flute, chapters 8 and 9. Røstvig claims
that “the rural ode is realistic, while the pastoral idealises; the one describes a real Sabine
farm, the other an Arcadian never-never-land…. The … motif … which identifies the rural
scene with the Golden Age, was particularly apt to cause generic confusion.” See Røstvig,
The Happy Man, 46–47. There seems to be more generic slippage here than Røstvig allows;
and, of course, solitude is important to both pastoral and beatus ille poems.
66
Cowley, The Complete Works, 2:324.
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This is part of a translation/adaption of Horace’s second epode (which beings “Beatus
ille”); Cowley’s invention lies in the details of the scene under the tree, adding a “softness”
and harmony to the moment.67 As Røstvig points out, Horace’s poem has a satirical bent,
since the praise of rural bliss and simplicity is given by a usurer, and “Horace ends his
poem by showing how the usurer’s love of money after all prevails over his theoretical
insight into the nature of human happiness.” Cowley, by contrast, eliminates the satirical
ending and retains only the praise of rural bliss.68
In Cowley’s poem on solitude, which supplements his essay “Of Solitude,” he
formulates a similar sense of ease and contentment in nature—though not wild, untamed
nature, but that of the “Country Houses and Retreat”:

Here let me, careless and unthoughtful lying,
Hear the soft Winds above me flying,
With all their wanton Boughs dispute,
And the more tuneful Birds to both replying,
Nor be myself too mute.

As Silver Stream shall roll his Waters near,
Gilt with the sun-beams here and there;
On whose enamell’d Bank I’ll walk,
And see how prettily they smile, and hear
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How prettily they talk.69

Cowley’s “Of Solitude” goes “beyond the classical idea in insisting on complete
retirement,”70 among the deep peace and tranquility of communion with nature. As with
Mackenzie, there is an element of escape from politics and worldliness, but for Cowley it
is more about escape from failure and disappointment, “and subsequent determination to
seek happiness in obscurity.”71 As mentioned above, he dedicates his poem “The Garden”
to Evelyn, admiring him for choosing solitude among books and gardens over “empty
shows and senceless noys,” the goal of which solitude is “full choice of thine own
Happiness.”72 Cowley includes “a carefully qualified statement in favour of Epicurus,”
“the most important garden philosopher of Antiquity”:73

When Epicurus to the World had taught,
That pleasure was the chiefest good,
(And was perhaps i’th’ right, if rightly understood)
His life he to his Doctrine brought,
And in a Gardens shade that Sovereign Pleasure sought.
Whoever a true Epicure would be,
May there find cheap and virtuous Luxurie.74
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Cowley, The Complete Works, 2:318.
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Cowley, The Complete Works, 2:327; see Røstvig, The Happy Man, 218.
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The emphasis is strictly on pleasure and contentment, though we also find the attempt to
appropriate and redefine “virtue,” as in Mackenzie: here “virtuous Luxurie,” in Mackenzie,
“virtuous inactivity.” Cowley’s use of the word sovereign is also interesting: while
meaning it in the sense of “a person or thing which excels or surpasses others of the kind,”75
it of course is redolent of supremacy, authority, and the sovereign himself—in other words,
the “sovereign pleasure” one obtains in solitary retirement depends on separation from the
political world of power and sovereigns.
There are moments in Mackenzie’s treatise that gesture to the peace and tranquility
of solitary retirement in nature, a fantasy of quietistic withdrawal away from moral
ambivalence and ethical compromise. “If we would view the various faces of the sky but
one day,” Mackenzie writes, “we would perceive more of variety in those, more of
excellent colours and various motions, then in ten thousand such trifles as these [in the city
or court]. Consider but the beauty of one tulip, and it’s several freckles; the motion of one
Bird, and it’s several wheelings; the shapes of several worms, and their different crawlings;
and ye will find task enough, and more variety there, then a City can afford” (87–88). Like
Cowley, Mackenzie uses the pathetic fallacy in painting the ideal picture of solitude: “Here
the levelling … trees, lay their heads together, to protect such as seek shelter under their
well-cloath’d branches: and the Cristal-streams run slowly and turn many windings, as if
by that and their quiet murmurings, they would express an unwillingness to leave so
pleasant a field” (113). Cowley’s “Silver Stream” becomes Mackenzie’s “Cristal-streams,”
in this bucolic life of ease and careless contemplation, where sleep comes easily,
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untormented by self-doubt and internal conflict.
Røstvig, in painting a portrait of “the happy Epicurean” as one strand of her “happy
man” type, emphasizes the Epicurean aspects of Mackenzie’s text.76 For example, she
points to Mackenzie’s take on the issue of contemplation, which “would have shocked the
Stoic moralist”: Mackenzie writes, “Contemplation does often drive our souls into extasies,
and is so charming, that is may be rather said to ravish then please” (82). For Røstvig, “the
terms used (‘charming,’ ‘ravish’ ‘please’) are characteristic of the Restoration attitude.
Contemplation, no longer a duty but a pleasure, is praised in terms usually applied to a
mistress.”77 At the same time, for those who, like Mackenzie, “scorned both the reeling
multitude and the scheming politicians the garden of Epicurus, or the Lucretian pinnacle,
became the logical refuge.”78 Two points should be made here. While Røstvig’s analysis
of the Epicurean tendency is no doubt correct, that tendency comprises a relatively
miniscule portion of Mackenzie’s text: this is not a Lipsian discourse on gardens or an
extended Epicurean fantasy.79 Second, Røstvig traces this strain of solitude/retirement,
embodied by Cowley but supposedly shared by Mackenzie, to what she sees as the
newfound calm that sweeps over England after the Restoration: “The reaction of the
English nation in 1660 was largely caused by the feeling that a period of fear and insecurity
was at an end. With the re-establishment of the old regime something of the order long

Vickers does the same: e.g., Mackenzie’s work’s “chief end is pleasure.” See Vickers,
ed., Public and Private Life, xxii.
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Justus Lipsius’s De Constantia (1584) contains a long garden interlude, and “in view of
the popularity and wide diffusion of Concerning Constancy, it is not improbable that much
of the garden poetry of the seventeenth century … was written with Lipsius’ garden
interlude in mind.” See Lipsius, Concerning Constancy, ed. R. V. Young, xxiii.
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vanished again returned to the English scene…. The influence of this turning of the tides
was necessarily profound. With the general relaxation of tension came a fondness for
leisured ease, and the dimpled god of the bacchanalian love feast entered into the landscape
of retirement.”80
Whatever the validity of this interpretation of England, the Restoration in Scotland
was anything but a return of order or a “relaxation of tension”: thus, Mackenzie’s treatise
is a work of angst, not a work of bacchanalian ease and peace of mind. As outlined above,
the years from 1660 to 1689 in Scotland, until the government of William of Orange, were
defined by bitter and deadly conflicts between the ministers of Charles II and James II, on
the one hand, and the Covenanters, on the other. As Mackenzie’s early twentieth-century
biographer Andrew Lang writes,

The struggle of the Restoration was a struggle to impose Episcopacy on one side,
and to restore Presbytery on the other…. English visitors to Scotland during the
Restoration, could no more understand … what the trouble was about. The
Confession of Faith of 1560 was still the standard of the Church, the worship in the
churches seemed identical … with that of the Presbyterian meeting-houses in
England. English tourists asked why there were risings, murders, hangings, and
torture, all about nothing?81

Ultimately, Mackenzie’s career and legacy comes to be largely defined by this post-
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Restoration conflict, earning him the moniker “Bluidy Mackenzie,” for his treatment of the
Covenanters. A deep irony, then, is the dedication of his 1665 treatise on solitude to a
prominent Covenanter, John Lindsay, Seventeenth Earl of Crawford: the work on solitude
articulates a hope of moving beyond the conflicts and moral shortcomings that would end
up defining his legacy.
None of this is to offer an apologia or condemnation of Mackenzie: rather, these
conflicts, self-divisions, and moral ambiguities all speak to his particular rendition of the
solitude trope. A desire for escape into something uncontaminated and unambiguous is
easily understood: it arises not from peace and tranquility after the Restoration, but rather
from turmoil, from blood, from endless conflict. The social critique that comprises the
majority of the treatise also has a personal element to it. Mackenzie offers an attack on the
moral hazards of ambition as someone who harbored deep and lofty ambitions and had
already navigated (or succumbed) to those hazards. In Lang’s words, Mackenzie was of
“an ambitious nature,” and some wish “he had gone back to his books and his garden….
In the use of judicial torture he acted against the grain of his character,” which was “rather
that of a man of letters than a man of action.”82 The book on solitude embodies this selfdivision: it is written by the man letters against the man of action. The radicalism of his
critique, safely embedded within a classically derived genre and popular topic of debate,
expresses a disgust and disillusionment with both the forces he fought against and the
forces he served. Solitude became a means not just to dream of escape, but to engage radical
ideas that delegitimized contemporary society, while conjuring the seemingly unattainable
desire for an alternative, ideal community, which is paradoxically represented by
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community in solitude.
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